{"article":{"id":138377,"heading":"CUCKOO ECONOMICS (Abridged Ed.)","author":"Gavin R. Putland","created":"2005-11-01 19:50:38","modified":"2013-11-11 00:35:53","last_modified":"Mon, 11 Nov 2013 07:35:53","article":"

CUCKOO ECONOMICS

(Abridged Ed.)

Gavin R. Putland

October 31, 2005

(Original Ed. released Oct.19, 2005)



CONTENTS

1. Bird brains

2. Counterfeit \"capital\"

3. Bait and switch

4. The preferred enemy

5. \"Natural\" unemployment

6. All-devouring rent

7. \"Free\" trade

8. The cause of recessions

9. The U.S. dollar bubble

10. Rogue states

11. The Great Depression of 2006-?

12. Summary

Notes

Copyright



1. BIRD BRAINS

The history of life on earth is the history of gene wars:

the genes that survive longest are those that are best able

to propagate themselves. To call this SURVIVAL OF THE

FITTEST is pointless because FITNESS has no meaning apart

from *ability to survive*.

The European cuckoo, for example, lays its eggs in the

nests of other birds and thereby enlists the labor of other

species in the propagation of its own genes. This behavior

*impedes the continuation of those species whose nests are

used, and does not assist the continuation of the class of

birds as a whole*; but it assists the propagation of the

cuckoo's genes, and no other consideration affects the

measure of \"fitness\" of those genes or of the behavior that

they produce.

If birds were endowed with conscience and reason, they

might think it inequitable to use other birds' labor

without compensation. They might perceive that if such

exploitation is permitted, it *reduces the incentive* to

build nests and feed chicks. They might conclude that birds

should serve their own interests in ways that *add to the

total welfare* of birds instead of merely *subtracting from

the welfare of others*. So, if all birds were subject to

one government, would not that government make a law

against laying eggs in the nests of other birds? Not if the

history of *human* government gives any guidance!



2. COUNTERFEIT \"CAPITAL\"

The assets known as the \"means of production\" fall into two

categories:

* *Assets that taxpayers can neither create nor destroy nor

move out of the taxing jurisdiction* may be called LAND-

LIKE assets or SITE-LIKE assets (where a SITE means a

piece of ground or airspace, including any *attached

rights* to erect buildings on that ground or into that

airspace, but *excluding* any actual buildings).

* The rest -- that is, assets that taxpayers can move and\/

or destroy and\/or refrain from creating -- may be called

HOUSE-LIKE assets.

By this terminology, *house-like* assets used as means of

production include not only buildings and other fixed

structures, but also industrial and commercial equipment of

all kinds (fixed or movable) and stock in trade. The great

classical economists from Adam Smith (1723-1790) to Max

Hirsch (1853-1909) called such assets CAPITAL. Because the

production of house-like assets *adds to the total wealth*

of humanity, and because the profits from such assets are

an *incentive* to produce the assets, capitalists advocate

the private ownership of house-like assets and the private

appropriation of profits derived therefrom.

*Land-like* assets include not only sites, but other

natural resources (which cannot be created by human

effort), statutory monopolies and limited licenses (which

can be created only by governments), and the so-called

NATURAL MONOPOLIES enjoyed by providers of networked

services such as electricity, gas, water, railways, and (at

the time of writing) telecommunications [1]. Returns on

land-like assets, net of the demands of labor and capital,

are known as ECONOMIC RENT [2]; owners of such assets

constitute the RENTIER class. The term \"rentier\" should be

understood as *functional* rather than personal, because

the same person may perform more than one economic role.

(For example, one man may be a worker *and* a capital owner

*and* a rentier -- and, under present arrangements, may

lose more in the first two roles than he gains in the

third.)

From the viewpoint of taxpayers, land-like assets cannot be

*produced*, but can only be *acquired*. Such acquisitions

do *not* add to the total assets of humanity. Furthermore,

while the returns on labor and capital applied to a land-

like asset are incentives to apply that labor and capital,

the return on the asset itself (net of the demands of labor

and capital) is *not* an incentive to do anything except

acquire the asset; indeed, the party acquiring the asset

need not be the one applying the labor or capital.

