{"article":{"id":75534,"heading":"40 lies of Bush the Bastard","author":"lifted from Portland by Sheepdog","created":"2003-08-04 00:16:42","modified":"2013-11-11 00:24:45","last_modified":"Mon, 11 Nov 2013 07:24:45","article":"<br><br>                        top 40 lies on Iraq <br>  <br>                                                        02.Aug.2003 06:46 <br>  <br> . <br>  <br>                         <a href=\"http:\/\/truthout.org\/docs_03\/080103F.shtml\" rel=\"nofollow\">http:\/\/truthout.org\/docs_03\/080103F.shtml<\/a>  <br><br>                        Bring 'em On!  <br>  <br>                        The Bush administration's top 40 lies about war and terrorism  <br>  <br>                        By Steve Perry  <br>  <br>                        City Pages  <br><br>                        Wednesday 30 July 2003  <br><br>                        Author's note: In the interest of relative brevity I've stinted on citing <br>  <br>                        and quoting sources in some of the items below. You can find links <br>  <br>                        to news stories that elaborate on each of these items at my online <br>  <br>                        Bush Wars column, www.bushwarsblog.com.  <br><br>                        1) The administration was not bent on war with Iraq from 9\/11 <br>  <br>                        onward.  <br><br>                        Throughout the year leading up to war, the White House publicly <br>  <br>                        maintained that the U.S. took weapons inspections seriously, that <br>  <br>                        diplomacy would get its chance, that Saddam had the opportunity to <br>  <br>                        prevent a U.S. invasion. The most pungent and concise evidence to <br>  <br>                        the contrary comes from the president's own mouth. According to <br>  <br>                        Time's March 31 road-to-war story, Bush popped in on national <br>  <br>                        security adviser Condi Rice one day in March 2002, interrupting a <br>  <br>                        meeting on UN sanctions against Iraq. Getting a whiff of the subject <br>  <br>                        matter, W peremptorily waved his hand and told her, \"Fuck <br>  <br>                        Saddam. We're taking him out.\" Clare Short, Tony Blair's former <br>  <br>                        secretary for international development, recently lent further <br>  <br>                        credence to the anecdote. She told the London Guardian that Bush <br>  <br>                        and Blair made a secret pact a few months afterward, in the summer <br>  <br>                        of 2002, to invade Iraq in either February or March of this year.  <br><br>                        Last fall CBS News obtained meeting notes taken by a Rumsfeld <br>  <br>                        aide at 2:40 on the afternoon of September 11, 2001. The notes <br>  <br>                        indicate that Rumsfeld wanted the \"best info fast. Judge whether <br>  <br>                        good enough hit S.H. [Saddam Hussein] at same time. Not only <br>  <br>                        UBL [Usama bin Laden].... Go massive. Sweep it all up. Things <br>  <br>                        related and not.\"  <br><br>                        Rumsfeld's deputy Paul Wolfowitz, the Bushmen's leading <br>  <br>                        intellectual light, has long been rabid on the subject of Iraq. He <br>  <br>                        reportedly told Vanity Fair writer Sam Tanenhaus off the record that <br>  <br>                        he believes Saddam was connected not only to bin Laden and 9\/11, <br>  <br>                        but the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing.  <br><br>                        The Bush administration's foreign policy plan was not based on <br>  <br>                        September 11, or terrorism; those events only brought to the <br>  <br>                        forefront a radical plan for U.S. control of the post-Cold War world <br>  <br>                        that had been taking shape since the closing days of the first Bush <br>  <br>                        presidency. Back then a small claque of planners, led by Wolfowitz, <br>  <br>                        generated a draft document known as Defense Planning Guidance, <br>  <br>                        which envisioned a U.S. that took advantage of its lone-superpower <br>  <br>                        status to consolidate American control of the world both militarily <br>  <br>                        and economically, to the point where no other nation could ever <br>  <br>                        reasonably hope to challenge the U.S. Toward that end it envisioned <br>  <br>                        what we now call \"preemptive\" wars waged to reset the  <br>  <br>                        geopolitical table.  <br><br>                        After a copy of DPG was leaked to the New York Times, <br>  <br>                        subsequent drafts were rendered a little less frank, but the basic idea <br>  <br>                        never changed. In 1997 Wolfowitz and his true believers--Richard <br>  <br>                        Perle, William Kristol, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld--formed an <br>  <br>                        organization called Project for the New American Century to carry <br>  <br>                        their cause forward. And though they all flocked around the Bush <br>  <br>                        administration from the start, W never really embraced their plan <br>  <br>                        until the events of September 11 left him casting around for a <br>  <br>                        foreign policy plan.  <br><br>                        2) The invasion of Iraq was based on a reasonable belief that Iraq <br>  <br>                        possessed weapons of mass destruction that posed a threat to the <br>  <br>                        U.S., a belief supported by available intelligence evidence.  <br><br>                        Paul Wolfowitz admitted to Vanity Fair that weapons of mass <br>  <br>                        destruction were not really the main reason for invading Iraq: \"The <br>  <br>                        decision to highlight weapons of mass destruction as the main <br>  <br>                        justification for going to war in Iraq was taken for bureaucratic <br>  <br>                        reasons.... [T]here were many other important factors as well.\" <br>  <br>                        Right. But they did not come under the heading of self-defense.  <br><br>                        We now know how the Bushmen gathered their prewar <br>  <br>                        intelligence: They set out to patch together their case for invading <br>  <br>                        Iraq and ignored everything that contradicted it. In the end, this <br>  <br>                        required that Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, et al. set aside the findings of <br>  <br>                        analysts from the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (the <br>  <br>                        Pentagon's own spy bureau) and stake their claim largely on the <br>  <br>                        basis of isolated, anecdotal testimony from handpicked Iraqi <br>  <br>                        defectors. (See #5, Ahmed Chalabi.) But the administration did not <br>  <br>                        just listen to the defectors; it promoted their claims in the press as a <br>  <br>                        means of enlisting public opinion. The only reason so many <br>  <br>                        Americans thought there was a connection between Saddam and al <br>  <br>                        Qaeda in the first place was that the Bushmen trotted out Iraqi <br>  <br>                        defectors making these sorts of claims to every major media outlet <br>  <br>                        that would listen.  <br><br>                        Here is the verdict of Gregory Thielman, the recently retired head of <br>  <br>                        the State Department's intelligence office: \"I believe the Bush <br>  <br>                        administration did not provide an accurate picture to the American <br>  <br>                        people of the military threat posed by Iraq. This administration has <br>  <br>                        had a faith-based  <br>  <br>                        intelligence attitude--we know the answers, give us the intelligence <br>  <br>                        to support those answers.\" Elsewhere he has been quoted as saying, <br>  <br>                        \"The principal reasons that Americans did not understand the nature <br>  <br>                        of the Iraqi threat in my view was the failure of senior <br>  <br>                        administration officials to speak honestly about what the intelligence <br>  <br>                        showed.\"  <br><br>                        3) Saddam tried to buy uranium in Niger.  <br><br>                        Lies and distortions tend to beget more lies and distortions, and here <br>  <br>                        is W's most notorious case in point: Once the administration decided <br>  <br>                        to issue a damage-controlling (they hoped) mea culpa in the matter <br>  <br>                        of African uranium, they were obliged to couch it in another, more <br>  <br>                        perilous lie: that the administration, and quite likely Bush himself, <br>  <br>                        thought the uranium claim was true when he made it. But former <br>  <br>                        acting ambassador to Iraq Joseph Wilson wrote an op-ed in the <br>  <br>                        New York Times on July 6 that exploded the claim. Wilson, who <br>  <br>                        traveled to Niger in 2002 to investigate the uranium claims at the <br>  <br>                        behest of the CIA and Dick Cheney's office and found them to be <br>  <br>                        groundless, describes what followed this way: \"Although I did not <br>  <br>                        file a written report, there should be at least four documents in U.S. <br>  <br>                        government archives confirming my mission. The documents should <br>  <br>                        include the ambassador's report of my debriefing in Niamey, a <br>  <br>                        separate report written by the embassy staff, a CIA report summing <br>  <br>                        up my trip, and a specific answer from the agency to the office of <br>  <br>                        the vice president (this may have been delivered orally). While I <br>  <br>                        have not seen any of these reports, I have spent enough time in <br>  <br>                        government to know that this is standard operating procedure.\"  <br><br>                        4) The aluminum tubes were proof of a nuclear program.  <br><br>                        The very next sentence of Bush's State of the Union address was <br>  <br>                        just as egregious a lie as the uranium claim, though a bit cagier in its <br><br>                        formulation. \"Our intelligence sources tell us that [Saddam] has <br>  <br>                        attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for <br>  <br>                        nuclear weapons production.\" This is altogether false in its <br>  <br>                        implication (that this is the likeliest use for these materials) and may <br>  <br>                        be untrue in its literal sense as well. As the London Independent <br>  <br>                        summed it up recently, \"The U.S. persistently alleged that Baghdad <br>  <br>                        tried to buy high-strength aluminum tubes whose only use could be <br>  <br>                        in gas centrifuges, needed to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. <br>  <br>                        Equally persistently, the International Atomic Energy Agency said <br>  <br>                        the tubes were being used for artillery rockets. The head of the <br>  <br>                        IAEA, Mohamed El Baradei, told the UN Security Council in <br>  <br>                        January that the tubes were not even suitable for centrifuges.\" <br>  <br>                        [emphasis added]  <br><br>                        5) Iraq's WMDs were sent to Syria for hiding.  <br><br>                        Or Iran, or.... \"They shipped them out!\" was a rallying cry for the <br>  <br>                        administration in the first few nervous weeks of finding no WMDs, <br>  <br>                        but not a bit of supporting evidence has emerged.  <br><br>                        6) The CIA was primarily responsible for any prewar intelligence <br>  <br>                        errors or distortions regarding Iraq.  <br><br>                        Don't be misled by the news that CIA director George Tenet has <br>  <br>                        taken the fall for Bush's falsehoods in the State of the Uranium <br>  <br>                        address. As the journalist Robert Dreyfuss wrote shortly before the <br>  <br>                        war, \"Even as it prepares for war against Iraq, the Pentagon is <br>  <br>                        already engaged on a second front: its war against the Central <br>  <br>                        Intelligence Agency. The Pentagon is bringing relentless pressure to <br>  <br>                        bear on the agency to produce intelligence reports more supportive <br>  <br>                        of war with Iraq. ... Morale inside the U.S. national-security <br>  <br>                        apparatus is said to be low, with career staffers feeling intimidated <br>  <br>                        and pressured to justify the push for war.\"  <br><br>                        In short, Tenet fell on his sword when he vetted Bush's State of the <br>  <br>                        Union yarns. And now he has had to get up and fall on it again.  <br><br>                        7) An International Atomic Energy Agency report indicated that Iraq <br>  <br>                        could be as little as six months from making nuclear weapons.  <br><br>                        Alas: The claim had to be retracted when the IAEA pointed out that <br>  <br>                        no such report existed.  <br><br>                        8) Saddam was involved with bin Laden and al Qaeda in the <br>  <br>                        plotting of 9\/11.  <br><br>                        One of the most audacious and well-traveled of the Bushmen's fibs, <br>  <br>                        this one hangs by two of the slenderest evidentiary threads <br>  <br>                        imaginable: first, anecdotal testimony by isolated, handpicked Iraqi <br>  <br>                        defectors that there was an al Qaeda training camp in Iraq, a claim <br>  <br>                        CIA analysts did not  <br>  <br>                        corroborate and that postwar U.S. military inspectors conceded did <br>  <br>                        not exist; and second, old intelligence accounts of a 1991 meeting in <br>  <br>                        Baghdad between a bin Laden emissary and officers from Saddam's <br>  <br>                        intelligence service, which did not lead to any subsequent contact <br>  <br>                        that U.S. or UK spies have ever managed to turn up. According to <br>  <br>                        former State Department intelligence chief Gregory Thielman, the <br>  <br>                        consensus of U.S. intelligence agencies well in advance of the war <br>  <br>                        was that \"there was no significant pattern of cooperation between <br>  <br>                        Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist operation.\"  <br><br>                        9) The U.S. wants democracy in Iraq and the Middle East.  <br><br>                        Democracy is the last thing the U.S. can afford in Iraq, as anyone <br>  <br>                        who has paid attention to the state of Arab popular sentiment <br>  <br>                        already realizes. Representative government in Iraq would mean the <br>  <br>                        rapid expulsion of U.S. interests. Rather, the U.S. wants <br>  <br>                        westernized, secular leadership regimes that will stay in pocket and <br>  <br>                        work to neutralize the politically ambitious anti-Western religious <br>  <br>                        sects popping up everywhere. If a little brutality and graft are <br>  <br>                        required to do the job, it has never troubled the U.S. in the past. <br>  <br>                        Ironically, these standards describe someone more or less like <br>  <br>                        Saddam Hussein. Judging from the state of civil affairs in Iraq now, <br>  <br>                        the Bush administration will no doubt be looking for a strongman <br>  <br>                        again, if and when they are finally compelled to install anyone at all.  <br><br>                        10) Ahmed Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress are a <br>  <br>                        homegrown Iraqi political force, not a U.S.-sponsored front.  <br><br>                        Chalabi is a more important bit player in the Iraq war than most <br>  <br>                        people realize, and not because he was the U.S.'s failed choice to <br>  <br>                        lead a post-Saddam government. It was Chalabi and his INC that <br>  <br>                        funneled compliant defectors to the Bush administration, where they <br>  <br>                        attested to everything the Bushmen wanted to believe about <br>  <br>                        Saddam and Iraq (meaning, mainly, al Qaeda connections and <br>  <br>                        WMD programs). The administration proceeded to take their <br>  <br>                        dubious word over that of the combined intelligence of the CIA and <br>  <br>                        DIA, which indicated that Saddam was not in the business of <br>  <br>                        sponsoring foreign terrorism and posed no imminent threat to <br>  <br>                        anyone.  <br><br>                        Naturally Chalabi is despised nowadays round the halls of Langley, <br>  <br>                        but it wasn't always so. The CIA built the Iraqi National Congress <br>  <br>                        and installed Chalabi at the helm back in the days following Gulf <br>  <br>                        War I, when the thought was to topple Saddam by whipping up and <br>  <br>                        sponsoring an internal opposition. It didn't work; from the start <br>  <br>                        Iraqis have disliked and distrusted Chalabi. Moreover, his erratic and <br>  <br>                        duplicitous ways have alienated practically everyone in the U.S. <br>  <br>                        foreign policy establishment as well--except for Rumsfeld's <br>  <br>                        Department of Defense, and therefore the White House.  <br><br>                        11) The United States is waging a war on terror.  <br><br>                        Practically any school child could recite the terms of the Bush <br>  <br>                        Doctrine, and may have to before the Ashcroft Justice Department is <br>  <br>                        finished: The global war on terror is about confronting terrorist <br>  <br>                        groups and the nations that harbor them. The United States does not <br>  <br>                        make deals with terrorists or nations where they find safe lodging.  <br><br>                        Leave aside the blind eye that the U.S. has always cast toward <br>  <br>                        Israel's actions in the territories. How are the Bushmen doing <br>  <br>                        elsewhere vis-&agrave;-vis their announced principles? We can start with <br>  <br>                        their fabrications and manipulations of Iraqi WMD evidence--which, <br>  <br>                        in the eyes of weapons inspectors, the UN Security Council, <br>  <br>                        American intelligence analysts, and the world at large, did not pose <br>  <br>                        any imminent threat.  <br><br>                        The events of recent months have underscored a couple more <br>  <br>                        gaping  <br>  <br>                        violations of W's cardinal anti-terror rules. In April the Pentagon <br>  <br>                        made a cooperation pact with the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK), an <br>  <br>                        anti-Iranian terrorist group based in Iraq. Prior to the 1979 Iranian <br>  <br>                        revolution, American intelligence blamed it for the death of several <br>  <br>                        U.S. nationals in Iran.  <br><br>                        Most glaring of all is the Bush administration's remarkable treatment <br>  <br>                        of Saudi Arabia. Consider: Eleven of the nineteen September 11 <br>  <br>                        hijackers were Saudis. The ruling House of Saud has longstanding <br>  <br>                        and well-known ties to al Qaeda and other terrorist outfits, which it <br>  <br>                        funds (read protection money) to keep them from making mischief <br>  <br>                        at home. The May issue of Atlantic Monthly had a nice piece on the <br>  <br>                        House of Saud that recounts these connections.  <br><br>                        Yet the Bush government has never said boo regarding the Saudis <br>  <br>                        and international terrorism. In fact, when terror bombers struck <br>  <br>                        Riyadh in May, hitting compounds that housed American workers <br>  <br>                        as well, Colin Powell went out of his way to avoid tarring the House <br>  <br>                        of Saud: \"Terrorism strikes everywhere and everyone. It is a threat <br>  <br>                        to the civilized world. We will commit ourselves again to redouble <br>  <br>                        our efforts to work closely with our Saudi friends and friends all <br>  <br>                        around the world to go after al Qaeda.\" Later it was alleged that the <br>  <br>                        Riyadh bombers purchased some of their ordnance from the Saudi <br>  <br>                        National Guard, but neither Powell nor anyone else saw fit to revise <br>  <br>                        their statements about \"our Saudi friends.\"  <br><br>                        Why do the Bushmen give a pass to the Saudi terror hotbed? <br>  <br>                        Because the House of Saud controls a lot of oil, and they are still <br>  <br>                        (however  <br>  <br>                        tenuously) on our side. And that, not terrorism, is what matters most <br>  <br>                        in Bush's foreign policy calculus.  <br><br>                        While the bomb craters in Riyadh were still smoking, W held a <br>  <br>                        meeting with Philippine president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. <br>  <br>                        Speaking publicly afterward, he outlined a deal for U.S. military aid <br>  <br>                        to the Philippines in exchange for greater \"cooperation\" in getting <br>  <br>                        American hands round the throats of Filipino terrorists. He <br>  <br>                        mentioned in particular the U.S.'s longtime nemesis Abu <br>  <br>                        Sayyaf--and he also singled out the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, a <br>  <br>                        small faction based on Mindanao, the southernmost big island in the <br>  <br>                        Philippine chain.  <br><br>                        Of course it's by purest coincidence that Mindanao is the location of <br>  <br>                        Asia's richest oil reserves.  <br><br>                        12) The U.S. has made progress against world terrorist elements, in <br>  <br>                        particular by crippling al Qaeda.  <br><br>                        A resurgent al Qaeda has been making international news since <br>  <br>                        around the time of the Saudi Arabia bombings in May. The best <br>  <br>                        coverage by far is that of Asia Times correspondent Syed Saleem <br>  <br>                        Shahzad. According to Shahzad's detailed accounts, al Qaeda has <br>  <br>                        reorganized itself along leaner, more diffuse lines, effectively <br>  <br>                        dissolving itself into a coalition of localized units that mean to strike <br>  <br>                        frequently, on a small scale, and in multiple locales around the <br>  <br>                        world. Since claiming responsibility for the May Riyadh bombings, <br>  <br>                        alleged al Qaeda communiqu&eacute;s have also claimed credit for some of <br>  <br>                        the strikes at U.S. troops in Iraq.  <br><br>                        13) The Bush administration has made Americans safer from terror <br>  <br>                        on U.S. soil.  <br><br>                        Like the Pentagon \"plan\" for occupying postwar Iraq, the <br>  <br>                        Department of Homeland Security is mainly a Bush administration <br>  <br>                        PR dirigible untethered to anything of substance. It's a scandal <br>  <br>                        waiting to happen, and the only good news for W is that it's near <br>  <br>                        the back of a fairly long line of scandals waiting to happen.  <br><br>                        On May 26 the trade magazine Federal Computer Week published a <br>  <br>                        report on DHS's first 100 days. At that point the nerve center of <br>  <br>                        Bush's domestic war on terror had only recently gotten e-mail <br>  <br>                        service. As for the larger matter of creating a functioning <br>  <br>                        organizational grid and, more important, a software architecture plan <br>  <br>                        for integrating the enormous mass of data that DHS is supposed to <br>  <br>                        process--nada. In the nearly two years since the administration <br>  <br>                        announced its intention to create a cabinet-level homeland security <br>  <br>                        office, nothing meaningful has been accomplished. And there are no <br>  <br>                        funds to implement a network plan if they had one. According to the <br>  <br>                        magazine, \"Robert David Steele, an author and former intelligence <br>  <br>                        officer, points out that there are at least 30 separate intelligence <br>  <br>                        systems [theoretically feeding into DHS] and no money to connect <br>  <br>                        them to one another or make them interoperable. 'There is nothing <br>  <br>                        in the president's homeland security program that makes America <br>  <br>                        safer,' he said.