<\/p>\n\n
1) The Chernobyl catastrophe and health care<\/b><\/p>\n\n
By Michel Fernex<\/b><\/p>\n\n
This manuscript represents a chapter in a book to be published\nin France on Belarus. The original is in French and it is also available in Russian\nin Internet at: www.chernobyl.da.ru<\/u>. The origin and consequences\nof the Agreement concluded between the World Health Organisation\n(WHO) and the IAEA are discussed. This Agreement may explain why\nthe WHO remained absent during the first five after the Chernobyl\naccident on health studies and in particular studies on the genome\nThe WHO-IAEA Agreement has led to risks for scientists intending\nto study and publish on the real consequences of such accidents\nor even the show damages due to chronic, low-dose radiation in\nthe organism due to incorporation of radionuclides with food.
\n<\/b><\/p>\n\n
<\/b> <\/p>\n\n
2) Western responsibility regarding the health consequences\nof the Chernobyl catastrophe in Belarus, the Ukraine and Russia.<\/b><\/p>\n\n
Bella Belbéoch<\/b><\/p>\n\n
Introduction<\/b><\/p>\n\n
The accident at Chernobyl nuclear plant has to be considered\nas an unprecedented catastrophe in the industrial world given\nthe scale of radioactive polluted land, the levels of contamination\nand the huge number of people affected.<\/p>\n\n
Since the beginning of the nuclear crisis after Unit-4 had\nexploded, Western pressure has been exerted to minimize the health\nimpact evaluation of the accident regarding the long term effects\nof low levels of radiation (cancer and genetic effects) which\nwill affect the inhabitants of the ex-USSR* exposed to radiation.\nIn fact, quite unexpected health problems emerged shortly after\nthe accident giving rise to an obvious increase of morbidity especially\namongst children. They pushed into the background the delayed\neffects of radiation but, like these effects, they have not only\nbeen minimized but even denied by the Soviet authorities and by\nWestern experts as well.<\/p>\n\n
To dismiss the field-observations made by local medical doctors\nit is often said that they did not correspond to the effects observed\non A-Bomb Japanese survivors. But the point is that the two situations\nare not identical at all. In Hiroshima and Nagasaki the exposure\nto radiation was essentially external and the flash lasted a very\nshort time (the follow-up began only five years after the bombings).\nAfter Chernobyl the \"emergency phase\" lasted a long\ntime (huge amounts of radioactive releases continued all through\nthe month of May) and exposed people to external radiation from\nthe plume and from ground radioactive deposits, but also to internal\nradiation by inhalation of radioactive air and ingestion of heavily\ncontaminated food. Then followed a phase of chronic exposure,\ninternal exposure essentially through ingestion of food contaminated\nby a cocktail of radionuclides. No reliable data exist for such\na situation : Chernobyl is the first large-scale \"experiment\"\nof this kind in the world.<\/p>\n\n
Radiation-controlled zones** have been decreed in the Ukraine,\nByelorussia and Russia, where caesium-137 ground deposition densities\nwere higher than 5 curies per km2 (Cs137>5 Ci\/km2)\n[1]. More than 800 000 inhabitants were living on these areas\n[2] and more than 7 million on territories with radioactive caesium\npollution above 1 Ci\/km2 (see annex).<\/p>\n\n
As time elapsed, worsening of people's health, especially children's,\ncaused great anxiety and complaint among the population. Later\non, street demonstrations took place : people wanted to be evacuated\nfrom contaminated areas. The definite position taken in favour\nof people's demands by eminent members of the Academy of Sciences\nboth in the Ukraine and in Byelorussia, quite a very unusual situation\nin the USSR (and in other countries), have obliged Republican\nand Moscow authorities to consider the necessity of new evacuations.\nIn July and October 1989, the Byelorussian authorities released\n\"relocation\" plans concerning about 120 000 of\nthe most exposed inhabitants of the so-called zones of strict\nradiation control (Cs137>15 Ci\/km2), with some\nvillages far away from Chernobyl, more than 200 km.<\/p>\n\n
With the help of Western experts, Moscow authorities have been\nvery efficient in opposing the complete realization of these plans\nand their extension to the whole of the zones under radiation\ncontrol. Quite obviously the essential concern of these experts\nwas related to the management of a possible nuclear crisis in\ntheir own country.<\/p>\n\n
We will chronologically summarize some significant facts from\nthe point of view of post-Chernobyl health problems.<\/p>\n\n
<\/p>\n\n