Therefore the argument by which capitalists rightly defend

the private ownership of house-like assets and the private

appropriation of the returns on house-like assets is *not

applicable* to land-like assets. But they apply it anyway!



3. BAIT AND SWITCH

Because land-like assets by definition are protected from

competition, the returns thereon are high and increase in

line with economic growth, giving the owners both the

motive and the means to fight for the retention of \"their\"

economic rents. In the late 19th century, when economics

was becoming established as a separate academic discipline,

rentiers were well represented on the trustee boards of

certain prestigious American universities, whose

endowments, moreover, consisted chiefly of land grants. And

there was no academic tenure: professors who did not do the

bidding of their paymasters could be fired without process

or redress.

So *the language of economics was corrupted so as to

conflate land with capital, economic rent with profit, and

acquisition with production*, in order to obscure the

advantages of a selective tax on land-like assets [3]. As

the unit of heredity is the selfish gene, which is no less

\"fit\" if it propagates purely at the expense of other

genes, so the unit of economic analysis became the selfish

ENTITY (individual or firm), which was no less praiseworthy

if it prospered purely at the expense of other entities. It

was as if the cuckoos, being relieved of the burden of

building nests, had used their discretionary time to

convince other birds that any restriction on the laying of

eggs in other birds' nests would *discourage* the building

of nests!

By calling itself NEO-CLASSICAL economics, the new pseudo-

science masqueraded as the successor, though in fact it was

the usurper, of the classical tradition. Within a

generation it became the new orthodoxy.



4. THE PREFERRED ENEMY

The obvious winners under the neo-classical paradigm were

the rentiers; for if land-like assets were capital, then

capitalism, which demanded private ownership of capital and

private enjoyment of profit, implicitly also demanded

private ownership of land-like assets and private

appropriation of economic rent.

*The other winners, whether by accident or by design, were

communists!* For if land was nothing but capital, then

communism, which began by demanding expropriation of land,

was obliged in the name of \"consistency\" to demand

expropriation of *all* forms of capital, enabling the

revolutionaries to eschew intellectual distinctions between

categories of assets and stir up the masses by appealing to

crude envy.

The conflation of land with capital did not *precede* these

developments in capitalism and communism, but it offered a

false conceptual framework that was willingly adopted by

both rentiers and communists to entrench their respective

positions and deny the existence of any intermediate

position. It was as if the cuckoos, in order to protect

their legal right to lay eggs in other birds' nests, had

colluded with a gang of avian revolutionaries who wanted to

expropriate all nests and raise all chicks in common!



5. \"NATURAL\" UNEMPLOYMENT

As the rentiers and their economists have forbidden heavy

taxation of economic rent, governments are compelled by

default to impose punitive taxes on work, investment,

employment, and the consumption that sustains demand -- in

short, on everything that capitalism professes to

encourage. All these taxes socialize the fruits of

individual effort -- as communists recommend. They also

increase the cost of hiring a worker at a given standard of

living, and consequently tend to increase inflation or

unemployment or both. Central banks fight the inflationary

tendency by raising interest rates (or otherwise

restricting credit) to discourage hiring and consumption,

causing yet more unemployment, in order to maintain

unemployment at the so-called NATURAL RATE, which the neo-

classicists define as the minimum unemployment rate that

causes sufficient downward pressure on wages to yield

stable inflation.

Thus, for the neo-classicists, unemployment is *not* an

evil to be avoided, but the price of ensuring that rentiers

can enjoy their economic rents with minimal interference

from the tax authorities.

