Just one day before writing this column, Colombia’s president Alvaro Uribe shocked the nation with a surprising announcement: he would travel to Washington D.C., and would personally take command of the Free-Trade Agreement negotiation that is underway between Colombia and the U.S. Apparently, he decided to take this unusual step moved by the lack of advancement in the negotiation, and by growing concerns that the FTA will become a hot issue in the upcoming electoral campaign.

From any point of view, this looks like a desperate and unwise move. It is not normal for a head of state to get directly involved in negotiations carried out by lower-level staff, unless his counterpart is also involved, which is extremely unusual, and extremely unlikely in this case.

President Uribe is doubtlessly an amazing leader: after years of growing political uncertainty, Uribe restored confidence in Colombia with an ambitious and well-designed security policy. His approval ratings have never been below 70%. Nevertheless, in what regards to the FTA and its negotiation process, Uribe has shown to be a very erratic leader, to the point that this process could be read as a guide of how not to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement. Here are some lessons from the recent Colombian experience:

1) Don’t show skepticism about the agreement: in an attempt to appease opponents of the FTA, by showing that the administration is not indifferent to the concerns of certain sectors (specially agricultural), president Uribe and his team have gone too far, and this has resulted in the generalized impression that even the President and the negotiators are not fully convinced of the advantages of signing the FTA. So far, Uribe and his administration have done little to explain the country why this agreement is so important and why, even if some business sectors believe they’ll be hurt by the FTA, it is beneficial for the society as a whole. Apart from a tiny booklet printed by the Ministry of Commerce, and occasional appearances on TV defending the agreement, there has not been a comprehensive and massive campaign to explain Colombians what the FTA means and why it’s good for the nation. Uribe and other officials have spent more time and words speaking about defending “Colombia’s interests” and not crossing “red lines”, and in doing protectionist talk, than in promoting the virtues of the FTA.

The enemies of the FTA have taken advantage of this incoherence and lack of leadership. It’s easy for them to show that this agreement is so bad, that even the president and his team have doubts on its effects. No wonder, popular support for the FTA has been decreasing, and the chances of a defeat in Congress or a Court rejection appear to grow.

2) Maintain the “purity” of the negotiating team: again, in the name of protecting the “interests” of certain sectors, president Uribe has involved other areas of government, apart from the Ministry of Commerce, in the negotiations. This is a recipe for trouble. Why? Because, whereas the original negotiating team has a mandate to negotiate and close a deal, people from other areas believe they have a mandate to look after certain interests. In a few words, they believe they have the mission to cause trouble. Which they have certainly done. A former Minister of Agriculture, for example, is remembered by his furious and vocal attacks on the American negotiating team and their supposed intentions. Recently, delegates from the Ministry of Social Protection, which is in charge of health matters, abandoned the negotiating team denouncing to the press the supposed surrendering of the nation’s interests to the American intentions, this time in the area of medicines.

3) Don’t expect business organizations to defend the agreement: apparently, Uribe counted on certain business associations to make a public defense of the agreement. As it could be expected, this never happened. Business groups carefully analyze every step they take, and, in absence of a strong leadership from the government, they wouldn’t want to take the political risk of defending an increasingly unpopular FTA.

4) Don’t be over-confident in political considerations: since when the negotiation process began, almost 2 years ago, there has been over-confidence in the political leverage that Colombia has in negotiating with the U.S. “We’re a very important ally of the U.S., specially in fighting drug traffic, so they’ll treat us nicely and they’ll be flexible in their positions”. None of this has happened, even when the deterioration of the regional landscape, due to Venezuela’s strongly anti-American stance, makes Colombia an increasingly important ally of the U.S. Some are still waiting for that last-minute call from President Bush that will untie the process. It might never happen.

Finally, it’s important to point to a sort of original sin in this negotiation: business groups and trade unions can never be given the representation of the whole society. Which the administration in a way has done. This is not only an arbitrary act, it is a strategic mistake: by doing so, you appoint as valid representatives of society those who are most likely to oppose your goals.