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by Armando Liwanag
Wednesday, Sep. 14, 2011 at 6:45 PM
Revisionism is the systematic revision of and deviation from
Marxism, the basic revolutionary principles of the proletariat
laid down by Marx and Engels and further developed by the series
of thinkers and leaders in socialist revolution and construction.
The revisionists call themselves Marxists, even claim to make an
updated and creative application of Marxism but they do so
essentially to sugarcoat the bourgeois antiproletarian and
anti-Marxist ideas that they propagate.
1975-mao-nixon-mao-zedong-ford-kissinger-cpp-ndfp.jpgcbwqre.jpg, image/jpeg, 318x505
The classical revisionists who dominated the Second International in 1912 were in social-democratic parties that acted as tails to bourgeois regimes and supported the war budgets of the capitalist countries in Europe. They denied the revolutionary essence of Marxism and the necessity of proletarian dictatorship, engaged in bourgeois reformism and social pacifism and supported colonialism and modern imperialism. Lenin stood firmly against the classical revisionists, defended Marxism and led the Bolsheviks in establishing the first socialist state in 1917.
The modern revisionists were in the ruling communist parties in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. They systematically revised the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism by denying the continuing existence of exploiting classes and class struggle and the proletarian character of the party and the state in socialist society. And they proceeded to destroy the proletarian party and the socialist state from within. They masqueraded as communists even as they gave up Marxist-Leninist principles. They attacked Stalin in order to replace the principles of Lenin with the discredited fallacies of his social democratic opponents and claimed to make a "creative application" of Marxism-Leninism.
The total collapse of the revisionist ruling parties and regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, has made it so much easier than before for Marxist-Leninists to sum up the emergence and development of socialism and the peaceful evolution of socialism into capitalism through modern revisionism. It is necessary to trace the entire historical trajectory and draw the correct lessons in the face of the ceaseless efforts of the detractors of Marxism-Leninism to sow ideological and political confusion within the ranks of the revolutionary movement.
Among the most common lines of attack are the following: "genuine" socialism never came into existence; if socialism ever existed, it was afflicted with or distorted by the "curse" of "Stalinism", which could never be exorcised by his anti-Stalin successors and therefore Stalin was responsible even for the anti-Stalin regimes after his death; and socialism existed up to 1989 or 1991 and was never overpowered by modern revisionism before then or that modern revisionism never existed and it was an irremediably "flawed" socialism that fell in 1989-1991.
There are, of course, continuities as well as discontinuities from the Stalin to the post-Stalin periods. But social science demands that a leader be held responsible mainly for the period of his leadership. The main responsibility of Gorbachov for his own period of leadership should not be shifted to Stalin just as that of Marcos, for example, cannot be shifted to Quezon. It is necessary to trace the continuities between the Stalin and the post-Stalin regimes. And it is also necessary to recognize the discontinuities, especially because the post-Stalin regimes were anti-Stalin in character. In the face of the efforts of the imperialists, the revisionists and the unremoulded petty bourgeois to explain everything in anti-Stalin terms and to condemn the essential principles and the entire lot of Marxism-Leninism, there is a strong reason and necessity to recognize the sharp differences between the Stalin and post-Stalin regimes. The phenomenon of modern revisionism deserves attention, if we are to explain the blatant restoration of capitalism and bourgeois dictatorship in 1989-91.
After his death, the positive achievements of Stalin (such as the socialist construction, the defense of the Soviet Union, the high rate of growth of the Soviet economy, the social guarantees, etc.) continued for a considerable while. So were his errors continued and exaggerated by his successors up to the point of discontinuing socialism. We refer to the denial of the existence and the resurgence of the exploiting classes and class struggle in Soviet society; and the unhindered propagation of the petty-bourgeois mode of thinking and the growth of the bureaucratism of the monopoly bureaucrat bourgeoisie in command of the great mass of petty-bourgeois bureaucrats.
From the Khrushchov period through the long Brezhnev period to the Gorbachov period, the dominant revisionist idea was that the working class had achieved its historic tasks and that it was time for the Soviet leaders and experts in the state and ruling party to depart from the proletarian stand. The ghost of Stalin was blamed for bureaucratism and other ills. But in fact, the modern revisionists promoted these on their own account and in the interest of a growing bureaucratic bourgeoisie. The general run of new intelligentsia and bureaucrats was petty bourgeois-minded and provided the social base for the monopoly bureaucrat bourgeoisie. In the face of the collapse of the revisionist ruling parties and regimes, there is in fact cause for the Party to celebrate the vindication of its Marxist-Leninist, antirevisionist line. The correctness of this line is confirmed by the total bankruptcy and collapse of the revisionist ruling parties, especially the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the chief disseminator of modern revisionism on a world scale since 1956. It is clearly proven that the modern revisionist line means the disguised restoration of capitalism over a long period of time and ultimately leads to the undisguised restoration of capitalism and bourgeois dictatorship. The supraclass sloganeering of the petty bourgeoisie has been the sugarcoating for the antiproletarian ideas of the big bourgeoisie in the Soviet state and party.
In the Philippines, the political group that is most embarrassed, discredited and orphaned by the collapse of the revisionist ruling parties and regimes is that of the Lavas and their successors. It is certainly not the Communist Party of the Philippines, reestablished in 1968. But the imperialists, the bourgeois mass media and certain other quarters wish to confuse the situation and try to mock at and shame the Party for the disintegration of the revisionist ruling parties and regimes. They are barking at the wrong tree.
There are elements who have been hoodwinked by such catchphrases of Gorbachovite propaganda as "socialist renewal", "perestroika", "glasnost" and "new thinking" and who have refused to recognize the facts and the truth about the Gorbachovite swindle even after 1989, the year when modern revisionism started to give way to the open and blatant restoration of capitalism and bourgeois dictatorship. There are a handful of elements within the Party who continue to follow the already proven anticommunist, antisocialist and pseudodemocratic example of Gorbachov and who question and attack the vanguard role of the working class through the Party, democratic centralism, the essentials of the revolutionary movement, and the socialist future of the Philippine revolutionary movement. Their line is aimed at nothing less than the negation of the basic principles of the Party and therefore the liquidation of the Party.