Obviously politicians cannot admit the \"need\" for a certain

rate of unemployment. They must always pretend to want full

employment, and will be judged on their success in reducing

unemployment during their terms of office. Given that the

central bank will maintain unemployment at the natural

rate, the *actual* rate cannot be reduced except by

reducing the *natural* rate. And if, due to opposition from

the rentier class, the natural rate cannot be reduced by

shifting the tax burden onto economic rent, the only

remaining method is to make life more difficult for the

unemployed, increasing the desperation of the unemployed to

get jobs and of the employed to keep them, so that *the

same downward pressure on wages can be obtained with a

smaller number of unemployed*. Having a smaller number of

more desperate unemployed does not reduce the overall

severity of the problem, but makes the statistics look

better. Hence we see \"mutual obligation\" policies including

one or more of the following:

* Idlers are compelled to seek jobs and consequently *take

jobs from people who want to work*.

* Job-seekers are compelled to submit certain quotas of job

applications per week. This keeps them busy, forces them

to incur expenses, and *artificially intensifies the

competition for jobs* -- the implication being that the

scarcity of jobs, by itself, does not cause sufficiently

cut-throat competition.

* Unemployed people are compelled to \"work for the dole\"

*and* submit quotas of job applications. They are *not*

hired as ordinary employees to do the same work for the

same hours at the same cost to the government -- because

if they were, they would no longer have to apply for

other jobs.

* The dole is cut off after a certain time.

To defend such policies, governments must cultivate the

myth that unemployment consists in unwillingness to work,

whereas in fact unemployment, by definition, is an

*oversupply* of willing workers relative to the available

jobs. Here it may be instructive to note that the closest

human analog of the cuckoo is the man whose illegitimate

children are supported by the husband of his mistress.

Etymologically, \"cuckoo\" and \"cuckold\" ought to be

synonymous. Yet it is the husband of the adulteress, not

her partner in adultery, who is called the cuckold!



6. ALL-DEVOURING RENT

No worker can live, and no enterprise can trade, without

occupying space on the surface of the earth. Yet all the

usable space is owned. So the rents and prices of land are

competed upward, and the returns to labor and capital are

consequently competed downward, until the returns to labor

(net of the cost of access to residential land) are reduced

to the minimum for which workers will \"consent\" to acquire

skills, work, and raise the next generation of workers [4],

while the returns to capital (net of the cost of access to

commercial land) are reduced to the minimum for which the

financiers will consent to save and invest. *Every direct

improvement in the condition of the working class or the

employing class is competed away in the land market*, so

that the ultimate benefit accrues not to the nominal

recipient, but to the cuckoo in the nest: the land-owning

class.

*That is why the ever-increasing sums handed out in wages,

welfare, charity, and industry assistance never seem to be

enough.* But because the real reason is not widely

understood, the rentiers and their economists can easily

blame the nominal recipients for allegedly squandering the

assistance given to them. It is as if the cuckoos, having

laid their eggs in other birds' nests and taxed all the

birds to help feed the cuckoo chicks, explained the host

birds' lack of reproductive success by accusing them of

wasting the food!

The effective demand for land-like assets tends to increase

due to population growth (which increases competition for

use or acquisition of assets), economic growth (which

increases capacity to pay for the assets), and improvements

in technological infrastructure (which increases the

amenity of certain types of assets, especially sites). But,

as the assets are land-like, this additional demand cannot

be offset by additional supply. So *land-like assets tend

to appreciate in real terms*. This causes SPECULATIVE

DEMAND for land-like assets as individuals and corporations

buy assets in the hope of reselling them for higher prices,

or try to save money by early acquisition of assets that

they intend to use later. The speculative motive raises

prices because all buyers must compete with the

speculators. Worse, assets held by speculators are likely

to be unused or underused because the owners are not yet

ready to use them, or because the owners wish to avoid

commitments that would fetter their ability to sell at the

most opportune times. This effect raises not only prices,

but also rents, as not only buyers but also renters must

compete with the speculators.

A sufficiently heavy tax on the holding of land-like assets

requires the owners to use the assets efficiently in order

to generate sufficient income to cover the tax. That is

enough to eliminate the price and rent premiums caused by

the non-use and under-use of speculatively held assets. In

this case -- and only in this case -- the benefit to

workers and owners of capital is *not* competed away in the

land market, because it arises from reduced competition for

land!