Vienna, 25-29 August 1986. IAEA International Experts' Meeting.\nFirst evaluation of the health consequences in the aftermath of\nChernobyl<\/b><\/p>\n\n
Attended by worldwide experts and organized by the International\nAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA), this conference aimed to analyse\nthe accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant and its consequences.\nThe different study groups' sessions took place behind closed\ndoors and information was released to journalists in daily press-conferences\n(seemingly with no protest against this kind of \"information\").The\nSoviet delegation, headed by V. Legasov, presented a voluminous\nreport (370 pages), a general main part and 7 annexes dealing\nwith more specialized questions [3]. Annex 7 was completely devoted\nto \"Medical-Biological problems\"<\/i> and was at the\norigin of an intense dispute.<\/p>\n\n
Besides detailed data related to acute radiation injuries which\nhave affected the people sent into very \"hot\" places\nclose to the destroyed reactor and exposed then to very high doses\n(on-site personnel, firemen who struggled with the burning reactor\netc.) and on whom were tried unsuccessful bone marrow transplantation,\nthe report not only made an estimation of the external doses received\nby the 135 000 evacuees from the 30 km area around the nuclear\nplant which became the \"prohibited zone\", but also dealt\nwith the long-term health consequences of the accident for 75\nmillion inhabitants of the European part of the Soviet Union.\nTheir external collective dose was estimated and also their internal\ncollective dose for a period of 70 years due to chronic contamination\nby radioactive caesium.<\/p>\n\n
With the hypothesis recommended in 1977 by the International\nCommission on Radiological Protection* (ICRP) of a linear relationship\nbetween the number of fatal radiation-induced cancers and the\nexposure dose [without a threshold], it was possible, taking into\naccount the ICRP risk factor of the fatal cancer excess per unit\ndose of radiation and knowing the collective doses, to calculate\nroughly the number of long term radiation-induced cancer deaths\n[4]. Annex 7 gave also the approximate number of thyroid cancer\ndeaths due to radioactive iodine intake. (The Soviet report did\nnot consider strontium-90 but indicated that it might become important\nafterwards).<\/p>\n\n
There was a general outcry : the estimate of the long-term\nimpact of the Chernobyl catastrophe on cancer mortality was a\npossible range of 30 000-40 000 extra deaths<\/b>\n(more than 80% due to caesium) in 70 years representing up to\n0.4% of the normal number of cancer deaths. These numbers were\nconsidered too high by Western experts.<\/p>\n\n
At the press conference on August 26th, Dan Beninson, chairman\nof the study group on the health consequences of Chernobyl said\nthat these Soviet figures were \" extremely overestimated\n\"<\/i>. For Morris Rosen, Director of the Safety Division\nat the IAEA, the upper limit for the number of deaths was 25 000\nand it fell down to 10 000 two days later and Beninson's\nto 5 100 [5]. At that time Beninson was chairman of the ICRP\nand people set great value on his opinion (he was also top official\nof nuclear energy in Argentina). For Beninson and Rosen the Soviet\nfigures were too high because caesium internal contamination had\nbeen overestimated. Let us point out that such an affirmation\ncould not have had any scientific basis at that time.<\/p>\n\n
This annex 7, very troublesome for promotors of nuclear energy,\nhas in fact been almost completely censored. Only a few people\nwere made acquainted with its existence. In France, the main report\nwas translated and widely distributed but not the annexes. Afterwards,\nSoviet and Western experts never referred to this annex 7 as if\nit had never existed.<\/p>\n\n
<\/p>\n\n
Revision of the initial estimation<\/b><\/p>\n\n
As early as october 1986 the internal dose was 10 times too\nhigh according to some European experts [6]. In January 1987 \"\nAfter a five days visit in USSR top IAEA officials<\/i> called\nthe first post-accident assessments of damage health effects \"apparently\ntoo pessimistic\" and should be decreased by a factor five\nto seven \"<\/i> [7].<\/p>\n\n
To gain credibility the re-assessment had to be worked out\nby Soviet experts themselves. It was started during the first\nVienna IAEA meeting and specified afterwards.<\/p>\n\n