I. The Party's Marxist-Leninist Stand Against Modern Revisionism
The proletarian revolutionary cadres of the Party who have continuously adhered to the Marxist-Leninist stand against modern revisionism and have closely followed the developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe since the early 1960s are not surprised by the flagrant antisocialist and antidemocratic outcome of modern revisionism. The Party should never forget that its founding proletarian revolutionary cadres had been able to work with the remnants of the old merger Party of the Communist and Socialist parties since early 1963 only for so long as there was common agreement that the resumption of the anti-imperialist and antifeudal mass struggle meant the resumption of the new-democratic revolution through revolutionary armed struggle and that the old merger party would adhere to the revolutionary essence of Marxism-Leninism and reject the Khrushchovite revisionist line of bourgeois populism and pacifism and the subsequent Khrushchovism without Khrushchov of the Brezhnev regime.
So, in April 1967 when the Lava revisionist renegades violated the common agreement and ignored the Executive Committee that had been formed in 1963, it became necessary to lay the ground for the reestablishment of the Party as a proletarian revolutionary party. Everyone can refer to the diametrically opposed proclamations of the proletarian revolutionaries and the Lava revisionist renegades which were disseminated in the Philippines and published respectively in Peking (Beijing) Review and the Prague Information Bulletin within the first week of May 1967.
The reestablishment of the Party on the theoretical foundation of Marxism-Leninism on December 26, 1968 necessarily meant the criticism and repudiation of all the subjectivist and opportunist errors of the Lava revisionist group and the modern revisionism practised and propagated by this group domestically and by one Soviet ruling clique after another internationally.
The criticism and repudiation of modern revisionism are a fundamental component of the reestablishment and rebuilding of the Party and are inscribed in the basic document of rectification, "Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party" and the Program and Constitution of the Party. These documents have remained valid and effective. No leading organ of the CPP has ever had the power and the reason to reverse or reject the criticism and repudiation of modern revisionism by the Congress of Reestablishment in 1968.
In the late 1970s, the Party decided to expand the international relations of the revolutionary movement in addition to the Party's relations with Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations abroad. The international representative of the National Democratic Front began to explore possibilities for the NDF to act like the Palestinian Liberation Organization, African National Congress and other national liberation movements in expanding friendly and diplomatic relations with all forces abroad that are willing to extend moral and material support to the Philippine revolutionary struggle on any major issue and to whatever extent. This line in external relations was in consonance with the Marxist-Leninist stand of the Party and the international united front against imperialism.
In 1983, a definite proposal to the Central Committee came up that the NDF or any of its member organizations vigorously seek friendly relations with the ruling parties in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as well as with parties and movements closely associated with the CPSU. However, this proposal was laid aside in favor of the counterproposal made by the international liaison department (ILD) of the Party Central Committee that the Party rather than the NDF explore and seek "fraternal" relations with the ruling parties of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and other related parties.
Veering Away from the Antirevisionist Line
This counterproposal disregarded the fact that the Lava revisionist group had already preempted our Party from the possibility of "fraternal" relations with the revisionist ruling parties. More significantly, the counterproposal did not take into serious consideration the Marxist-Leninist stand of the Party against modern revisionism.
Notwithstanding the ill-informed and unprincipled basis for seeking "fraternal" relations with the revisionist ruling parties and the absence of any congress withdrawing the correct antirevisionist line, the staff organ in charge of international relations proceeded in 1984 to draft and circulate a policy paper, "The Present World Situation and the CPP's General International Line and Policies" describing the CPSU as a Marxist-Leninist party, the Soviet Union as the most developed socialist country and as proletarian internationalist rather than social-imperialist, as having supported third world liberation movements and as having attained military parity with the United States. This policy paper was presented to the 1985 Central Committee Plenum and the latter decided to conduct further studies on it.
In 1986, the Executive Committee of the Central Committee commissioned a study of the Soviet Union and East European countries. The study was superficial. It was done to support the predetermined conclusion that these countries were socialist because their economies were still dominated by state-owned enterprises and these enterprises were still growing and because the state still provided social guarantees to the people. The study overlooked the fact that the ruling party in command of the economy was no longer genuinely proletarian and that state-owned enterprises since the time of Khrushchov had already become milking cows of corrupt bureaucrats and private entrepreneurs who colluded under various pretexts to redirect the products to the "free" (private) market.
By this time, the attempt to deviate from the antirevisionist line of the Party was clearly linked to the erroneous idea that total victory in the Philippine revolution could be hastened by "regularizing" the few thousands of NPA fighters with importations of heavy weapons and other logistical requisites from abroad, by skipping stages in the development of people's war and in building the people's army and by arousing the forces for armed urban insurrection in anticipation of some sudden "turn in the situation" to mount a general uprising.
There was the notion that the further development of the people's army and the people's war depended on the importation of heavy weapons and getting logistical support from abroad and that the failure to import these would mean the stagnation or retrogression of the revolutionary forces because there is no other way by which the NPA could overcome the enemy's "blockhouse" warfare and control of the highways except through the use of sophisticated heavy weapons (antitank and laser-guided missiles) which necessarily have to be imported from abroad.
In the second half of 1986, with the approval of the Party's central leadership, a drive was started to seek the establishment of "fraternal" relations with the CPSU and other revisionist ruling parties as well as nonruling ones close to the CPSU. A considerable amount of resources was allotted to and expended on the project.
In late 1986, some Brezhnevites within the CPSU and some other quarters made the suggestion that the Communist Party of the Philippines merge with the Lava revisionist group in order to gain "fraternal" relations with the CPSU. But such a suggestion was tactfully rejected with the countersuggestion that the CPSU and other revisionist ruling parties could keep their fraternal relations with the Lava group while the CPP could have friendly relations with them. We stood pat on the Leninist line of proletarian party-building.
Up to 1987 the failure to establish relations with the revisionist ruling parties was interpreted by some elements as the result of the refusal on the part of our Party to repudiate its antirevisionist line. These elements had to be reminded in easily understood practical terms that if the antirevisionist line of the Party had been withdrawn and the revisionist ruling parties would continue to rebuff our offer of "fraternal" or friendly relations with them, then the proposed opportunism would be utterly damaging to the Party.