Rentiers and their economists agree that such a tax is a

bad idea, but disagree as to the reasons. Some, who seem

never to have looked out the window of a bus or train,

flatly deny that the culture of speculation leads to non-

use or under-use of land. Others pretend that such non-use

or under-use is socially desirable in that it prevents any

initial use that would interfere with conversion to a

higher use at the optimal time, as if the initial use were

not desirable in itself, and as if the higher use would not

interfere with conversion to a still higher use at a still

later time -- yea, as if the cuckoos were helping other

birds by giving them time to become better parents!



7. \"FREE\" TRADE

The neo-classicists claim that income tax is compatible

with \"free\" trade because it is \"non-discriminatory\"

between domestic and international transactions. Never mind

that the tax on export income raises export prices as if it

were a tariff in every country of destination of those

exports. Similarly, they claim that a value-added tax (VAT)

or goods-and-services tax (GST) is compatible with \"free\"

trade because it is finally paid in the country of

consumption and is \"non-discriminatory\" as regards the

country of origin. Never mind that the VAT\/GST on imports

raises their prices as if it were a tariff. Never mind that

the same tax inflates export prices through its compliance

costs and its influence on the cost of living, hence wages.

Never mind that as long as taxation is \"non-discriminatory\"

by the neo-classicists' definition, trade can be taxed to

the point of prohibition and still be considered free!

In fact, *all* taxes on house-like assets impede trade and

raise prices by discouraging the production of such assets,

while *all* transaction taxes impede trade and raise prices

by discouraging transactions.

*The only taxes that do not impede trade or raise prices

are holding taxes on land-like assets*. The economic rents

of such assets are *not incentives* to produce anything.

So as long as the holding taxes take no more than the

annualized economic rents, they cannot restrict the supply

or raise the price (or hire or rent) of any product or

asset.

Hence, *by collecting more of its public revenue from

holding taxes on land-like assets, and less from other

taxes, a country can make itself more competitive.* This of

course would compel other countries to do likewise. So the

rentier class and its economists are constantly on guard to

ensure that no country is the first to take this step; they

know that the price of freedom (from the need to work for a

living) is eternal vigilance [3, pp.237-260].



8. THE CAUSE OF RECESSIONS

In a *rational market*, the CAPITALIZED (or \"lump-sum\")

value of a land-like asset is the DISCOUNTED PRESENT VALUE

of the future rent stream. (That is, the capitalized value

is the lump sum that would yield an interest stream equal

to the rent for the same risk, or the sum of the future

rental payments individually discounted for time and risk.)

But the market is not always rational. When assets of a

certain type are conspicuously appreciating, people want to

buy them. In so doing, they accelerate the rise in prices,

inducing more people to buy the assets, and so on, causing

a speculative BUBBLE -- that is, a state in which prices

are decoupled from rents and are supported solely by the

circular argument that prices will continue to rise.

Eventually the illusion becomes unsustainable and the price

rise slows down, which takes away the alleged justification

for current prices, and so on, until prices dive back to

earth: the bubble \"bursts\". But eventually the natural

appreciation of land-like assets leads to a new bubble in

the same asset class. So the market for any land-like asset

class is CYCLIC.

A bursting bubble in a particular asset market has two

counteracting effects. On the one hand, it drives investors

away from that asset class and, by default, towards some

other asset class that may also be susceptible to bubbles.

On the other hand, those who have invested heavily in the

collapsed market have to reduce their expenditure, and some

become insolvent. As one agent's expenditure is another's

income, and as one agent's debt is another's asset, a chain

reaction ensues, reducing the funds available for

investment in other asset markets, possibly causing them to

collapse, and so on; these are the ingredients of a

recession. After an isolated bubble-burst, the former

effect tends to dominate; thus the stock-market crash of

1987 led to a land bubble. But after a second burst in

quick succession, the cumulative belt-tightening and bad

debt tend to cause a recession; thus the land burst of 1989

led to the recession of 1990-91.