May 1987<\/b> : at the WHO conference in Copenhagen [8],\nresulting from \" evidence of a positive trend of\nthe radiation hygiene situation as a result of the implementation\nof large-scale protective and preventive measures \"<\/i> A.\nMoiseev reduced the previous external dose estimate by a factor\n1.45 and the internal dose by a factor between 7 and 10.5. Nevertheless\nhe admitted that one year after the catastrophe an important proportion\nof local milk in Byelorussia was still contaminated above the\nCs137 permissible levels and \" had to be withdrawn from<\/i>\ndirect consumption and sent for reprocessing \"<\/i> but\nhe did not give any information about this process. One might\nquestion if this milk was not sent to remote regions of the USSR\n(Armenian powdered milk was analysed by CRII-RAD, an independant\nFrench association, and high levels of radioactive caesium were\nfound [9]). Let us recall that \"democratisation\" of\nradiation doses by increasing the number of exposed people, each\nperson receiving a smaller dose, does not change the final balance\n: the same collective dose leads to the same number of fatal radiation-induced\ncancers with the linear relationship (without a threshold) recommended\nby the ICRP between the number of cancers and the total dose [4].\nBy adding that the values given in his communication must be \"\nconsidered as \"upper\" estimates of the radiological\nconsequences of Chernobyl \"<\/i> Moiseev, in fact, went back\nto a model with a threshold.<\/p>\n\n
September 1987<\/b> : L. A. Ilyin and O. A. Pavlovskij presented\na new report on the Radiological consequences of the Chernobyl\naccident in Vienna at the IAEA's international conference [10].\nThe subtitle of their report was \" Analysis of data\nconfirms the effectiveness of large-scale actions to limit the\naccident's effects \"<\/i>.<\/p>\n\n
According to the authors, right after the accident the decision\nwas taken to evacuate 115 000 people, including the inhabitants\nof Pripyat, to prevent them from receiving whole body and thyroid\ndoses up to the emergency dose limits prevailing at that time\nin the USSR. (The 18 700 inhabitants of Byelorussia evacuated\nbetween June and August 1986 are not mentioned). The report indicated\nthat \" a total of 5.4 million people including 1.7 million\nchildren received iodine prophylactically \"<\/i> [against\nradioactive iodine]. Introduction of large-scale measures to protect\nthe public, such as standards for foodstuffs, have been efficient\nespecially the interdiction of milk exceeding the permissible\niodine-131 level of 3 700 becquerels per liter (3 700\nBq\/l). Average infant thyroid doses were given for the northern\nmost contaminated regions of the Ukraine while for Byelorussia\nthe average is reported for all the country* .<\/p>\n\n
No increase of morbidity was observed in children and no difference\nbetween \"dirty\" (contaminated) and \"clean\"\nareas. For the first time radiation phobia syndrome<\/i> was\nmentioned.<\/p>\n\n
The estimate of the collective effective dose equivalent p4commitment\nfor the whole Soviet population (278 million inhabitants) through\ningestion of radioactive caesium was 18 times lower than the first\n1986 estimate for only 75 million inhabitants. In April 1988<\/b>\nL. A. Ilyin re-increased this dose [11] and finally the United\nNations Scientific Committe on the Effects of Atomic Radiation\nin its UNSCEAR 1988 Report averaged Ilyin's two estimates and\ntherefore reduced the 1986 estimate of annex 7 by 9 [12]. M. Beninson\nshould have been pleased with this new value.<\/p>\n\n
Both Ilyin and Pavlovskij were in the list of authors of the\n1986 Soviet report. Therefore their 1987 and 1988 articles quoted\nabove should be considered as a true self-criticism.<\/p>\n\n
The collective dose reduction was supposed to be the result\nof countermeasures efficiency. This official optimism was in complete\ndisagreement with V. Legasov's testament published in Pravda\n<\/i>(May 20th, 1988) in which he gave evidence of the incredible\nlack of care which followed the Chernobyl catastrophe [V. Legasov\nkilled himself on the second anniversary of Chernobyl][13]. The\nsupposed effectiveness of countermeasures is rather doubtful,\ngiven the well known ineffectiveness of Soviet bureaucracy and\nthe shortage of \"clean\" food which should have been\nimported into zones of strict control, given also the number of\nthe rural population accounting for almost half of the 75 million\npeople of annex 7, with a self-sufficient way of life, consuming\nlocal \"dirty\" foodstuff (just after the accident iodine-131\nlevels in cow's milk reached 1 million Bq\/l in some districts\nof Byelorussia [3]). Heavily contaminated meat was partly destroyed\nin Byelorussia but was also exported to be mixed up with \"clean\"\nmeat [14]. Meat above permissible levels of Cs137 was sold even\nin Moscow [15]. Standards for tea were introduced in quite a \"democratic\"\nway, depending on the regions and the kind of consumers. For example\ncleaner tea was sold in Moscow and heavily contaminated regions\nthan in factory cafeterias and in less contaminated areas [1].\nIn the Ukraine people were advised only in July 1989 of restrictions\nagainst the picking of mushrooms, wild berries and medicinal plants\n[16].<\/p>\n\n