By 1987, the Party became aware that the Gorbachov regime was already laying the ground for the emasculation of the revisionist ruling parties in favor of an openly bourgeois state machinery in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe by allowing his advisors, officials of the Academy of Social Sciences and the official as well as independent Soviet mass media to promote pro-imperialist, anticommunist and antisocialist ideas under the guise of social democracy and "liberal" communism. On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, Gorbachov himself delivered a speech abandoning the anti-imperialist struggle and describing imperialism as having shed off its violent character in an integral world in which the Soviet Union and the United States and other countries can cooperate in the common interest of humanity's survival.
In 1987, the chairman of the Party's Central Committee made an extensive interview on the question of establishing relations with the ruling parties of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and elsewhere. This was made in response to the demand from some quarters within the Party that the Party repudiate its line against revisionism and apologize to the CPSU for having criticized the Soviet Union on the question of Cambodia and Afghanistan. The interview clarified that the Party can establish friendly relations with the ruling parties even while the latter maintained their "fraternal" relations with the Lava group.
Failed Efforts at Establishing Relations
In June 1988, the "World Situation and Our Line" was issued to replace "The Present World Situation and the CPP's General International Line and Policies". The correct and positive side of the new document reiterated the principles of national integrity, independence, equality noninterference and mutual support and mutual benefit to guide the Party's international relations; and upheld the basic principles of socialism, anti-imperialism and proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence as a diplomatic policy. Furthermore, it noted and warned against the unhealthy trends of cynicism, anticommunism, nationalism, consumerism, superstition, criminality and the like already running rampant in the countries ruled by the revisionist parties.
The negative side included accepting at face value and endorsing the catchphrases of Gorbachov; describing the revisionist regimes as socialist under a "lowered" definition; and diplomatic avoidance of the antirevisionist terms of the Party.
In the course of trying to establish friendly relations with the revisionist ruling parties in 1987 and onward, Party representatives were able to discern that Gorbachov and his revisionist followers were reorganizing these parties towards their eventual weakening and dissolution. Despite Gorbachov's avowed line of allowing the other East European ruling parties to decide matters for themselves, Soviet agents pushed these parties to reorganize themselves by replacing Brezhnevite holdovers at various levels with Gorbachovites and subsequently paralyzed the Party organizations. However, it would be in 1989 that it became clear without any doubt that all the revisionist ruling parties and regimes were on the path of self-disintegration, blatant restoration of capitalism and bourgeois dictatorship under the slogans of "multiparty democracy" and "economic reforms".
It is correct for the Party to seek friendly relations with any foreign party or movement on the basis of anti-imperialism. But it is wrong to go into any "fraternal" relations involving the repudiation of the Party's Marxist-Leninist stand against modern revisionism.
In this regard, we must be self-critical for wavering or temporarily veering away from the Party's antirevisionist line and engaging in a futile expedition. The motivation was to seek greater material and moral support for the Filipino people's revolutionary struggle. Although such motivation is good, it can only mitigate but cannot completely excuse the departure from the correct line. The error is a major one but it can be rectified through education far more easily than other errors unless ideological confusion over the developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is allowed to continue. Most comrades assigned to do international work were merely following the wrong line from above.
The worst damage caused by the unconsummated and belated flirtation with the revisionist ruling parties in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is not so much the waste of effort and resources but in the circulation of incorrect ideas, such as that these parties were still socialist and that the availability or nonavailability of material assistance from them, especially heavy weapons, would spell the advance or stagnation and retrogression of the Philippine revolutionary movement. It should be pointed out that the Lava group had the best of relations with these parties since the sixties but this domestic revisionist group never amounted to anything more than being an inconsequential toady of Soviet foreign policy and the Marcos regime.
At this point, the central leadership and entirety of the Party must renew their resolve to adhere to Marxism-Leninism and to the antirevisionist line. We are in a period which requires profound and farsighted conviction in the new democratic revolution as well as the socialist revolution. This is a period comparable to that when the classical revisionist parties disintegrated and it seemed as if socialism had become a futile dream and the world seemed to be merely a helpless object of imperialist oppression and exploitation. But that period was exactly the eve of socialist revolution.
II. The Legacy of Lenin and Stalin
The red flag of the Soviet Union has been brought down. The czarist flag of Russia now flies over the Kremlin. It may only be a matter of time that the body of the great Lenin is removed from its mausoleum in the Red Square, unless Russia's new bourgeoisie continue to regard it as a lucrative tourist attraction for visitors with hard foreign currency.
The Soviet modern revisionists, from Khrushchov to Gorbachov, had invoked the name of Lenin to attack Stalin. But in fact, the total negation of Stalin was but the spearhead of the total negation of Lenin and Leninism, socialism, the Soviet Union and the entire course of Bolshevik and Soviet history. The bourgeoisie in the former Soviet Union was not satisfied with anything less than the open restoration of capitalism and the imposition of the class dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.
It is necessary to refresh ourselves on the legacy of Lenin and Stalin in the face of concerted attempts by the imperialists, the modern revisionists, the barefaced restorationists of capitalism and the anticommunist bourgeois intelligentsia to slander and discredit it. The greatness of Lenin lies in having further developed the three components of the theory of Marxism: philosophy, political economy and scientific socialism. Lenin is the great master of Marxism in the era of modern imperialism and proletarian revolution.
He delved further into dialectical materialism, pointed to the unity of opposites as the most fundamental law of material reality and transformation and contended most extensively and profoundly with the so-called "third force" subjectivist philosophy (empirio-criticism). He analyzed modern imperialism and put forward the theory of uneven development, which elucidated the possibility of socialist revolution at the weakest point of the world capitalist system. He elaborated on the Marxist theory of state and revolution. He stood firmly for proletarian class struggle and proletarian dictatorship against the classical revisionists and actually led the first successful socialist revolution.
The ideas of Lenin were tested in debates within the Second International and within the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP). The proletarian revolutionary line that he and his Bolshevik comrades espoused proved to be correct and victorious in contention with various bourgeois ideas and formations that competed for hegemony in the struggle against czarist autocracy.