In short, a burst in one asset market interferes with the

cycles of other markets, sometimes pushing them out of

synchronism by encouraging bubbles, and sometimes drawing

them into synchronism by triggering further bursts (and a

recession). This mutual interference, complicated by

external shocks, makes it difficult to discern the

autonomous cycles of some asset classes, and causes

irregularities in cycles that can be more easily discerned.

The clearest cycles are the *residential land cycle*

(typically 9 years in duration) and the *commercial land

cycle* (typically 18 years). A bursting land bubble is the

most reliable *single* predictor of a recession; in

particular, the global recessions of 1974-5, 1981-2, and

1990-91 were heralded by bursting \"property\" bubbles, i.e.

land bubbles [5].

A sufficiently heavy holding tax on land-like assets would

*prevent recessions by preventing speculative bubbles*. If

the tax were based on capitalized values or changes in

capitalized values, it would force speculators to consider

the tax implications before bidding up prices. If based on

changes in *annualized* values, it would directly reduce

the changes in after-tax rents that translate into

speculative gains; in particular, if it were to take *all*

real increases in rental values, it would prevent real

increases in capitalized values and thereby *entirely*

eliminate the speculative motive.

The first years of the 21st century were marked by a

*global* property bubble. The inevitable burst began in

Australia in early 2004. It has spread to the British Isles

and Europe, and in due course must reach the United States.

Although this global bubble was confined to \"housing\" (i.e.

residential land), it was the *biggest asset bubble in

history* in terms of the combined GDPs of the affected

countries [6] -- and that measure fails to account for the

number and economic weight of the countries involved. The

bigger the bubble, the bigger the burst. The bigger the

burst, the bigger the recession.

But even that is understating the problem.



9. THE U.S. DOLLAR BUBBLE

As the money supply is controlled directly or indirectly by

government, money is a land-like asset and a component of

the so-called interest of money is economic rent. This

economic rent accrues to those who merely *possess* money.

What of those who also *create* it?

For half a century the U.S. dollar has been the *de facto*

international currency. Importers need reserves of dollars

to pay their suppliers. Central banks need reserves of

dollars to protect their currencies. Poor countries must

borrow dollars to get capital, and must earn dollars to

service their debts. Hence the growth in international

trade causes growth in the global demand for U.S. dollars,

allowing the U.S. to export dollars -- which cost nothing

to produce -- and receive real goods and services in

return. That is how the U.S. manages to import 50 percent

more goods and services than it exports. When the exported

dollars are invested, they can be invested only in U.S.

assets, creating a demand for U.S. Treasury Bills without

high interest rates, and inflating the price\/earnings

ratios of U.S. property, stocks, and bonds. This inflow of

investment creates a surplus on the CAPITAL ACCOUNT, which

balances the deficit on the CURRENT ACCOUNT (including

imports, exports, interest, rent, and dividends).

The U.S. dollar is also the dominant currency -- and until

November 2000 was the exclusive currency -- for

international trading in *oil*. Therefore any increase in

the global demand for oil *or the price of oil* causes a

corresponding increase in global demand for the U.S. dollar

and boosts its value, protecting the U.S. economy against

the inflationary effect of higher global oil prices and

allowing the U.S. to increase its trade deficit. Hence the

reinvestment of exported dollars in U.S. assets is

sometimes called RECYCLING OF PETRODOLLARS.

One consequence of this recycling of petrodollars is that

the value of the dollar is out of proportion to its earning

capacity (interest on dollars, or yields on other dollar-

denominated assets). That is one characteristic of a

*bubble*.

After 1971, when the U.S. dollar ceased to be backed by

gold, the dollar's position as the world currency became

increasingly dependent on its use in the oil trade, so that

the argument supporting the dollar became circular: dollars

would buy oil *because* oil exporters would accept dollars

*because* dollars would buy other products *because*

exporters of other products would accept dollars *because*

dollars would buy oil! Valuation by circular argument is

another characteristic of a *bubble*.

One thing that could burst the bubble is a credible

alternative to the dollar -- such as the euro.



10. ROGUE STATES

Iraq began selling oil for euros instead of dollars in

November 2000. When Iraqi oil exports resumed after the

U.S.-led invasion, payments were again in dollars [7].