Private information began to arrive in France : in contaminated\nregions of the Ukraine and Byelorussia the health of inhabitants\nwas worsening, complaints against the authorities were growing\n(as shown in Microphone,<\/i> a film by G. Shkliarevski and\nV. Kolinko). Detailed maps of radiation-controlled zones with\nCs137 levels above 5 Ci\/km2, were published in Sovetskaya\nByelorussia<\/i> (February 9th, 1989) showing their extent. From\nthe article one could get an idea of the large number of people\naffected in their daily life : food monitoring, supply of \"clean\"\nfood if local food was too \"dirty\", medical care, advice\nto use special tractors with airtight cabs, small bonus of monthly\n\"danger money\" etc. [1]. The chairman of the Byelorussian\nCouncil of Ministers has summarized the situation by saying \"\nwe have been unable to put back the radioactive djinn in the bottle\n\"<\/i> (Pravda<\/i>, February 11th, 1989,).<\/p>\n\n
Finally, Moscow authorities disclosed maps in Pravda<\/i>\n(March 20th, 1989), showing the general gamma-field pattern measured\non 10th May 1986<\/b> with gamma dose readings for the Ukraine,\nByelorussia and Russia. The dose rates used as basis for deciding\non the early evacuation of people in 1986 were also given : prohibited\nzone for dose rates above 20 milliroentgen per hour (20 mR\/h),\nevacuation above 5 mR\/h, temporary evacuation of pregnant women\nand children between 3 and 5 mR\/h. From these maps it is not clear\nwhy areas far away from Chernobyl (districts of Gomel, Mogilev\nand Bryansk) where gamma dose rates above 5 mR\/h were recorded\non 10th May 1986 were not included in the early evacuation plans.\nAt the end of 1988 it was known that some villages in the Ukraine\nof Narodichi district close to the prohibited zone were about\nto be evacuated.<\/p>\n\n
<\/p>\n\n
Concept of \"Safe\" living. Life time exposure :\n\"35 rem per 70 years\"<\/b><\/p>\n\n
The legal<\/i> definition of contaminated areas decreed by\nSoviet authorities consisted of areas with Cs137 deposition density\nabove 1 curie per km2. In 1989 more than 7 million\npeople lived in these areas. (At the same time, in the UK, sheep\nwere still forbidden for consumption, yet, their grazing pastures\nin highlands -Scotland, Cumbria etc.- were 2 or 3 times less contaminated\nthan 1 Ci\/km2). People were to be resettled from heavily\ncontaminated areas with Cs137 levels higher than 40 Ci\/km2,\nsome places are far away from Chernobyl.<\/p>\n\n
Criteria for \"relocation\"<\/b> : the \"safe\"\nliving concept was worked out in September 1988 by the USSR authorities\n[17]. It was summarized in newspapers by the words \" 35\nrem per 70 years \"<\/i>. It is considered safe to live in\na place where the dose accumulated during a 70 year-lifetime will\nnot exceed 35 rem. If this dose exceeds 35 rem people had to be\nmoved away and resettled in a new place. This life-long dose is\ncalculated by radiological protection institutes, all of them\ndepending on the Health Ministry of the USSR and therefore completely\nunder control of Moscow authorities. Besides the dose received\nduring the emergency phase (irradiation by the radioactive plume\nand ground deposits, inhalation of radioactive particules and\naerosols, ingestion of contaminated food) the lifetime dose has\nto include the dose to be received in the future<\/i> by living\nin a given place of residence. Therefore, besides external dose\ndue to radioactive deposits, the lifetime dose must include the\neffective committed dose in 70 years due to ingestion of Cs137-contaminated\nfood. Hot particles (containing transuranic elements ) were not\nconsidered. All these calculations depend on models : life-style\nand diet, metabolism, etc.<\/p>\n\n
If this calculated dose exceeded 35 rem, relocation had to\nbe decided. (L. Ilyin, head of the Soviet radiological protection\nsaid \" it is not an evacuation but a planned displacement\nof people \"<\/i>. In places where the life-long dose was supposed\nnot to exceed 35 rem, a normal lifestyle could be resumed with\nconsumption of local food and no further import of clean food.<\/p>\n\n