We speak of the socialist revolution as beginning on November 7, 1917 because it was on that day that the people under the leadership of the proletariat through the Bolshevik party seized political power from the bourgeoisie. It was at that point that the proletarian dictatorship was established. For this, Lenin is considered the great founder of Soviet socialism. Proletarian dictatorship is the first requisite for building socialism. Without this power, socialist revolution cannot be undertaken. By this power, Lenin was able to decree the nationalization of the land and capital assets of the exploiting classes and take over the commanding heights of the economy.
Proletarian class dictatorship is but another expression for the state power necessary for smashing and replacing the state power or class dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, for carrying out the all-rounded socialist revolution and for preventing the counterrevolutionaries from regaining control over society.
Proletarian dictatorship is at the same time proletarian democracy and democracy for the entire people, especially the toiling masses of workers and peasants. Without the exercise of proletarian dictatorship against their class enemies, the proletariat and the people cannot enjoy democracy among themselves. Proletarian dictatorship is the fruit of the highest form of democratic action-the revolutionary process that topples the bourgeois dictatorship. It is the guarantor of democracy among the people against domestic and external class enemies, the local exploiting classes and the imperialists.
The Bolsheviks were victorious because they resolutely established and defended the proletarian class dictatorship. They had learned their lessons well from the failure of the Paris Commune of 1871 and from the reformism and treason of the social democratic parties in the Second International.
Wielding proletarian dictatorship, the Bolsheviks disbanded in January 1918 the Constituent Assembly that had been elected after the October Revolution but was dominated by the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, because that assembly refused to ratify the Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People. The Bolsheviks subsequently banned the bourgeois parties because these parties engaged in counterrevolutionary violence and civil war against the proletariat and collaborated with the foreign interventionists. In his lifetime, Lenin led the Soviet proletariat and people and the soviets of workers, peasants and soldiers to victory in the civil war and the war against the interventionist powers from 1918 to 1921. He consolidated the Soviet Union as a federal union of socialist republics and built the congresses of soviets and the nationalities. As a proletarian internationalist, he established the Third International and set forth the anti-imperialist line for the world proletariat and all oppressed nations and peoples.
In 1922 he proclaimed the New Economic Policy as a transitory measure for reviving the economy from the devastation of war in the quickest possible way and remedying the problem of "war communism" which had involved requisitioning and rationing under conditions of war, devastation and scarcity. Under the new policy, the small entrepreneurs and rich peasants were allowed to engage freely in private production and to market their products.
The Record of Stalin
Lenin died in 1924. He did not live long enough to see the start of fullscale socialist economic construction. This was undertaken by his successor and faithful follower Stalin. He carried it out in accordance with the teachings of Marx, Engels and Lenin: proletarian dictatorship and mass mobilization, public ownership of the means of production, economic planning, industrialization, collectivization and mechanization of agriculture, full employment and social guarantees, free education at all levels, expanding social services and the rising standard of living.
But before the socialist economic construction could be started in 1929 with the first five-year economic plan, Stalin continued Lenin's New Economic Policy and had to contend with and defeat the Left Opposition headed by Trotsky who espoused the wrong line that socialism in one country was impossible and that the workers in Western Europe (especially in Germany) had to succeed first in armed uprisings and that rapid industrialization had to be undertaken immediately at the expense of the peasantry.
Stalin won out with his line of socialism in one country and in defending the worker-peasant alliance. If Trotsky had his way, he would have destroyed the chances for Soviet socialism by provoking the capitalist powers, by breaking up the worker-peasant alliance and by spreading pessimism in the absence of any victorious armed uprisings in Western Europe.
When it was time to put socialist economic construction in full swing, the Right opposition headed by Bukharin emerged to argue for the continuation of the New Economic Policy and oppose Soviet industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture. If Bukharin had had his way, the Soviet Union would not have been able to build a socialist society with a comprehensive industrial base and a mechanized and collectivized agriculture and provide its people with a higher standard of living; and would have enlarged the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois nationalists in the various republics and become an easier prey to Nazi Germany whose leader Hitler made no secret of his plans against the Soviet Union.
The first five-year economic plan was indeed characterized by severe difficulties due to the following: the limited industrial base to start with in a sea of agrarian conditions, the continuing effects of the war, the economic and political sanctions of the capitalist powers, the constant threat of foreign military intervention, the burdensome role of the pioneer and the violent reaction of the rich peasants who refused to put their farms, tools and work animals under collectivization, slaughtered their work animals and organized resistance. But after the first five-year economic plan, there was popular jubilation over the establishment of heavy and basic industries. To the relief of the peasantry there was considerable mechanization of agriculture, especially in the form of tractor stations. There was marked improvement in the standard of living.
In 1936, a new constitution was promulgated. As a result of the successes of the economic construction and in the face of the actual confiscation of bourgeois and landlord property and the seeming disappearance of exploiting classes by economic definition, the constitution declared that there were no more exploiting classes and no more class struggle except that between the Soviet people and the external enemy. This declaration would constitute the biggest error of Stalin. It propelled the petty-bourgeois mode of thinking in the new intelligentsia and bureaucracy even as the proletarian dictatorship was exceedingly alert to the old forces and elements of counterrevolution.
The error had two ramifications.
One ramification abetted the failure to distinguish contradictions among the people from those between the people and the enemy and the propensity to apply administrative measures against those loosely construed as enemies of the people. There were indeed real British and German spies and bourgeois nationalists engaged in counterrevolutionary violence. They had to be ferreted out. But this was done by relying heavily on a mass reporting system (based on patriotism) that fed information to the security services. And the principle of due process was not assiduously and scrupulously followed in order to narrow the target in the campaign against counterrevolutionaries and punish only the few who were criminally culpable on the basis of incontrovertible evidence. Thus, in the 1936-38 period, arbitrariness victimized a great number of people. Revolutionary class education through mass movement under Party leadership was not adequately undertaken for the purpose of ensuring the high political consciousness and vigilance of the people.