Iran expressed interest in the euro from 1999, and had

converted most of its currency reserves to euros by late

2002. In 2003, Iran began accepting payment in euros for

oil exports to Europe and Asia. In mid 2004, Iran announced

that it would establish a euro-denominated international

oil bourse (exchange), which is now due to start trading by

March 2006 [8,9]. George W. Bush named Iran in his \"axis of

evil\" in January 2002. If Bush's speech was designed to

revive the flagging fortunes of extremist candidates in

Iranian elections, it could hardly have been more

successful: on October 26, 2005, Iran's newly elected

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, quoting the late Ayatollah

Ruhollah Khomeini, declared that \"Israel must be wiped off

the map.\"

Since September 2000, Venezuela and 13 other Latin-American

countries have entered into barter agreements whereby

Venezuela sells oil for goods and services instead of

dollars. In April 2002, editorials in the U.S. media

welcomed news of a coup against Venezuela's elected

President Hugo Chavez; but the coup collapsed after two

days [10,11]. In mid 2005, Venezuela decided to move its

currency reserves out of U.S. banks and liquidate its

investments in U.S. Treasury securities. By early October,

about 60 percent of its reserves had been converted to

euros [12].

The U.S. may threaten Iran and Venezuela; but if Russia and

Norway start selling their oil for euros, the U.S. will

have to take it on the chin.



11. THE GREAT DEPRESSION OF 2006-?

Given that the value of the U.S. dollar must fall, nobody

wants to be the last sucker holding dollars. Therefore any

perception that the crash is imminent will trigger selling

of dollars in an effort to pre-empt the crash. That selling

will amplify the perception, causing more selling, and so

on; so the perception will become reality. Moreover, *the

rush to sell dollars will extend to dollar-denominated

assets*, including U.S. property, stocks, bonds, and bills.

So the burst of the dollar bubble may be the trigger for

the expected burst of the U.S. property bubble -- among

other things.

If, on the contrary, the U.S. property bubble bursts of its

own accord, the falling value of this class of dollar-

denominated assets will reduce the attractiveness of

holding dollars. Worse, the recession precipitated by the

property burst will bring down other dollar-denominated

asset markets. If the initial collapse of the U.S. property

market is not enough to prick the dollar bubble, the

ensuing collapse of other dollar-denominated asset markets

will certainly be enough, and the dollar crash in turn will

drive further selling of dollar-denominated assets.

In either case, there will be a *multiple burst involving

not only the global property bubble*, which is already

deflating outside the U.S., *but also the U.S. dollar

bubble and every other asset bubble that has been pumped up

by recycled petrodollars*. The bigger the burst, the bigger

the recession.



12. SUMMARY

In short, the neo-classical economy works like this. The

supplies of certain assets, including land, are not within

the control of taxpayers. The returns on such assets

(economic rent) are not due to any activity of the owners

(rentiers) and therefore *could* be taken for public

revenue, by means of holding taxes, with no ill effects.

But this option is rejected. Instead, governments impose

taxes penalizing everything that the neo-classicists

profess to encourage. These taxes deter employment and feed

inflation. Central banks fight the inflation by raising

interest rates, causing more unemployment, for which the

politicians' remedy is not to create more jobs (which would

defeat the efforts of the central banks) but to intensify

the competition for the few jobs that are available.

Meanwhile, the opportunity to speculate on land-like assets

creates a permanent artificial demand for those assets,

causing permanent price premiums and rent premiums

exacerbated by periodic speculative bubbles, which burst

causing periodic recessions. One of these overpriced

land-like asset classes is residential land, for which

working people must pay out of wages that have been

depressed by the deliberately engineered scarcity of jobs,

eroded by income tax, and devalued by indirect taxes.

Unemployment, poverty, and housing stress are the price

that must be paid so that rentiers can continue to enjoy

the economic rent that they do not produce. This is the

prize for which the Cold War was fought, the End of

History, the capitalist Nirvana.

