In 1963JFK faced a dilema over Vietnam. See John Newman's book JFK & VIETNAM, in which he lays out a good argument that Kennedy was contemplating withdrawal after re-election in '64 [he actually announced a 1,000 troop withdrawal in October 1963], but wouldn't hand Republicans an issue that could lead to his defeat, and of course, continuation of the war.

Also Newman explores the duplicity of LBJ, whom it appears the military and CIA were schooling with correct info on how bad the war was going for the West, whereas they were attempting to feed JFK misinformation that the war was winnable.

Newman's second book on Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico City in October 1963, indicates that a plot was

afoot to eliminate JFK once the establishment realized he was not buying their line of a winnable war.

Of course, the deed was done 38 years ago tomorrow.

See also Michael Beschloss books on tape recordings of both JFK and LBJ, Oliver Stone's film JFK, and KILL RADIO- IMC program on US imperialism history webcast Monday November 12.

JFK seemed to be leaning toward limiting the role of the US as an imperial power [in a June 1963 address to American University students, which Radio Moscow later broadcast, an almost umprecidented occurance in the midst of the cold war, Kennedy said "We seek not a 'Pax Americana'"]. LBJ, on the other hand, tragically aquiessed to the military/industrial lobbyists for a wider Vietnam war.

These same issues of the extent of US empire confront us now 38 years later with regard to our role in the Middle East and Afghanistan.





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The problem with Newman's analysis is that LBJ was no more anxious than JFK to fight in Vietnam. He was even more afraid that if he "lost" Vietnam, then he & the Democrats would lose power--just as they did with the "loss" of China in the early 50s. LBJ worked his tail off in the Senate getting the Democrats back on top, and he was not going to do anything to jeapordize what he'd accomplished.

Thus far, there is only one book that deals comprehensively with the role of the Senate in relationship to the presidency & the vietnam War--*A Grand Delusion* by Robert Mann. One thing that comes through loud and clear is the lasting impact of McCarthyism on the Democratic Party establishment within the Senate. While there may be some truth to Newman's speculaitons, it is, relatively speaking, a minor detail compared to the overall framewrok in which LBJ and the Senators who supported him were operating in.

On domestic matters--economics and race at the top of the list--LBJ was both more liberal than JFK and more dedicated togetting things done. So the rationale of a coup in such a situation is a loooong way from being clear-cut. On the other hand, the open record which has been documented & discussed in increasing detail over the past 5 years or so makes it increasingly clear that neither Kennedy nor Johnson really wanted a war in Vietnam, but that they were confronting a long legacy of Cold War thinking that should rightly be traced back to the very beginnings of the Cold War. Rather than obsessing exclusively over speculations about the Kennedy assasination, we should devote far more attention to the years 1945-1950, and how these affected all that came after.