The other ramification was the promotion of the idea that building socialism was a matter of increasing production, improving administration and technique, letting the cadres decide everything (although Stalin never ceased to speak against bureaucratism) and providing the cadres and experts and the toiling masses with ever increasing material benefits. The new intelligentsia produced by the rapidly expanding Soviet educational system had a decreasing sense of the proletarian class stand and an increasing sense that it was sufficient to have the expertise and to become bureaucrats and technocrats in order to build socialism. The old and the new intelligentsia were presumed to be proletarian so long as they rendered bureaucratic and professional service. There was no recognition of the fact that bourgeois and other antiproletarian ideas can persist and grow even after the confiscation of bourgeois and landlord property.
To undertake socialist revolution and construction in a country with a large population of more than 100 nationalities and a huge land mass, with a low economic and technological level as a starting point, ravaged by civil war and ever threatened by local counterrevolutionary forces and foreign capitalist powers, it was necessary to have the centralization of political will as well as centralized planning in the use of limited resources. But such a necessity can be overdone by a bourgeoisie that is reemergent through the petty bourgeoisie and can become the basis of bureaucratism, decreasing democracy in the process of decision-making. The petty bourgeoisie promotes the bureaucratism that gives rise to and solidifies the higher levels of the bureaucrat bourgeoisie and that alienates the Party and the state from the people. Democratic centralism can be made to degenerate into bureaucratic centralism by the forces and elements that run counter to the interests of the proletariat and all working people.
In world affairs, Stalin encouraged and supported the communist parties and anti-imperialist movements in capitalist countries and the colonies and semicolonies through the Third International. And from 1935 onward, he promoted internationally the antifascist Popular Front policy. Only after Britain and France spurned his offer of antifascist alliance and continued to induce Germany to attack the Soviet Union did Stalin decide to forge a nonaggression pact with Germany in 1939. This was a diplomatic maneuver to forestall a probable earlier Nazi aggression and gain time for the Soviet Union to prepare against it.
Stalin made full use of the time before the German attack in 1941 to strengthen the Soviet Union economically and militarily as well as politically through patriotic calls to the entire Soviet people and through concessions to conservative institutions and organizations. For instance, the Russian Orthodox Church was given back its buildings and its privileges. There was marked relaxation in favor of a broad antifascist popular front.
In the preparations against fascist invasion and in the course of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45, the line of Soviet patriotism further subdued the line of class struggle among the old and new intelligentsia and the entire people. The Soviet people united. Even as they suffered a tremendous death casualty of 20 million and devastation of their country, including the destruction of 85 percent of industrial capacity, they played the pivotal role in defeating Nazi Germany and world fascism and paved the way for the rise of several socialist countries in Eastern Europe and Asia and the national liberation movements on an unprecedented scale. In the aftermath of World War II, Stalin led the economic reconstruction of the Soviet Union. Just as he succeeded in massive industrialization from 1929 to 1941 (only 12 years) before the war, so he did again from 1945 to 1953 (only eight years) but this time with apparently no significant resistance from counterrevolutionaries. In all these years of socialist construction, socialism proved superior to capitalism in all respects.
In 1952, Stalin realized that he had made a mistake in prematurely declaring that there were no more exploiting classes and no more class struggle in the Soviet Union, except the struggle between the people and the enemy. But it was too late, the Soviet party and state were already swamped by a large number of bureaucrats with waning proletarian revolutionary consciousness. These bureaucrats and their bureaucratism would become the base of modern revisionism.
When Stalin died in 1953, he left a Soviet Union that was a politically, economically, militarily and culturally powerful socialist country. He had successfully united the Soviet people of the various republics and nationalities and had defended the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany. He had rebuilt an industrial economy, with high annual growth rates, with enough homegrown food for the people and the world's largest production of oil, coal, steel, gold, grain, cotton and so on.
Under his leadership, the Soviet Union had created the biggest number of research scientists, engineers, doctors, artists, writers and so on. In the literary and artistic field, social realism flourished while at the same time the entire cultural heritage of the Soviet Union was cherished.
In foreign policy, Stalin held the U.S. forces of aggression at bay in Europe and Asia, supported the peoples fighting for national liberation and socialism, neutralized what was otherwise the nuclear monopoly of the United States and ceaselessly called for world peace even as the U.S.-led Western alliance waged the Cold War and engaged in provocations. It is absolutely necessary to correctly evaluate Stalin as a leader in order to avoid the pitfall of modern revisionism and to counter the most strident anticommunists who attack Marxism-Leninism under the guise of anti-Stalinism. We must know what are his merits and demerits. We must respect the historical facts and judge his leadership within its own time, 1924 to 1953.
It is unscientific to make a complete negation of Stalin as a leader in his own time and to heap the blame on him even for the modern revisionist line, policies and actions which have been adopted and undertaken explicitly against the name of Stalin and have - at first gradually and then rapidly - brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union and the restoration of capitalism. Leaders must be judged mainly for the period of their responsibility even as we seek to trace the continuities and discontinuities from one period to another.
Stalin's merits within his own period of leadership are principal and his demerits are secondary. He stood on the correct side and won all the great struggles to defend socialism such as those against the Left opposition headed by Trotsky; the Right opposition headed by Bukharin, the rebellious rich peasants, the bourgeois nationalists, and the forces of fascism headed by Hitler. He was able to unite, consolidate and develop the Soviet state. After World War II, Soviet power was next only to the United States. Stalin was able to hold his ground against the threats of U.S. imperialism. As a leader, he represented and guided the Soviet proletariat and people from one great victory to another.
III. The Process of Capitalist Restoration
The regimes of Khrushchov, Brezhnev and Gorbachov mark the three stages in the process of capitalist restoration in the Soviet Union, a process of undermining and destroying the great accomplishments of the Soviet proletariat and people under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin. This process has also encompassed Eastern Europe.
The Khrushchov regime laid the foundation of Soviet modern revisionism and overthrew the proletarian dictatorship. The Brezhnev regime fully developed modern revisionism for a far longer period of time and completely converted socialism into monopoly bureaucrat capitalism. And the Gorbachov regime brought the work of modern revisionism to the final goal of wiping out the vestiges of socialism and entirely dismantling the socialist facade of the revisionist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. He destroyed the Soviet Union that Lenin and Stalin had built and defended.