This concept \"35 rem per 70 years\" (0,5 rem\/year,\nor 5 millisievert\/year) had to become law on January 1st, 1990.\nIts authors assured that it was in line with ICRP recommendations.\nByelorussian scientists, at the top level of the Academy of Sciences\nhave fought against this law and brought forward another concept,\n7 rem in 70 years (0,1 rem\/ year) while Ukrainian scientists proposed\n10 rem. Among the pertinent arguments of Byelorussian scientists\n[17] let us just recall that, since its Statement from the 1985\nParis meeting, ICRP recommended a lifetime average annual dose\nof 1 millisievert (1 mSv =0,1 rem).<\/p>\n\n
<\/p>\n\n
The World Health Organization Experts<\/b>.<\/p>\n\n
The dispute between Byelorussian and Moscow scientists was\nopen to the public in March 1989, during long debates of the session\nof the Soviet of Byelorussia and needed afterwards a special session\ndevoted to 35 rem per 70 years<\/i> which took place at the\nByelorussian Academy of Sciences in Minsk with the participation\nof three WHO experts. Besides M. Waight, (WHO secretary), appeared\nas WHO experts Dan Beninson, mentioned before, and Pr. P. Pellerin,\nthe head of French Services of Radiological Protection (SCPRI).\nLet us recall that at the Copenhagen WHO meeting held on 6th May\n1986, only a few days after the reactor had exploded, delegates\nof all European countries presented the dose-rates values recorded\nin their country when it was reached by the plume. France, represented\nby a delegate of Pr. Pellerin's Services did not give any precise\nvalue and indicated only : \"low\"<\/i> [18]. One might\nquestion if it is for this reason that, some years later, WHO\nqualified Pr. Pellerin to intervene in the radiological protection\nof the Soviet population.<\/p>\n\n
The WHO experts' report was published in Sovetskaya Byelorussia<\/i>\n(11 July 1989) under the title : \"Experts' point of view\"<\/i>.\nWHO experts concluded that, \" in post-accident situations,\nan exposure of 35 rem during a lifetime of 70 years was quite\na conservative value, (...) This value was in agreement with international\nrecommendations based on assessments of ionizing radiation health\nrisks<\/i>. (...) If asked to fix a limit on the lifetime cumulative\ndose they should have chosen dose-limits of 2 to 3 times 35\nrem<\/b> \"<\/i> [the underlining is mine].<\/p>\n\n
The report disparaged those scientists opposed to the life-dose\nlimit supported by Soviet authorities \" (...) Scientists\nwho are not well versed in radiation effects have attributed various\nbiological and health effects to radiation exposure (...) These\nchanges (...) are more likely due to psychological factors and\nstress \"<\/i>.<\/p>\n\n
In short, everything is known about radiation health effects,\nfirst-hand observations made by local medical doctors had to be\nin line with widespread consensus. It is worrying to see how these\nexperts are denying an obvious fact : the Chernobyl catastrophe\nhas the very sad privilege of inaugurating a new \"experiment\"\nin the medical field. They are trying to close the only way to\napproach it, first and foremost, all<\/b> biological and medical\ninformation has to be registered and taken into consideration.<\/p>\n\n
At the end of July 1989, during the Byelorussian Parliament's\nsession which adopted the evacuation plans, the Health minister\nof Byelorussia referred to the WHO report and declared that Byelorussian\nscientists who opposed the 35 rem lifetime dose were ignorant\nof radiation questions. (Reported by I. I. Lichtvane, Vice-president\nof Academy of sciences, Sovetskaya Byelorussia<\/i>, 1st August\n1989).<\/p>\n\n
In Paris some people became upset. What was Pr. Pellerin doing\nin the Ukraine and in Byelorussia making a false statement that\na lifetime dose of 35 rem was in conformity with international\nrecommendations and suggesting even higher limits 2 to 3 times\n35 rem which are outside the prescribed French regulation ? Was\nPr. Pellerin, a civil servant of the health minister in charge\nof French radiological protection, no longer obliged to respect\nFrench law when he was representing WHO ? Five associations asked\nmany questions to the French health minister but never received\nan answer [19].<\/p>\n\n
Meanwhile, through information available in France and first-hand\nnews from medical doctors and journalists coming back from the\nUkraine and Byelorussia it became obvious that the population's\nhealth was worsening (thyroid gland disorders, immunodeficiencies\netc.). The answer of Soviet authorities was : radiophobia. Later\non demonstrations took place in Minsk.<\/p>\n\n
<\/p>\n\n
September 1989 : letter from 92 Soviet experts to M. Gorbachev\nto enforce the \"35 rem lifetime concept\"<\/b><\/p>\n\n
The French Group of Scientists for Information on Nuclear Energy\n(GSIEN) got a copy of this letter dated 14 th September, 1989\nand sent to the President of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR with\n92 signatures of top scientists \" working in the medical\nand radiological fields and concerned by the situation created\nby the Chernobyl accident \"<\/i> [20].<\/p>\n\n