\"  <br><br>                        14) The Bush administration has nothing to hide concerning the <br>  <br>                        events of September 11, 2001, or the intelligence evidence collected <br>  <br>                        prior to that day.  <br><br>                        First Dick Cheney personally intervened to scuttle a broad <br>  <br>                        congressional investigation of the day's events and their origins. And <br>  <br>                        for the past several months the administration has fought a quiet <br>  <br>                        rear-guard action culminating in last week's delayed release of <br>  <br>                        Congress's more modest 9\/11 report. The White House even went <br>  <br>                        so far as to classify after the fact materials that had already been <br>  <br>                        presented in public hearing.  <br><br>                        What were they trying to keep under wraps? The Saudi connection, <br>  <br>                        mostly, and though 27 pages of the details have been excised from <br>  <br>                        the public report, there is still plenty of evidence lurking in its <br>  <br>                        extensively massaged text. (When you see the phrase \"foreign <br>  <br>                        nation\" substituted in brackets, it's nearly always Saudi Arabia.) The <br>  <br>                        report documents repeated signs that there was a major attack in the <br>  <br>                        works with extensive help from Saudi nationals and apparently also <br>  <br>                        at least one member of the government. It also suggests that is one <br>  <br>                        reason intel operatives didn't chase the story harder: Saudi Arabia <br>  <br>                        was by policy fiat a \"friendly\" nation and therefore no threat. The <br>  <br>                        report does not explore the administration's response to the <br>  <br>                        intelligence briefings it got; its purview is strictly the performance of <br>  <br>                        intelligence agencies. All other questions now fall to the independent <br>  <br>                        9\/11 commission, whose work is presently being slowed by the <br>  <br>                        White House's foot-dragging in turning over evidence.  <br><br>                        15) U.S. air defenses functioned according to protocols on <br>  <br>                        September 11, 2001.  <br><br>                        Old questions abound here. The central mystery, of how U.S. air <br>  <br>                        defenses could have responded so poorly on that day, is fairly easy <br>  <br>                        to grasp. A cursory look at that morning's timeline of events is <br>  <br>                        enough. In very short strokes:  <br><br>                        8:13 Flight 11 disobeys air traffic instructions and turns off its <br>  <br>                        transponder.  <br><br>                        8:40 NORAD command center claims first notification of likely <br>  <br>                        Flight 11 hijacking.  <br><br>                        8:42 Flight 175 veers off course and shuts down its transponder.  <br><br>                        8:43 NORAD claims first notification of likely Flight 175 hijacking.  <br><br>                        8:46 Flight 11 hits the World Trade Center north tower.  <br><br>                        8:46 Flight 77 goes off course.  <br><br>                        9:03 Flight 175 hits the WTC south tower.  <br><br>                        9:16 Flight 93 goes off course.  <br><br>                        9:16 NORAD claims first notification of likely Flight 93 hijacking.  <br><br>                        9:24 NORAD claims first notification of likely Flight 77 hijacking.  <br><br>                        9:37 Flight 77 hits the Pentagon.  <br><br>                        10:06 Flight 93 crashes in a Pennsylvania field.  <br><br>                        The open secret here is that stateside U.S. air defenses had been <br>  <br>                        reduced to paltry levels since the end of the Cold War. According to <br>  <br>                        a report by Paul Thompson published at the endlessly informative <br>  <br>                        Center for  <br>  <br>                        Cooperative Research website (www.cooperativeresearch.org), <br>  <br>                        \"[O]nly two air force bases in the Northeast region... were formally <br>  <br>                        part of NORAD's defensive system. One was Otis Air National <br>  <br>                        Guard Base, on Massachusetts's Cape Cod peninsula and about 188 <br>  <br>                        miles east of New York City. The other was Langley Air Force <br>  <br>                        Base near Norfolk, Virginia, and about 129 miles south of <br>  <br>                        Washington. During the Cold War, the U.S. had literally thousands <br>  <br>                        of fighters on alert. But as the Cold War wound down, this number <br>  <br>                        was reduced until it reached only 14 fighters in the continental U.S. <br>  <br>                        by 9\/11.\"  <br><br>                        But even an underpowered air defense system on slow-response <br>  <br>                        status (15 minutes, officially, on 9\/11) does not explain the <br>  <br>                        magnitude of NORAD's apparent failures that day. Start with the <br>  <br>                        discrepancy in the times at which NORAD commanders claim to <br>  <br>                        have learned of the various hijackings. By 8:43 a.m., NORAD had <br>  <br>                        been notified of two probable hijackings in the previous five <br>  <br>                        minutes. If there was such a thing as a system-wide air defense <br>  <br>                        crisis plan, it should have kicked in at that moment. Three minutes <br>  <br>                        later, at 8:46, Flight 11 crashed into the first WTC tower. By then <br>  <br>                        alerts should have been going out to all regional air traffic centers of <br>  <br>                        apparent coordinated hijackings in progress. Yet when Flight 77, <br>  <br>                        which eventually crashed into the Pentagon, was hijacked three <br>  <br>                        minutes later, at 8:46, NORAD claims not to have learned of it until <br>  <br>                        9:24, 38 minutes after the fact and just 13 minutes before it crashed <br>  <br>                        into the Pentagon.  <br><br>                        The professed lag in reacting to the hijacking of Flight 93 is just as <br>  <br>                        striking. NORAD acknowledged learning of the hijacking at 9:16, <br>  <br>                        yet the Pentagon's position is that it had not yet intercepted the <br>  <br>                        plane when it crashed in a Pennsylvania field just minutes away <br>  <br>                        from Washington, D.C. at 10:06, a full 50 minutes later.  <br><br>                        In fact, there are a couple of other circumstantial details of the crash, <br>  <br>                        discussed mostly in Pennsylvania newspapers and barely noted in <br>  <br>                        national wire stories, that suggest Flight 93 may have been shot <br>  <br>                        down after all. First, officials never disputed reports that there was a <br>  <br>                        secondary debris field six miles from the main crash site, and a few <br>  <br>                        press accounts said that it included one of the plane's engines. A <br>  <br>                        secondary debris field points to an explosion on board, from one of <br>  <br>                        two probable causes--a terrorist bomb carried on board or an Air <br>  <br>                        Force missile. And no  <br>  <br>                        investigation has ever intimated that any of the four terror crews <br>  <br>                        were toting explosives. They kept to simple tools like the box <br>  <br>                        cutters, for ease in passing security. Second, a handful of <br>  <br>                        eyewitnesses in the rural area around the crash site did report seeing <br>  <br>                        low-flying U.S. military jets around the time of the crash.  <br><br>                        Which only raises another question. Shooting down Flight 93 would <br>  <br>                        have been incontestably the right thing to do under the <br>  <br>                        circumstances. More than that, it would have constituted the only <br>  <br>                        evidence of anything NORAD and the Pentagon had done right that <br>  <br>                        whole morning. So why deny it? Conversely, if fighter jets really <br>  <br>                        were not on the scene when 93 crashed, why weren't they? How <br>  <br>                        could that possibly be?  <br><br>                        16) The Bush administration had a plan for restoring essential <br>  <br>                        services and rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure after the shooting war <br>  <br>                        ended.  <br><br>                        The question of what the U.S. would do to rebuild Iraq was raised <br>  <br>                        before the shooting started. I remember reading a press briefing in <br>  <br>                        which a Pentagon official boasted that at the time, the American <br>  <br>                        reconstruction team had already spent three weeks planning the <br>  <br>                        postwar world! The Pentagon's first word was that the essentials of <br>  <br>                        rebuilding the country would take about $10 billion and three <br>  <br>                        months; this stood in fairly stark contrast to UN estimates that an <br>  <br>                        aggressive rebuilding program could cost up to $100 billion a year <br>  <br>                        for a minimum of three years.  <br><br>                        After the shooting stopped it was evident the U.S. had no plan for <br>  <br>                        keeping order in the streets, much less commencing to rebuild. <br>  <br>                        (They are upgrading certain oil facilities, but that's another matter.) <br>  <br>                        There are two ways to read this. The popular version is that it <br>  <br>                        proves what bumblers Bush and his crew really are. And it's <br>  <br>                        certainly true that where the details of their grand designs are <br>  <br>                        concerned, the administration tends to have postures rather than <br>  <br>                        plans. But this ignores the strategic advantages the U.S. stands to <br>  <br>                        reap by leaving Iraqi domestic affairs in a chronic state of (managed, <br>  <br>                        they hope) chaos. Most important, it provides an excuse for the <br>  <br>                        continued presence of a large U.S. force, which ensures that <br>  <br>                        America will call the shots in putting Iraqi oil back on the world <br>  <br>                        market and seeing to it that the Iraqis don't fall in with the wrong <br>  <br>                        sort of oil company partners. A long military occupation is also a <br>  <br>                        practical means of accomplishing something the U.S. cannot do <br>  <br>                        officially, which is to maintain air bases in Iraq indefinitely. (This <br>  <br>                        became necessary after the U.S. agreed to vacate its bases in Saudi <br>  <br>                        Arabia earlier this year to try to defuse anti-U.S. political tensions <br>  <br>                        there.)  <br><br>                        Meanwhile, the U.S. plans to pay for whatever rebuilding it gets <br>  <br>                        around to doing with the proceeds of Iraqi oil sales, an enormous <br>  <br>                        cash box the U.S. will oversee for the good of the Iraqi people.  <br><br>                        In other words, \"no plan\" may have been the plan the Bushmen <br>  <br>                        were intent on pursuing all along.  <br><br>                        17) The U.S. has made a good-faith effort at peacekeeping in Iraq <br>  <br>                        during the postwar period.  <br><br>                        \"Some [looters] shot big grins at American soldiers and Marines or <br>  <br>                        put down their prizes to offer a thumbs-up or a quick finger across <br>  <br>                        the throat and a whispered word--Saddam--before grabbing their <br>  <br>                        loot and vanishing.\" --Robert Fisk, London Independent, 4\/11\/03  <br><br>                        Despite the many clashes between U.S. troops and Iraqis in the <br>  <br>                        three months since the heavy artillery fell silent, the postwar <br>  <br>                        performance of U.S. forces has been more remarkable for the things <br>  <br>                        they have not  <br>  <br>                        done--their failure to intervene in civil chaos or to begin <br>  <br>                        reestablishing basic civil procedures. It isn't the soldiers' fault. <br>  <br>                        Traditionally an occupation force is headed up by military police <br>  <br>                        units schooled to interact with the natives and oversee the <br>  <br>                        restoration of goods and services. But Rumsfeld has repeatedly <br>  <br>                        declined advice to rotate out the combat troops sooner rather than <br>  <br>                        later and replace some of them with an MP force. Lately this has <br>  <br>                        been a source of escalating criticism within military ranks.  <br><br>                        18) Despite vocal international opposition, the U.S. was backed by <br>  <br>                        most of the world, as evidenced by the 40-plus-member Coalition of <br>  <br>                        the Willing.  <br><br>                        When the whole world opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the outcry <br>  <br>                        was so loud that it briefly pierced the slumber of the American <br>  <br>                        public, which poured out its angst in poll numbers that bespoke little <br>  <br>                        taste for a war without the UN's blessing. So it became necessary to <br>  <br>                        assure the folks at home that the whole world was in fact for the <br>  <br>                        invasion. Thus was born the Coalition of the Willing, consisting of <br>  <br>                        the U.S. and UK, with Australia caddying--and 40-some additional <br>  <br>                        co-champions of U.S.-style democracy in the Middle East, whose <br>  <br>                        ranks included such titans of diplomacy and pillars of representative <br>  <br>                        government as Angola, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Eritrea, and <br>  <br>                        Micronesia. If the American public noticed the ruse, all was <br>  <br>                        nonetheless forgotten when Baghdad fell. Everybody loves a <br>  <br>                        winner.  <br><br>                        19) This war was notable for its protection of civilians.  <br><br>                        This from the Herald of Scotland, May 23: \"American guns, bombs, <br>  <br>                        and missiles killed more civilians in the recent war in Iraq than in <br>  <br>                        any conflict since Vietnam, according to preliminary assessments <br>  <br>                        carried out by the UN, international aid agencies, and independent <br>  <br>                        study groups. Despite U.S. boasts this was the fastest, most clinical <br>  <br>                        campaign in military history, a first snapshot of 'collateral damage' <br>  <br>                        indicates that between 5,000 and 10,000 Iraqi non-combatants died <br>  <br>                        in the course of the hi-tech blitzkrieg.\"  <br><br>                        20) The looting of archaeological and historic sites in Baghdad was <br>  <br>                        unanticipated.  <br><br>                        General Jay Garner himself, then the head man for postwar Iraq, <br>  <br>                        told the Washington Times that he had put the Iraqi National <br>  <br>                        Museum second on a list of sites requiring protection after the fall of <br>  <br>                        the Saddam  <br>  <br>                        government, and he had no idea why the recommendation was <br>  <br>                        ignored. It's also a matter of record that the administration had met <br>  <br>                        in January with a group of U.S. scholars concerned with the <br>  <br>                        preservation of Iraq's fabulous Sumerian antiquities. So the war <br>  <br>                        planners were aware of the riches at stake. According to Scotland's <br>  <br>                        Sunday Herald, the Pentagon took at least one other meeting as <br>  <br>                        well: \"[A] coalition of antiquities collectors and arts lawyers, calling <br>  <br>                        itself the American Council for Cultural Policy (ACCP), met with <br>  <br>                        U.S. Defense and State department officials prior to the start of <br>  <br>                        military action to offer its assistance.... The group is known to <br>  <br>                        consist of a number of influential dealers who favor a relaxation of <br>  <br>                        Iraq's tight restrictions on the ownership and export of antiquities.... <br>  <br>                        [Archaeological Institute of America] president Patty Gerstenblith <br>  <br>                        said: 'The ACCP's agenda is to encourage the collecting of <br>  <br>                        antiquities through weakening the laws of archaeologically rich <br>  <br>                        nations and eliminate national ownership of antiquities to allow for <br>  <br>                        easier export.'