To restore capitalism, the Soviet revisionist regimes had to revise the basic principles of socialist revolution and construction and to go through stages of camouflaged counterrevolution in a period of 38 years, 1953 to 1991. It is a measure of the greatness of Lenin and Stalin that their accomplishments in 36 years of socialist revolution and construction took another long period of close to four decades to dismantle. Stalin spent a total of 20 years in socialist construction. The revisionist renegades took a much longer period of time to restore capitalism in the Soviet Union.
In the same period of time, the revisionist regimes cleverly took the pretext of attacking Stalin in order to attack the foundations of Marxist-Leninist theory and practice and eventually condemn Lenin himself and the entire course of Soviet history and finally destroy the Soviet Union. The revisionist renegades in their protracted "de-Stalinization" campaign blamed Stalin beyond his lifetime for their own culpabilities and failures. For instance, they aggravated bureaucratism in the service of capitalist restoration but they still blamed the long-dead Stalin for it.
Tito of Yugoslavia had the unique distinction of being the pioneer in modern revisionism. In opposing Stalin, he deviated from the basic principles of socialist revolution and construction in 1947 and received political and material support from the West. He refused to undertake land reform and collectivization. He preserved and promoted the bourgeoisie through the bureaucracy and private enterprise, especially in the form of private cooperatives.
He considered as key to socialism not the public ownership of the means of production, economic planning and further development of the productive forces but the immediate decentralization of enterprises; the so-called workers' self-management that actually combined bureaucratism and anarchy of production; and the operation of the free market (including the goods imported from Western countries) upon the existent and stagnant level of production. In misrepresenting Lenin's New Economic Policy as the very model for socialist economic development, he was the first chief of state to use the name of Lenin against both Lenin and Stalin.
First Stage: The Khrushchov Regime, 1953-64
To Khrushchov belongs the distinction of being the pioneer in modern revisionism in the Soviet Union, the first socialist country in the history of mankind, and of being the most influential in promoting modern revisionism on a world scale.
Khrushchov's career as a revisionist in power started in 1953. He was a bureaucratic sycophant and an active player in repressive actions during the time of Stalin. To become the first secretary of the CPSU and accumulate power in his hands, he played off the followers of Stalin against each other and succeeded in having Beria executed after a summary trial. He depended on the new bourgeoisie that had arisen from the bureaucracy and the new intelligentsia.
In 1954, he had already reorganized the CPSU to serve his ideological and political position. In 1955, he upheld Tito against the memory of Stalin, especially on the issue of revisionism. In 1956, he delivered before the 20th Party Congress his "secret" speech against Stalin, completely negating him as no better than a bloodthirsty monster and denouncing the "personality cult". The congress marked the overthrow of the proletarian dictatorship. In 1957, he used the armed forces to defeat the vote for his ouster by the Politburo and thereby made the coup to further consolidate his position.
In 1956, the anti-Stalin diatribe inspired the anticommunist forces in Poland and Hungary to carry out uprisings. The Hungarian uprising was stronger and more violent. Khrushchov ordered the Soviet army to suppress it, chiefly because the Hungarian party leadership sought to rescind its political and military ties with the Soviet Union.
But subsequently, all throughout Eastern Europe under Soviet influence, it became clear that it was alright to the Soviet ruling clique for the satellite regimes to adopt capitalist-oriented reforms (private enterprise in agriculture, handicraft and services, dissolution of collective farms even where land reform had been carried out on a narrow scale and, of course, the free market) like Yugoslavia along an anti-Stalin line. The revisionist regimes were, however, under strict orders to remain within the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Warsaw Pact.
The unremoulded social-democratic and petty-bourgeois sections of the revisionist ruling parties in Eastern Europe started to kick out genuine communists from positions of leadership in the state and party under the direction of Khrushchov and under the pressure of anticommunist forces in society. It must be recalled that the so- called proletarian ruling parties were actually mergers of communists and social-democrats put into power by the Soviet Red Army. At the most, there were only a few years of proletarian dictatorship and socialist economic construction before Khrushchov started in 1956 to enforce his revisionist line in the satellite parties and regimes.
The total negation of Stalin by Khrushchov was presented as a rectification of the personality cult, bureaucratism and terrorism; and as the prerequisite for the efflorescence of democracy and civility, rapid economic progress that builds the material and technological foundation of communism in twenty years, the peaceful form of social revolution from an exploitative system to a nonexploitative one, detente with the United States, nuclear disarmament step by step and world peace, a world without wars and arms.
Khrushchov paid lip service to proletarian dictatorship and the basic principles of socialist revolution and construction but at the same time introduced a set of ideas to undermine them. He used bourgeois populism, declaring that the CPSU was a party of the whole people and the Soviet state was a state of the whole people on the anti-Marxist premise that the tasks of proletarian dictatorship had been fulfilled. He used bourgeois pacifism, declaring that it was possible and preferable for mankind to opt for peaceful transition to socialism and peaceful economic competition with the capitalist powers in order to avert the nuclear annihilation of humanity; raising peaceful coexistence from the level of diplomatic policy to that of the general line governing all kinds of external relations of the Soviet Union and the CPSU; and denying the violent nature of imperialism.
In the economic field, he used the name of Lenin against Lenin and Stalin by misrepresenting Lenin's New Economic Policy as the way to socialism rather than as a transitory measure towards socialist construction. He carried out decentralization to some degree, he autonomized state enterprises and promoted private agriculture and the free market. The autonomized state enterprises became responsible for their own cost and profit accounting and for raising the wages and bonuses on the basis of the profits of the individual enterprise. The private plots were enlarged and large areas of land (ranging from 50 to 100 hectares) were leased to groups, usually households. Many tractor stations for collective farms were dissolved and agricultural machines were turned over to private entrepreneurs. The free market in agricultural and industrial products and services was promoted.
In the same way that the revisionist rhetoric of Khrushchov overlapped with Marxist-Leninist terminology, socialism overlapped with capitalist restoration. The socialist system of production and distribution was still dominant for a while. Thus, the Soviet economy under Khrushchov still registered high rates of growth. But the regime took most pride in the higher rate of growth in the private sector which benefited from cheap energy, transport, tools and other supplies from the public sector and which was credited with producing the goods stolen from the public sector.