They wrote : \" At each step of its elaboration this\nconcept has been accompanied by a systematic consultation and\na careful appraisal of various international organizations such\nas IAEA, WHO, UNSCEAR, which looked at it from all its angles\nand have approved it \".<\/i><\/p>\n\n
Some arguments developed in this letter which oppose Byelorussian\nand Ukrainian proposals of lifetime doses of 7 or 10 rem instead\nof 35 rem, <\/i>seem to us very important \" In\nthe choice of the lifetime limit of 35 rem the National Radiological\nProtection Commission of the USSR has paid attention to the fact\nthat the limit has to include the dose received in the past three\nyears, and in some agglomerations this cumulative dose is already\nabout half the recommended lifetime dose <\/b>\".<\/i> In addition,\nin some villages where the dose of 35 rem has already been reached\nor soon will be, the decision of resettlement was taken a long\ntime ago but \" for some incomprehensible reasons has not\nyet been carried out in practice \".<\/i> Furthermore \"\n(...) it must be kept in mind that, since the accident, in most\nagglomerations of the permanent control zone, this dose (7-10\nrem) has already been reached or will be reached in the near future\n\"<\/i>. The authors invoked the deep psychological and health\ndetriment that could be caused by the \" <\/i>[displacement]\nresettlement of hundreds of thousands of people (up to one\nmillion)<\/b> (...). If this 7-10 limit is adopted as a criterion\nfor resettlement the problem will appear for the inhabitants of\nmany big towns and district centers \".<\/i> They further\nadded that it cannot be taken for granted that good medical care\ncould be assured in case of \" a plan of resettlement\nof one million people<\/b> \".<\/i> [The underlinings are mine].<\/p>\n\n
Thus, at that time, hundreds of thousands of people, up to\none million, would have needed to be resettled if the 7-10 rem\nlifetime dose had become law. The comparison of these figures\nwith the number of people living in all areas submitted to radiation\ncontrol brings out clearly that the one million people figure\nis consistent with the number of all <\/b>inhabitants of radiation\ncontrol zones where Cs137 ground deposition is above 5 Ci\/km2\n(see annex).<\/p>\n\n
One might wonder why, as years passed, official estimates of\npeople's cumulative doses were shrinking away in contaminated\nareas, and ask if this could not be the result of tampering with\ndata, and readjusting measurements and models ...[20].<\/p>\n\n
<\/p>\n\n
\"The international Chernobyl Project\". ICP Report<\/b>.<\/p>\n\n
In October 1989 the USSR government requested the IAEA to carry\nout an international experts' assessment of the health impact\nof Chernobyl and to evaluate the effectiveness of the protective\nmeasures taken by the Soviet Authorities. One goal of ICP was\nalso to assist them and provide guidance on radiological protection\nsubjects including their lifetime dose concept of 350 millisievert\n(35 rem) for \"safe\" living in areas affected by radioactive\ncontamination. Besides Soviet experts, 200 specialists from 25\ncountries and 7 multinational organizations (IAEA, UNSCEAR, WHO,\nEEC etc.) participated in the Project.<\/p>\n\n
The final ICP report was delivered at the international IAEA\nmeeting in Vienna (21-24 May 1991) [21]. It was concluded that\nno health disorders could be attributed directly to radiation\nexposure.<\/b> The ICP experts' estimates of both internal and\nexternal doses for the surveyed contaminated settlements were\nlower by a factor of 2 to 3 than the values officially reported\nby Moscow health authorities.The representatives of Byelorussia\nand the Ukraine have publicly demonstrated their disagreement.<\/p>\n\n
The introduction emphazised the fact that the USSR government\nhad already benefited from international assistance. Mentioned\nabove, the team of WHO experts was first sent there in June 1989.\nThen the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies which\nboth came to the same conclusion as WHO : psychological stress\nand anxiety were causing physical symptoms. The International\nChernobyl Project reached the same conclusion.<\/p>\n\n
Concerning the safe lifetime dose of 35 rem for relocation,\n\" the protective measures taken or planned for the longer\nterm, albeit well intentioned, generally exceed<\/b> what would\nhave been strictly necessary from a radiological point of view.\nThe relocation and foodstuff restrictions should have been less\nextensive \".<\/i> As regards the social cost of relocation\npolicy \" (...) due account has not been taken by\nthe authorities of the many negative aspects of relocation (...)\n\".<\/i> And also, \" In applying a lifetime dose criterion\nfor relocation it is not appropriate to take into account of past\ndoses \"<\/i>.<\/p>\n\n