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NOTES

[1] A networked service is a monopoly in the sense that any

new competitor wishing to serve its first customer must

either replicate the whole network, which is prohibitively

expensive, or connect to the existing network on terms

dictated by the owner or governed by regulation; none of

these options admits free and fair competition.

[2] The so-called \"rent\" of real property comprises the

rent of the land plus the hire of any building(s) attached

to the land; only the former is economic rent. The so-

called \"rent\" of a vehicle is not economic rent, but a

return on capital.

[3] M. Gaffney, F. Harrison, and K. Feder, THE CORRUPTION

OF ECONOMICS (London: Shepheard-Walwyn, 1994; 271pp.).

[4] Of course workers can hardly refuse to acquire skills

and to work. But nowadays they can easily refuse to raise

the next generation of workers if the future for workers

looks bleak. That is their biggest bargaining chip.

[5] Concerning the theory that recessions are due to high

oil prices, suffice it to say that (i) there were

recessions before there were oil shocks; (ii) the recession

of 1990-91 started before the oil shock that allegedly

caused it; and (iii) in the words of Alan Greenspan, \"we

create these elaborate models for policy responses and we

put in oil prices [but] they don't create a recession in

the models\" [answer to a question from the International

Monetary Conference (London, June 8, 2004), transcribed by

Ashley Seager and quoted in Fred Harrison, BOOM BUST

(London: Shepheard-Walwyn, 2005), p.65].

[6] THE ECONOMIST, June 16, 2005;

http:\/\/economist.com\/opinion\/displayStory.cfm?story_id=4079458<\/a> ,

http:\/\/economist.com\/opinion\/displaystory.cfm?story_id=4079027<\/a> .

[7] William Clark et al., \"U.S. Dollar vs. the Euro: Another

Reason for the Invasion of Iraq\", PROJECT CENSORED, #19 for

2002-3, http:\/\/projectcensored.org\/publications\/2004\/19.html<\/a> ;

5 refs.

[8] William Clark et al., \"Iran's New Oil Trade System

Challenges U.S. Currency \", PROJECT CENSORED, #9 for 2004-5,

http:\/\/projectcensored.org\/censored_2006\/index.htm#9<\/a> ; 5 refs.

[9] Cóilín Nunan, \"Petrodollar or Petroeuro? A new source

of global conflict\", FEASTA REVIEW No.2,

http:\/\/www.feasta.org\/documents\/review2\/nunan.htm<\/a> ; 32 refs.

[10] Hazel Henderson, \"Globocop v. Venezuela's Chavez: Oil,

Globalization and Competing Visions of Development\", April

2002, http:\/\/hazelhenderson.com\/editorials\/globoCop04-02.html<\/a> .

[11] Duncan Campbell et al., \"Bush Administration Behind Failed

Military Coup in Venezuela\", PROJECT CENSORED, #12 for 2002-3,

http:\/\/projectcensored.org\/publications\/2004\/12.html<\/a> .

[12] Gregory Wilpert, \"Venezuela's Central Bank Confirms it

Deposited $20 Billion in Swiss Bank\", Venezuelanalysis.com ,

Oct.5, 2005, http:\/\/venezuelanalysis.com\/news.php?newsno=1777<\/a> .

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Copyright (c) 2005 Prosper Australia

(http:\/\/prosper.org.au<\/a> , http:\/\/earthsharing.org.au<\/a>).

Author: Gavin R. Putland (http:\/\/grputland.com<\/a>).

Permission is given to forward, copy, translate, and

otherwise publish this work for non-commercial

purposes provided that the work remains intact and

includes this copyright notice.

\n","contact":"","link":"","address":"","phone":"","parent_id":0,"mime_type":"text\/plain","summary":"By deliberately confusing assets that can be *produced*\r\nwith assets that can only be *acquired*, modern economics\r\nlaid the ideological foundation for unemployment, poverty,\r\ninequality, and the looming global depression.","numcomment":0,"fileurl":"\/uploads\/","filesize":null,"article_url":"\/news\/2005\/11\/138377.php"},"attachments":[],"comments":[]}