In the autonomization of state enterprises, managers acquired the power to hire and fire workers, transact business within the Soviet Union and abroad; increase their own salaries, bonuses and other perks at the expense of the workers; lessen the funds available for the development of other parts of the economy; and engage in bureaucratic corruption in dealing with the free market.
With regard to private agriculture, propaganda was loudest on the claim that it was more productive than the state and collective farms. The reemergent rich peasants were lauded. But in fact, the corrupt bureaucrats and private farmers and merchants were colluding in underpricing and stealing products (through pilferage and wholesale misdeclaration of goods as defective) from the collective and state farms in order to rechannel these to the free market. In the end, the Soviet Union would suffer sharp reductions in agricultural production and would be importing huge amounts of grain.
The educational system continued to expand, reproducing in great numbers the new intelligentsia now influenced by the ideas of modern revisionism and looking to the West for models of efficient management and for quality consumer goods. In the arts and in literature, social realism was derided and universal humanism, pacifism and mysticism came into fashion.
The Khrushchov regime drew prestige from the advances of Soviet science and technology, from the achievements in space technology and from the continuing economic construction. All of these were not possible without the prior work and the accumulated social capital under the leadership of Stalin. Khrushchov went into rapid housing and office construction which pleased the bureaucracy.
The CPSU and the Chinese Communist Party were the main protagonists in the great ideological debate. Despite Khrushchov's brief reconciliation with Tito, the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and the Moscow Statement of 1960 maintained that modern revisionism was the main danger to the international communist movement as a result of the firm and vigorous stand of the Chinese and other communist parties.
Khrushchov extended the ideological debate into a disruption of state-to-state relations between the Soviet Union and China. In the Cuban missile crisis, he had a high profile confrontation with Kennedy. He first took an adventurist and then swung to a capitulationist position. With regard to Vietnam, he was opposed to the revolutionary armed struggle of the Vietnamese people and grudgingly gave limited support to them.
The deterioration of Soviet industry and the breakdown of agriculture and bungling in foreign relations led to the removal of Khrushchov in a coup by the Brezhnev clique. Brezhnev became the general secretary of the CPSU and Kosygin became the premier. The former would eventually assume the position of president.
Second Stage: The Brezhnev Regime, 1964-82
While Khrushchov was stridently anti-Stalin, Brezhnev made a limited and partial "rehabilitation" of Stalin. If we link this to the recentralization of the bureaucracy and the state enterprises previously decentralized and the repressive measures taken against the pro-imperialist and anticommunist opposition previously encouraged by Khrushchov, it would appear that Brezhnev was reviving Stalin's policies.
In fact, the Brezhnev regime was on the whole anti-Stalin, with respect to the continuing line of promoting the Khrushchovite capitalist-oriented reforms in the economy and the line of developing an offensive capability "to defend the Soviet Union outside of its borders". It is therefore false to say that the 18-year Brezhnev regime was an interruption of the anti-Stalin line started by Khrushchov.
There is, however, an ideological error that puts both Khrushchov and Brezhnev on board with Stalin. This is the premature declaration of the end of the exploiting classes and class struggle, except that between the enemy and the people. This line served to obfuscate and deny the existence of an already considerable and growing bourgeoisie in Soviet society and to justify repressive measures against those considered as enemy of the Soviet people for being opposed to the ruling clique.
Under the Brezhnev leadership, the Khrushchovite capitalist-oriented reforms were pushed hard by the Brezhnev-Kosygin tandem. Socialism was converted fully into state monopoly capitalism, with the prevalent corrupt bureaucrats not only increasing their official incomes and perks but taking their loot by colluding with private entrepreneurs and even criminal syndicates in milking the state enterprises. On an ever widening scale, tradeable goods produced by the state enterprises were either underpriced, pilfered or declared defective only to be channeled to the private entrepreneurs for the free market.
Sales and purchase contracts with capitalist firms abroad became a big source of kickbacks for state officials who deposited these in secret bank accounts abroad. There was also a thriving blackmarket in foreign exchange and goods smuggled from the West through Eastern Europe, the Baltic and southern republics.
The corruption of the bureaucrat and private capitalists discredited the revisionist ruling party and regime at various levels. At the end of the Brezhnev regime, there was already an estimated 30 million people engaged in private enterprise. Among them were members of the families of state and party officials. Members of the Brezhnev family themselves were closely collaborating with private firms and criminal syndicates in scandalous shady deals.
The state enterprises necessary for assuring funds for the ever expanding central Soviet bureaucracy and for the arms race were recentralized. A military-industrial complex grew rapidly and ate up yearly far more than the conservatively estimated 20 percent of the Soviet budget. The Brezhnev regime was obsessed with attaining military parity with its superpower rival, the United States.
The huge Soviet state that could have generated the surplus income for reinvestment in more efficient and expanded civil production of basic and nonbasic consumer goods, wasted the funds on the importation of the high grade consumer goods for the upper five per cent of the population (the new bourgeoisie), on increasing amounts of imported grain, on the military-industrial complex and the arms race, on the maintenance and equipment of half a million troops in Eastern Europe and on other foreign commitments in the third world. Among the commitments that arose due to superpower rivalry was the assistance to the Vietnamese people in the Vietnam war, Cuba, Angola and Nicaragua. Among the commitments that arose due to the sheer adventurism of Soviet social-imperialism was the dispatch of a huge number of Soviet troops and equipment to Afghanistan at the time that the Soviet Union was already clearly in dire economic and financial straits.
The hard currency for the importation of grain and high-grade consumer goods came from the sale of some 10 percent of Soviet oil production to Western countries and the income from military sales to the oil-producing countries in the Middle East.
The Brezhnev regime used "Marxist-Leninist" phrasemongering to disguise and legitimize the growth of capitalism within the Soviet Union. Repressive measures were used against opponents of the regime, including the pretext of psychiatric confinement. These measures served the growth of bureaucrat monopoly capitalism and constituted social fascism. The Brezhnev regime introduced to the world a perverse reinterpretation of proletarian dictatorship and proletarian internationalism, with the proclamation of the Brezhnev doctrine of "limited sovereignty" and Soviet-centered "international proletarian dictatorship" on the occasion of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. It was also on this occasion that the Soviet Union came to be called social-imperialist, socialism in words and imperialism in deed. With the same arrogance, Brezhnev deployed hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops along the Sino-Soviet border.