Some special points : all examined chidren were found in good\nhealth. Concerning thyroid gland disorders, no abnormalities in\nthyroid hormones. No statistically significant difference was\nfound for any age group between surveyed contaminated settlements\nand surveyed settlements used as controls. Thyroid nodules were\nextremely rare.<\/p>\n\n
Concerning neoplasms \" The data did not reveal a marked\nincrease in leukaemia or thyroid tumours since the accident ;\nhowever (...) the possibility of an increase in the incidence\nof these tumours cannot be excluded. Only hearsay information\nrelating to such tumours was available \"<\/i>. Hearsay information\n? The 1990 incidence of thyroid cancer in children was already\n20 times the pre-Chernobyl incidence [22] and that year Pr. Demidchik\nhad operated upon 29 children for thyroid cancer (59 in 1991 and\nmore and more after).<\/p>\n\n
No information was given about immunological deficiencies observed\nin children. No mention of the increase of chromosome aberrations.\n\" No statistically significant evidence of an increase\nin incidence of foetal anomalies as a result of radiation exposure\n\"<\/i>. Quite a strong assertion when compared with the results\nwhich will be published by G. J. Lazjuk [23][24].<\/p>\n\n
Some issues were not investigated at all : nothing about the\nhealth of the liquidators*, of the early evacuees, no estimate\nof people's early doses received during the emergency phase.<\/p>\n\n
A peculiar point : Pr. Pellerin provided 8 000 film badge\ndosimeters which were distributed to residents of selected<\/i>\nsettlements in contaminated areas : \" For a two-month\nexposure period 90% of the results were under the detection limit\n(of 0.2 mSv) \"<\/i>. Let us point out that this detection\nlimit corresponds roughly to a normal background dose (without\nextra-radiation) accumulated during the same two-month period.\nTherefore, no radiation above natural background was detectable\nin these selected<\/i> villages ? Pr. Pellerin performed also\nwhole body countings : the amount of incorporated caesium was\nfound very low, as if \"clean\" food had been exclusively\n<\/b>consumed in these selected<\/i> contaminated villages. All\ninformation we got from contaminated radiation-controlled zones\ncontradicts such an assessment. How can we trust it ? Let us recall\na communiqué<\/i> released by Pr. Pellerin's Services\nsome days after the outset of the Chernobyl catastrophe : \"\n<\/i>[In France] the situation has come back<\/b> to normal \"<\/i>,\nbut without having been abnormal before ...<\/p>\n\n
<\/p>\n\n
The \"new\" concept. Paris, April 1991<\/b> [25].<\/p>\n\n
This concept, worked out by a team of Soviet scientists headed\nby academician S. Belaeyev, was presented in Paris and became\nlaw in May 1991. We will summarize it below.<\/p>\n\n
- Since 1st January 1990, countermeasures have been implemented\nto ensure that the lifetime dose will not exceed 35 rem (350 mSv).\nIt is supposed that they were crowned with success and therefore\nthis limit of 35 rem has become useless.<\/p>\n\n
- From now on past doses will not be taken into account<\/b>.\nOnly future averted doses should be considered for relocation\n(this point gives entire satisfaction to ICP experts). Doses received\nfrom 1986 to 1991 have to be considered only to improve living\nconditions but not for relocation. [Previously, according to the\nState Union republican programme of emergency measures for 1990-1992\non liquidation of the Chernobyl accident consequences (April 1990)\nrelocation was compulsory <\/b>for inhabitants of areas with\nCs137 levels above 40 Ci\/km2, whereas the annual dose\nis likely to exceed 0.5 rem (5 mSv) and also for pregnant women\nand children from areas with Cs137 levels 15-40 Ci\/km2].\nFrom now on, no massive compulsory relocation is justified. Any\nadditional resettlement should only be done on a voluntary\n<\/b>basis.<\/p>\n\n
- For 1991 and thereafter, the effective dose should not exceed\n1 mSv\/year (0.1 rem) which is the lower level of intervention.\nIf annual doses exceed 1 mSv, radiological monitoring of environment\nand food, medical control, agrotechnical decontamination work\n[which proved unsuccessful in the past] etc. still go on. These\nmeasures must be optimised to limit average annual doses to 5\nmSv in 1991 and to lower values afterwards.<\/p>\n\n