\"  <br><br>                        21) Saddam was planning to provide WMD to terrorist groups.  <br><br>                        This is very concisely debunked in Walter Pincus's July 21 <br>  <br>                        Washington Post story, so I'll quote him: \"'Iraq could decide on any <br>  <br>                        given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist <br>  <br>                        group or individual terrorists,' President Bush said in Cincinnati on <br>  <br>                        October 7.... But declassified portions of a still-secret National <br>  <br>                        Intelligence Estimate (NIE) released Friday by the White House <br>  <br>                        show that at the time of the president's speech the U.S. intelligence <br>  <br>                        community judged that possibility to be unlikely. In fact, the NIE, <br>  <br>                        which began circulating October 2, shows the intelligence services <br>  <br>                        were much more worried that Hussein might give weapons to al <br>  <br>                        Qaeda terrorists if he were facing death or capture and his <br>  <br>                        government was collapsing after a military attack by the United <br>  <br>                        States.\"  <br><br>                        22) Saddam was capable of launching a chemical or biological <br>  <br>                        attack in 45 minutes.  <br><br>                        Again the WashPost wraps it up nicely: \"The 45-minute claim is at <br>  <br>                        the center of a scandal in Britain that led to the apparent suicide on <br>  <br>                        Friday of a British weapons scientist who had questioned the <br>  <br>                        government's use of the allegation. The scientist, David Kelly, was <br>  <br>                        being investigated by the British parliament as the suspected source <br>  <br>                        of a BBC report that the 45-minute claim was added to Britain's <br>  <br>                        public 'dossier' on Iraq in September at the insistence of an aide to <br>  <br>                        Prime Minister Tony Blair--and against the wishes of British <br>  <br>                        intelligence, which said the charge was from a single source and <br>  <br>                        was considered unreliable.\"  <br><br>                        23) The Bush administration is seeking to create a viable Palestinian <br>  <br>                        state.  <br><br>                        The interests of the U.S. toward the Palestinians have not <br>  <br>                        changed--not yet, at least. Israel's \"security needs\" are still the U.S.'s <br>  <br>                        sturdiest pretext for its military role in policing the Middle East and <br>  <br>                        arming its Israeli proxies. But the U.S.'s immediate needs have tilted <br>  <br>                        since the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Now the Bushmen need <br>  <br>                        a fig leaf--to confuse, if not exactly cover, their designs, and to give <br>  <br>                        shaky pro-U.S. governments in the region some scrap to hold out to <br>  <br>                        their own restive peoples. Bush's roadmap has scared the hell out of <br>  <br>                        the Israeli right, but they have little reason to worry. Press reports in <br>  <br>                        the U.S. and Israel have repeatedly telegraphed the assurance that <br>  <br>                        Bush won't try to push Ariel Sharon any further than he's <br>  <br>                        comfortable going.  <br><br>                        24) People detained by the U.S. after 9\/11 were legitimate terror <br>  <br>                        suspects.  <br><br>                        Quite the contrary, as disclosed officially in last month's critical <br>  <br>                        report on U.S. detainees from the Justice Department's own Office <br>  <br>                        of Inspector General. A summary analysis of post-9\/11 detentions <br>  <br>                        posted at the UC-Davis website states, \"None of the 1,200 <br>  <br>                        foreigners arrested and detained in secret after September 11 was <br>  <br>                        charged with an act of  <br>  <br>                        terrorism. Instead, after periods of detention that ranged from weeks <br>  <br>                        to months, most were deported for violating immigration laws. The <br>  <br>                        government said that 752 of 1,200 foreigners arrested after <br>  <br>                        September 11 were in custody in May 2002, but only 81 were still <br>  <br>                        in custody in September 2002.\"  <br><br>                        25) The U.S. is obeying the Geneva conventions in its treatment of <br>  <br>                        terror-related suspects, prisoners, and detainees.  <br><br>                        The entire mumbo-jumbo about \"unlawful combatants\" was <br>  <br>                        conceived to skirt the Geneva conventions on treatment of prisoners <br>  <br>                        by making them out to be something other than POWs. Here is the <br>  <br>                        actual wording of Donald Rumsfeld's pledge, freighted with enough <br>  <br>                        qualifiers to make it absolutely  <br>  <br>                        meaningless: \"We have indicated that we do plan to, for the most <br>  <br>                        part, treat them in a manner that is reasonably consistent with the <br>  <br>                        Geneva conventions to the extent they are appropriate.\" Meanwhile <br>  <br>                        the  <br>  <br>                        administration has treated its prisoners--many of whom, as we are <br>  <br>                        now seeing confirmed in legal hearings, have no plausible <br>  <br>                        connection to terrorist enterprises--in a manner that blatantly <br>  <br>                        violates several key Geneva provisions regarding humane treatment <br>  <br>                        and housing.  <br><br>                        26) Shots rang out from the Palestine hotel, directed at U.S. soldiers, <br>  <br>                        just before a U.S. tank fired on the hotel, killing two journalists.  <br><br>                        Eyewitnesses to the April 8 attack uniformly denied any gunfire <br>  <br>                        from the hotel. And just two hours prior to firing on the hotel, U.S. <br>  <br>                        forces had bombed the Baghdad offices of Al-Jazeera, killing a <br>  <br>                        Jordanian reporter. Taken together, and considering the timing, they <br>  <br>                        were deemed a warning to unembedded journalists covering the fall <br>  <br>                        of Baghdad around them. The day's events seem to have been an <br>  <br>                        extreme instance of a more surreptitious pattern of hostility <br>  <br>                        demonstrated by U.S. and UK forces toward foreign journalists and <br>  <br>                        those non-attached Western reporters who moved around the <br>  <br>                        country at will. (One of them, Terry Lloyd of Britain's ITN, was <br>  <br>                        shot to death by UK troops at a checkpoint in late March under <br>  <br>                        circumstances the British government has refused to disclose.)  <br><br>                        Some days after firing on the Palestine Hotel, the U.S. sent in a <br>  <br>                        commando unit to raid select floors of the hotel that were known to <br>  <br>                        be occupied by journalists, and the news gatherers were held on the <br>  <br>                        floor at gunpoint while their rooms were searched. A Centcom <br>  <br>                        spokesman later explained cryptically that intelligence reports <br>  <br>                        suggested there were people \"not friendly to the U.S.\" staying at the <br>  <br>                        hotel. Allied forces also bombed the headquarters of Abu Dhabi TV, <br>  <br>                        injuring several.  <br><br>                        27) U.S. troops \"rescued\" Private Jessica Lynch from an Iraqi <br>  <br>                        hospital.  <br><br>                        If I had wanted to run up the tally of administration lies, the Lynch <br>  <br>                        episode alone could be parsed into several more. Officials claimed <br>  <br>                        that Lynch and her comrades were taken after a firefight in which <br>  <br>                        Lynch battled back bravely. Later they announced with great <br>  <br>                        fanfare that U.S. Special Forces had rescued Lynch from her <br>  <br>                        captors. They reported that she had been shot and stabbed. Later <br>  <br>                        yet, they reported that the recuperating Lynch had no memory of <br>  <br>                        the events.  <br><br>                        Bit by bit it all proved false. Lynch's injuries occurred when the <br>  <br>                        vehicle she was riding in crashed. She did not fire on anybody and <br>  <br>                        she was not shot or stabbed. The Iraqi soldiers who had been <br>  <br>                        holding her had abandoned the hospital where she was staying the <br>  <br>                        night before U.S. troops came to get her--a development her <br>  <br>                        \"rescuers\" were aware of. In fact her doctor had tried to return her <br>  <br>                        to the Americans the previous evening after the Iraqi soldiers left. <br>  <br>                        But he was forced to turn back when U.S. troops fired on the <br>  <br>                        approaching ambulance. As for Lynch's amnesia, her family has told <br>  <br>                        reporters her memory is perfectly fine.  <br><br>                        28) The populace of Baghdad and of Iraq generally turned out en <br>  <br>                        masse to greet U.S. troops as liberators.  <br><br>                        There were indeed scattered expressions of thanks when U.S. <br>  <br>                        divisions rolled in, but they were neither as extensive nor as <br>  <br>                        enthusiastic as Bush image-makers pretended. Within a day or two <br>  <br>                        of the Saddam government's fall, the scene in the Baghdad streets <br>  <br>                        turned to wholesale ransacking and vandalism. Within the week, <br>  <br>                        large-scale protests of the U.S. occupation had already begun <br>  <br>                        occurring in every major Iraqi city.  <br><br>                        29) A spontaneous crowd of cheering Iraqis showed up in a <br>  <br>                        Baghdad square to celebrate the toppling of Saddam's statue.  <br><br>                        A long-distance shot of the same scene that was widely posted on <br>  <br>                        the internet shows that the teeming mob consisted of only one or <br>  <br>                        two hundred souls, contrary to the impression given by all the <br>  <br>                        close-up TV news shots of what appeared to be a massive <br>  <br>                        gathering. It was later reported that members of Ahmed Chalabi's <br>  <br>                        local entourage made up most of the throng.  <br><br>                        30) No major figure in the Bush administration said that the Iraqi <br>  <br>                        populace would turn out en masse to welcome the U.S. military as  <br>  <br>                        liberators.  <br><br>                        When confronted with--oh, call them reality deficits--one habit of <br>  <br>                        the Bushmen is to deny that they made erroneous or misleading <br>  <br>                        statements to begin with, secure in the knowledge that the media <br>  <br>                        will rarely muster the energy to look it up and call them on it. They <br>  <br>                        did it when their bold prewar WMD predictions failed to pan out <br>  <br>                        (We never said it would be easy! No, they only implied it), and they <br>  <br>                        did it when the \"jubilant Iraqis\" who took to the streets after the fall <br>  <br>                        of Saddam turned out to be anything but (We never promised they <br>  <br>                        would welcome us with open arms!).  <br><br>                        But they did. March 16, Dick Cheney, Meet the Press: The Iraqis <br>  <br>                        are desperate \"to get rid of Saddam Hussein and they will welcome <br>  <br>                        as  <br>  <br>                        liberators the United States when we come to do that.... [T]he vast <br>  <br>                        majority of them would turn on [Saddam] in a minute if, in fact, <br>  <br>                        they thought they could do so safely\").  <br><br>                        31) The U.S. achieved its stated objectives in Afghanistan, and <br>  <br>                        vanquished the Taliban.  <br><br>                        According to accounts in the Asia Times of Hong Kong, the U.S. <br>  <br>                        held a secret meeting earlier this year with Taliban leaders and <br>  <br>                        Pakistani intelligence officials to offer a deal to the Taliban for <br>  <br>                        inclusion in the Afghan government. (Main condition: Dump Mullah <br>  <br>                        Omar.) As Michael Tomasky commented in The American <br>  <br>                        Prospect, \"The first thing you may be wondering: Why is there a <br>  <br>                        possible role for the Taliban in a future government? Isn't that <br>  <br>                        fellow Hamid Karzai running things, and isn't it all going basically <br>  <br>                        okay? As it turns out, not really and not at all.... The reality... is an <br>  <br>                        escalating guerilla war in which 'small hit-and-run attacks are a daily <br>  <br>                        feature in most parts of the country, while face-to-face skirmishes <br>  <br>                        are common in the former Taliban stronghold around Kandahar in <br>  <br>                        the south.'\"  <br><br>                        32) Careful science demonstrates that depleted uranium is no big <br>  <br>                        risk to the population.  <br><br>                        Pure nonsense. While the government has trotted out expert after <br>  <br>                        expert to debunk the dangers of depleted uranium, DU has been <br>  <br>                        implicated in health troubles experienced both by Iraqis and by U.S. <br>  <br>                        and allied soldiers in the first Gulf War. Unexploded DU shells are <br>  <br>                        not a grave danger, but detonated ones release particles that <br>  <br>                        eventually find their way into air, soil, water, and food.  <br><br>                        While we're on the subject, the BBC reported a couple of months <br>  <br>                        ago that recent tests of Afghani civilians have turned up with <br>  <br>                        unusually high concentrations of non-depleted uranium isotopes in <br>  <br>                        their urine.  <br>  <br>                        International monitors have called it almost conclusive evidence that <br>  <br>                        the U.S. used a new kind of uranium-laced bomb in the Afghan war. <br><br>  <br>  <br>                        33) The looting of Iraqi nuclear facilities presented no big risk to the <br>  <br>                        population.  <br><br>                        Commanders on the scene, and Rumsfeld back in Washington, <br>  <br>                        immediately assured everyone that the looting of a facility where <br>  <br>                        raw uranium powder (so-called \"yellowcake\") and several other <br>  <br>                        radioactive isotopes were stored was no serious danger to the <br>  <br>                        populace--yet the looting of the facility came to light in part because, <br>  <br>                        as the Washington Times noted, \"U.S. and British newspaper <br>  <br>                        reports have suggested that residents of the area were suffering from <br>  <br>                        severe ill health after tipping out yellowcake powder from barrels <br>  <br>                        and using them to store food.\"  <br><br>                        34) U.S. troops were under attack when they fired upon a crowd of <br>  <br>                        civilian protesters in Mosul.  <br><br>                        April 15: U.S. troops fire into a crowd of protesters when it grows <br>  <br>                        angry at the pro-Western speech being given by the town's new <br>  <br>                        mayor, Mashaan al-Juburi. Seven are killed and dozens injured. <br>  <br>                        Eyewitness accounts say the soldiers spirit Juburi away as he is <br>  <br>                        pelted with objects by the crowd, then take sniper positions and <br>  <br>                        begin firing on the crowd.  <br><br>                        35) U.S. troops were under attack when they fired upon two <br>  <br>                        separate crowds of civilian protesters in Fallujah.  <br><br>                        April 28: American troops fire into a crowd of demonstrators <br>  <br>                        gathered on Saddam's birthday, killing 13 and injuring 75. U.S. <br>  <br>                        commanders claim the troops had come under fire, but eyewitnesses <br>  <br>                        contradict the account, saying the troops started shooting after they <br>  <br>                        were spooked by warning shots fired over the crowd by one of the <br>  <br>                        Americans' own Humvees. Two days later U.S. soldiers fired on <br>  <br>                        another crowd in Fallujah, killing three more.  <br><br>                        36) The Iraqis fighting occupation forces consist almost entirely of <br>  <br>                        \"Saddam supporters\" or \"Ba'ath remnants.\"  <br><br>                        This has been the subject of considerable spin on the Bushmen's <br>  <br>                        part in the past month, since they launched Operation Sidewinder to <br>  <br>                        capture or kill remaining opponents of the U.S. occupation. It's true <br>  <br>                        that the most fierce (but by no means all) of the recent guerrilla <br>  <br>                        opposition has been concentrated in the Sunni-dominated areas that <br>  <br>                        were Saddam's stronghold, and there is no question that Saddam <br>  <br>                        partisans are numerous there. But, perhaps for that reason, many <br>  <br>                        other guerrilla fighters have flocked there to wage jihad, both from <br>  <br>                        within and without Iraq. Around the time of the U.S. invasion, some <br>  <br>                        10,000 or so foreign fighters had crossed into Iraq, and I've seen no <br>  <br>                        informed estimate of how many more may have joined them since.  <br><br>                        (No room here, but if you check the online version of this story, <br>  <br>                        there's a footnote regarding one less-than-obvious reason former <br>  <br>                        Republican Guard personnel may be fighting mad at this point.)  <br><br>                        37) The bidding process for Iraq rebuilding contracts displayed no <br>  <br>                        favoritism toward Bush and Cheney's oil\/gas cronies.  <br><br>                        Most notoriously, Dick Cheney's former energy-sector employer,  <br>  <br>                        Halliburton, was all over the press dispatches about the first round <br>  <br>                        of rebuilding contracts. So much so that they were eventually <br>  <br>                        obliged to bow out of the running for a $1 billion reconstruction <br>  <br>                        contract for the sake of their own PR profile. But Halliburton <br>  <br>                        subsidiary Kellogg Brown Root still received the first major plum in <br>  <br>                        the form of a $7 billion contract to tend to oil field fires and (the real <br>  <br>                        purpose) to do any retooling necessary to get the oil pumping at a <br>  <br>                        decent rate, a deal that allows them a cool $500 million in profit. <br>  <br>                        The fact that Dick Cheney's office is still fighting tooth and nail to <br>  <br>                        block any disclosure of the individuals and companies with whom <br>  <br>                        his energy task force consulted tells everything you need to know.  <br><br>                        38) \"We found the WMDs!\"  <br><br>                        There have been at least half a dozen junctures at which the <br>  <br>                        Bushmen have breathlessly informed the press that allied troops had <br>  <br>                        found the WMD smoking gun, including the president himself, who <br>  <br>                        on June 1 told  <br>  <br>                        reporters, \"For those who say we haven't found the banned <br>  <br>                        manufacturing devices or banned weapons, they're wrong, we <br>  <br>                        found them.\"  <br><br>                        Shouldn't these quickly falsified statements be counted as errors <br>  <br>                        rather than lies? Under the circumstances, no. First, there is just too  <br>  <br>                        voluminous a record of the administration going on the media <br>  <br>                        offensive to tout lines they know to be flimsy. This appears to be <br>  <br>                        more of same. Second, if the great genius Karl Rove and the rest of <br>  <br>                        the Bushmen have demonstrated that they understand anything <br>  <br>                        about the propaganda potential of the historical moment they've <br>  <br>                        inherited, they surely understand that repetition is everything. Get <br>  <br>                        your message out regularly, and even if it's false a good many <br>  <br>                        people will believe it.  <br><br>                        Finally, we don't have to speculate about whether the administration <br>  <br>                        would really plant bogus WMD evidence in the American media, <br>  <br>                        because they have already done it, most visibly in the case of Judith <br>  <br>                        Miller of the New York Times and the Iraqi defector \"scientist\" she <br>  <br>                        wrote about at the military's behest on April 21. Miller did not even <br>  <br>                        get to speak with the purported scientist, but she graciously passed <br>  <br>                        on several things American commanders claimed he said: that Iraq <br>  <br>                        only destroyed its chemical weapons days before the war, that <br>  <br>                        WMD materiel had been shipped to Syria, and that Iraq had ties to <br>  <br>                        al Qaeda. As Slate media critic Jack Shafer told WNYC Radio's On <br>  <br>                        the Media program, \"When you... look at [her story], you find that <br>  <br>                        it's gas, it's air. There's no way to judge the value of her <br>  <br>                        information, because it comes from an unnamed source that won't <br>  <br>                        let her verify any aspect of it. And if you dig into the story... you'll <br>  <br>                        find out that the only thing that Miller has independently observed is <br>  <br>                        a man that the military says is the scientist, wearing a baseball cap, <br>  <br>                        pointing at mounds in the dirt.\"  <br><br>                        39) \"The Iraqi people are now free.\"  <br><br>                        So says the current U.S. administrator of Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, in a <br>  <br>                        recent New York Times op-ed. He failed to add that disagreeing can <br>  <br>                        get you shot or arrested under the terms of the Pentagon's latest <br>  <br>                        plan for pacifying Iraq, Operation Sidewinder (see #36), a military <br>  <br>                        op launched last month to wipe out all remaining Ba'athists and <br>  <br>                        Saddam  <br>  <br>                        partisans--meaning, in practice, anyone who resists the U.S. <br>  <br>                        occupation too zealously.  <br><br>                        40) God told Bush to invade Iraq.  <br><br>                        Not long after the September 11 attacks, neoconservative high priest <br>  <br>                        Norman Podhoretz wrote: \"One hears that Bush, who entered the <br>  <br>                        White House without a clear s\n","contact":"","link":"","address":"","phone":"","parent_id":0,"mime_type":"text\/plain","summary":"Look at what I found @ Portland IMC.\r\n","numcomment":1,"fileurl":"\/uploads\/","filesize":null,"article_url":"\/news\/2003\/08\/75534.php"},"attachments":[],"comments":[{"id":75535,"heading":"damnit, I cliped it off.","article":"last paragraph...\r\n Not long after the September 11 attacks, neoconservative high priest Norman\r\n           Podhoretz wrote: &quot;One hears that Bush, who entered the White House without a clear\r\n           sense of what he wanted to do there, now feels there was a purpose behind his\r\n           election all along; as a born-again Christian, it is said, he believes he was chosen by\r\n           God to eradicate the evil of terrorism from the world.&quot;\r\n\r\n             No, he really believes it, or so he would like us to think. The\r\n           Palestinian prime minister, Mahmoud Abbas, told the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz that\r\n           Bush made the following pronouncement during a recent meeting between the two:\r\n           &quot;God told me to strike at al Qaeda and I struck them, and then he instructed me to\r\n           strike at Saddam, which I did, and now I am determined to solve the problem in the\r\n           Middle East.&quot;\r\n\r\n             Oddly, it never got much play back home.","author":"Sheepdog","parent_id":75534,"mime_type":"text\/plain","created":"2003-08-04 00:26:58","modified":"2003-08-04 00:26:58","fileurl":""}]}