The Soviet Union under Brezhnev tried to keep a tight rein on its satellites in Eastern Europe within the Warsaw Pact. Thus, it had to expend a lot of resources of its own and those of its satellites in maintaining and equipping half a million Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. Clearly, the revisionist ruling parties and regimes were not developing the lively participation and loyalty of the proletariat and people through socialist progress but were keeping them in bondage through bureaucratic and military means in the name of socialism.
The Soviet Union under Brezhnev promoted the principle of "international division of labor" within the CMEA. This meant the enforcement of neocolonial specialization in certain lines of production by particular member-countries other than the Soviet Union. The relationship between the Soviet Union and the other CMEA member-countries was no different from that between imperialism and the semicolonies. This stunted the comprehensive development of national economies of most of the member countries although some basic industries had been built and continued to be built.
Eventually, the Soviet Union started to feel aggrieved that it had to deliver oil at prices lower than those of the world market and receive off-quality goods in exchange. So, it continuously made upward adjustments on the price of oil supplies to the CMEA client states. At the same time, among the East European countries, there had been the long-running resentment over the shoddy equipment and other goods that they were actually getting from the Soviet Union at a real overprice.
Before the 1970s, the Soviet Union encouraged capitalist-oriented reforms in its East European satellites but definitely discouraged any attempt by these satellites to leave the Warsaw Pact. In the early 1970s, the Soviet Union itself wanted to have a detente with the United States, clinch the "most favored nation" (MFN) treatment, gain access to new technology and foreign loans from the United States and the other capitalist countries. However, in 1972, the Brezhnev regime was rebuffed by the Jackson-Vannik amendment, which withheld MFN status from the Soviet Union for preventing Jewish emigration. The regime then further encouraged its East European satellites to enter into economic, financial and trade agreements with the capitalist countries.
During most of the 1970s, these revisionist-ruled countries got hooked to Western investments, loans and consumer goods. In the early 1980s, most of them fell into serious economic troubles as a result of the aggravation of domestic economic problems and the difficulties in handling their debt burden, which per capita in most cases was even worse than that of the Philippines. Being responsible for the economic policies and for their bureaucratic corruption, the revisionist ruling parties and regimes became discredited in the eyes of the broad masses of the people and the increasingly anti-Soviet and anticommunist intelligentsia. The pro-Soviet ruling parties in Eastern Europe had always been vulnerable to charges of political puppetry, especially from the direction of the anticommunist advocates of nationalism and religion. In the 1970s and 1980s these parties conspicuously degenerated from the inside in an all-round way through bourgeoisification and became increasingly the object of public contempt.
The United States kept on dangling the prospect of MFN status and other economic concessions to the Soviet Union. Each time the United States did so, it was able to get something from the Soviet Union, like its commitment to the Helsinki Accord (intended to provide legal protection to dissenters in the Soviet Union) and a draft strategic arms limitation treaty but it never gave the concessions that the Soviet Union wanted. The United States simply wanted the Cold War to go on in order to induce or compel the Soviet Union to waste its resources on the arms race. The only significant concession that the Soviet Union continued to get was the purchase of grain and the commercial credit related to it.
When the CPP leadership decided to explore and seek relations with the Soviet and East European ruling parties in the middle of the 1980s, there was the erroneous presumption that the successors of Brezhnev would follow an anti-imperialist line in the Cold War of the two superpowers. Thus, the policy paper on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe praised the Brezhnev line in hyperbolic terms.
Although the Gorbachov regime would pursue worse revisionist policies than those of its predecessor, it would become a good source of information regarding the principal and essential character of the Brezhnev regime on a comprehensive range of issues. By using this information from a critical Marxist-Leninist point of view, we can easily sum up the Brezhnev regime and at the same time know the antisocialist and anticommunist direction of the Gorbachov regime in 1985-88.
The Third and Final Stage: The Gorbachov Regime, 1985-91
The Gorbachov regime from 1985 to 1991 marked the third and final stage in the anti-Marxist and antisocialist revisionist counterrevolution to restore capitalism and bourgeois dictatorship.
It involved the prior dissolution of the ruling revisionist parties and regimes in Eastern Europe, the absorption of East Germany by West Germany and finally the banning and dispossession of the CPSU and the disintegration of the Soviet Union no less, after a dubious coup attempt by Gorbachov's appointees in the highest state and party positions next only to his.
The counterrevolution was carried out in a relatively peaceful manner. After all, the degeneration from socialism to capitalism proceeded for 38 years. Within the last six years, the corrupt bureaucrats masquerading as communists were ready to peel off their masks, declare themselves as excommunists and even anticommunists overnight and cooperate with the longstanding anticommunists among the intelligentsia and the aggrieved broad masses of the people in setting up regimes that were openly bourgeois and antisocialist.
Because they were manipulated and directed by the big bourgeoisie and the anticommunist intelligentsia, the mass uprisings in Eastern Europe in 1989 cannot be simply and totally described as democratic although it is also undeniable that the broad masses of the people, including the working class and the intelligentsia, were truly aggrieved and did rise up. The far bigger mass actions that put Mussolini and Hitler into power or the lynch mobs unleashed by the Indonesian fascists to massacre the communists in 1965 do not make a fascist movement democratic. In determining the character of a mass movement, we take into account not only the magnitude of mass participation but also the kind of class leadership involved. Otherwise, the periodic electoral rallies of the bourgeois reactionary parties which exclude the workers and peasants from power or even the Edsa mass uprising cum military mutiny in 1986 would be considered totally democratic, without the necessary qualifications regarding the class leadership involved.
It is possible for nonviolent mass uprisings to arise and succeed when their objective is not to really effect a fundamental change of the exploitative social system, when one set of bureaucrats is simply replaced by another set and when the incumbent set of bureaucrats does not mind the change of administration. It was only in Romania where there was bloodshed because it was not completely within the reorganizing that had been done by the Gorbachovites in 1987 to 1989 in Eastern Europe. Ceaucescu resisted change as did Honecker to a lesser extent. In the dissolution of the CPSU and the Soviet Unio
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