{"article":{"id":28053,"heading":"Fortune Magazine: After Sadam","author":"Investor","created":"2003-02-03 22:19:46","modified":"2003-02-03 22:19:46","last_modified":"Tue, 04 Feb 2003 05:19:46","article":"<br><br> AFTER SADDAM <br>  <br> Iraq: We Win. Then What? <br>  <br> The real battle will begin only after Saddam is gone and the shooting has stopped. If all <br>  <br> goes well, oil will flow freely and the world economy will get a boost. But if it doesn't, <br>  <br> watch out. <br>  <br> FORTUNE <br>  <br> Sunday, November 10, 2002  <br>  <br> By Bill Powell  <br><br> The victors gathered on the northwestern coast of the Italian Riviera in a town called San <br>  <br> Remo, then as now a place of respite for Europe's wealthy. It was April 1920, a moment <br>  <br> that in the argot of the 21st century we would call an inflection point. They were there to <br>  <br> divide up the world. The Great War was over, and its merciful end brought a halt not only <br>  <br> to killing on a historic scale but to a world order. The Ottoman Empire was finished. The <br>  <br> conquering imperial powers of the war, France and Britain, convened at San Remo to <br>  <br> conclude a peace treaty with Turkey and to parcel out the spoils of what was supposed to <br>  <br> be the War to End All Wars. And those spoils, they knew very well, included oil--lots and <br>  <br> lots of oil.  <br>  <br> For that reason San Remo was to be a private affair, a matter between those countries, <br>  <br> Britain and France, with rich histories in colonial intrigue. Shut out was the nation for <br>  <br> which the first world war represented the end of isolationist innocence. A relative novice <br>  <br> at the imperial game, the U.S. would have lost the war's most valuable prize were it not <br>  <br> for a man named A.C. Bedford. He was neither diplomat nor politician, but the chairman <br>  <br> of what was then known as Standard Oil of New Jersey. And when the British and French <br>  <br> concluded the deal at San Remo that divided between them the entire future output of <br>  <br> Middle Eastern oil, Bedford intervened. He got a copy of the agreement from a friend in <br>  <br> the French delegation and passed it on to the State Department in Washington. Alarmed <br>  <br> at what had happened, the U.S. quickly became a player in the Middle East.  <br>  <br> Among the biggest prizes divvied up was Mesopotamia, the chunk of geologically rich <br>  <br> territory where the Tigris and Euphrates rivers flow. Bedford knew hydrocarbons were in <br>  <br> the ground there. And the State Department wanted the U.S. to get its fair share. \"It is <br>  <br> economically essential,\" a State Department economic officer wrote at the time, \"to <br>  <br> obtain foreign supplies of petroleum in order ... to assure supplies of bunker fuel [for the <br>  <br> Navy] and in order to perpetuate the United States' position as the world's leading oil and <br>  <br> oil products supplier.\"  <br>  <br> But Bedford and the other businessmen also knew that beyond oil, something else very <br>  <br> likely awaited them in Mesopotamia. And that was trouble. They wanted to explore for <br>  <br> oil only in areas that were politically stable, and unless one of the conquering powers was <br>  <br> willing to step in and rule the area with a very firm hand, Mesopotamia would be <br>  <br> anything but stable. It was, Bedford wrote the State Department, \"a collection of warring <br>  <br> tribes.\" So daunting was the part of the world that would eventually be known as Iraq that <br>  <br> Colonel Ernest Mercier, the head of the newly formed French national oil company, had <br>  <br> trouble raising the money he needed to look for the oil everyone knew was there. <br>  <br> \"Mesopotamia,\" he wrote ruefully to a friend, \"was so full of international difficulties.\"  <br>  <br> On Friday, Nov. 8, President George W. Bush got what he wanted from the United <br>  <br> Nations, just as he had, more than a month earlier, gotten what he wanted from the U.S. <br>  <br> Congress. After weeks of dickering, the UN agreed to insist that Saddam Hussein, the <br>  <br> brutal dictator of modern-day Mesopotamia, disarm or face the consequences. And the <br>  <br> consequences, as far as the U.S. was concerned, were clear: the end of Saddam's regime, <br>  <br> courtesy of the U.S. and British military and whoever else might be willing to help do the <br>  <br> honors.  <br>  <br> It is no exaggeration to say that the next two to three months could be among the most <br>  <br> fateful of any period since the end of World War II. They are months that quite literally <br>  <br> could change the world. More than 80 years after San Remo, history again beckons, as the <br>  <br> world decides the fate of Iraq. The consequences of the choices that both George W. Bush <br>  <br> and his sworn enemy, Saddam Hussein, must now make are breathtaking to behold. At <br>  <br> stake are nothing less than U.S. security in the age of terror, the future of millions of <br>  <br> people in Iraq and its neighboring countries, and the fate of the global economy and the <br>  <br> financial markets that gauge its health.  <br>  <br> What Morgan Stanley economist Stephen Roach calls a \"clean war\" and then a smooth <br>  <br> aftermath could send oil prices tumbling, kick-start a long-awaited global economic <br>  <br> recovery, and finally put the bear market in equities into hibernation. As warm and fuzzy <br>  <br> as all that sounds, an awful lot has to go right for it to happen. And an awful lot could go <br>  <br> wrong. Indeed, so fraught with possible dangers is round two with Saddam that there are <br>  <br> those within the U.S. national-security establishment who still can't quite bring <br>  <br> themselves to believe that Bush will actually make the decision to go to war.  <br>  <br> Yet for months war, and its maddeningly unpredictable consequences, have seemed <br>  <br> inevitable. The U.S. has been steadily moving military equipment and personnel to the <br>  <br> Gulf. The Air Force has expanded the number of targets in the so-called no-fly zones in <br>  <br> northern and southern Iraq, taking out radar and command and control centers. The U.S. <br>  <br> military has also begun training 5,000 Iraqi exiles to fight along with allied troops should <br>  <br> an invasion finally occur. And according to Zaab Sethna, a senior member of the Iraqi <br>  <br> National Congress, the political leadership of the Iraqi opposition abroad, a second <br>  <br> tranche of 10,000 will begin training in a matter of weeks.  <br>  <br> Despite all this, administration officials were at pains, in the wake of the UN resolution, <br>  <br> to say that war was not yet a foregone conclusion. If Saddam allows inspectors over the <br>  <br> next few months to go anywhere they want, without obstruction or argument, war could <br>  <br> perhaps be avoided, they insisted. One former senior Defense Department official <br>  <br> believes administration spokesmen are being truthful when they say that the President has <br>  <br> not yet, either in his gut or in his mind, made the decision to go to war. Nonetheless, there <br>  <br> is no question that if Saddam fails to disarm, post haste, the game will be over. And <br>  <br> former UN weapons inspectors are gloomily unanimous in believing that little in <br>  <br> Saddam's past behavior suggests that he will ever be serious about abiding by UN <br>  <br> demands that he rid himself of weapons of mass destruction. \"I would assume he thinks if <br>  <br> he can get inspectors in again, then the games can begin anew,\" says one inspector. \"I bet <br>  <br> he thinks the U.S. won't go to war over whether he refuses to unlock some door in one of <br>  <br> his palaces. But if this is what he's thinking, he has probably miscalculated, and that <br>  <br> means the end.\"  <br>  <br> If war is somehow averted, Saddam's now frantic neighbors, oil traders, and plenty of <br>  <br> investors the world over will finally exhale. The fog of uncertainty that plagues business <br>  <br> decision-making in executive suites everywhere will dissipate at least a little. But if the <br>  <br> current Washington consensus is correct--that the U.S. will be marching on Baghdad by <br>  <br> February, if not sooner--it will be, as oil economist Philip K. Verleger says, a \"historic <br>  <br> roll of the dice.\"  <br>  <br> The issue is not whether the U.S. and its coalition will prevail militarily. As Donald <br>  <br> Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense, told FORTUNE in a recent interview, of that there is <br>  <br> no question. The real battle for Iraq will be won or lost only after Saddam is gone and <br>  <br> most of the shooting has stopped. It is not unthinkable that a military victory could turn <br>  <br> into a strategic defeat for the U.S. Anything other than a quick, decisive campaign could <br>  <br> mean trouble. Civilian casualties in Baghdad and elsewhere could easily trigger regional <br>  <br> turmoil, spurred by an anti-Americanism that is, alas, all too real in the Islamic world. <br>  <br> Saddam on the way out may well opt for what Amatzia Baram, a historian of Iraq at the <br>  <br> University of Haifa, calls the \"Sampson option\"--that he will use the weapons of mass <br>  <br> destruction he now possesses as well as sabotage Iraq's oil fields. A prolonged, expensive, <br>  <br> American-led occupation is also plausible, one that could turn U.S. troops into sitting <br>  <br> ducks for Islamic terrorists, a la Lebanon in the 1980s. All of that could have immediate <br>  <br> and decidedly negative consequences for the global economy; an aftermath that does not <br>  <br> proceed relatively smoothly would almost certainly short-circuit what everyone <br>  <br> hopes--and assumes--will be stronger economic growth worldwide in 2003.  <br><br> <a href=\"http:\/\/www.fortune.com\/fortune\/articles\/0\" rel=\"nofollow\">http:\/\/www.fortune.com\/fortune\/articles\/0<\/a>,15114,390056,00.html <br><br>   <br>  <br> \n","contact":"","link":"","address":"","phone":"","parent_id":0,"mime_type":"text\/plain","summary":"&quot;A prolonged, expensive, American-led occupation is also plausible, one that could turn U.S. troops into sitting\r\nducks for Islamic terrorists, a la Lebanon in the 1980s.&quot; ","numcomment":0,"fileurl":"\/uploads\/","filesize":null,"article_url":"\/news\/2003\/02\/28053.php"},"attachments":[],"comments":[]}