The introduction of an annual dose limit of 1 mSv seemed to\ngive satisfaction to Byelorussian and Ukrainian scientists. In\nfact, after having gained time and by ignoring past doses, the\nSoviet authorities have eliminated the possibility of new massive\ncompulsory relocations. Relocation of all inhabitants of Cs137\ncontaminated zones above 15 Ci\/km2 (enacted by Republican\nparliaments) is no longer ascertained unless on a voluntary basis.<\/p>\n\n
The implosion of the USSR and the emergence of independent\nRepublics will aggravate the post-Chernobyl situation through\nfood shortage and financial problems. By giving support to Moscow\nauthorities, the intervention of WHO and international agencies\nin the management of the post-Chernobyl crisis has ruined the\nefforts of those scientists who tried to give better protection\nto the population living in contaminated areas. And for that we\nare responsible.<\/p>\n\n
<\/p>\n\n
Health consequences in the aftermath of Chernobyl<\/b><\/p>\n\n
Thyroid cancer and radioactive iodine<\/b><\/p>\n\n
An abnormal increase of thyroid cancer in children was reported\nin Belarus in two scientific letters published in September 1992\nin Nature<\/i> [26] and met, at first, great scepticism among\nscientists working in the field of medical and radiological protection\nwho denied that this increase could be the result of Chernobyl\n[27]. It was only after the data had been endorsed by well-known\nEuropean scientists that the \"hearsay\"<\/i> information\n(as written in ICP Report) was accepted as being true. It was\nthe first time that some Western scientists (belonging to WHO\n!) gave support to medical doctors from the ex-USSR and they have\nto be thanked for their obstinacy. Thyroid cancer in children\nwas also observed in the Ukraine and in Russia but with lower\nincidences than in Belarus. The number of thyroid cancer in adults\nincreased enormously during the first 7 years after the accident\nbut has since stabilized.<\/p>\n\n
Experts' reconstructed thyroid doses are now on the rise. Who\nreally got the millions of tablets of stable iodine as reported\nby Ilyin in 1987 ? The ICP Report concluded that the general response\nof the authorities had been broadly reasonable in the emergency\nphase [21]. But S. L. Belyayev conceded in 1991 that the countermeasures\n\" have not always been taken in due time, not when they\nwere really necessary and sometimes not completed \"<\/i> [25].<\/i><\/p>\n\n
<\/p>\n\n
What about radionuclides other than iodine ?<\/b><\/p>\n\n
Experts ensure us, at least in France, that apart from some\n200 cancer deaths which will affect the \"liquidators\"\nin next decades, the only cancers due to Chernobyl will be thyroid\ncancers in children having been exposed to radioactive iodine.\nAfter surgery, everything is fine. Thus the Chernobyl health consequences\nwill be limited essentially to psychological disorders.<\/p>\n\n
In other words, does it mean that, aside from radioactive iodine,\nthe cocktail of radionuclides (found in children's blood in the\nUkraine and Byelorussia), caesium-137 and 134, ruthenium-106,\nstrontium-90 etc. without forgetting transuranic elements like\nplutonium included in \"hot particles\", when ingested\nand inhaled will have no effect at all on the body ?<\/p>\n\n
Thyroid cancer in children is a rare disease and its dramatic\nincrease shortly after the accident gave clear evidence of its\nrelation to radioactive iodine. But other radiation-induced cancers\ndue to other radionuclides and to external exposure will only\nappear after latency periods of 10-50 years. If the follow-up\nof Chernobyl exposed populations in the next fifty years fails\nto show any statistically significant <\/i>excess of cancer\ndeaths it will not mean that this excess does not exist (especially\nif health statistics are under control of the management authorities).\nEven if the future Chernobyl radiation-induced cancer deaths are\nonly a small fraction of the normal number of cancer deaths they\nmight represent a total number of tens of thousands of deaths\nwhen applied to a huge population [13].<\/p>\n\n
Furthermore, Chernobyl was followed by a morbidity increase\nimplying some worsening of all functional systems which, in future,\nmight be responsible for an increase of mortality for causes other\nthan cancer. Please take note : In case of a severe nuclear\naccident, stable iodine will not protect people from radionuclides\nother than iodine and will not suppress the long term health consequences\nfor the people exposed to the radioactive fallout.<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n\n
<\/p>\n\n
Relocations after 1989<\/b><\/p>\n\n
It is quite impossible to know exactly how many people have\nbeen moved away from the radiation-controlled zones and resettled\ncompulsorily since 1989 and after the independence of Republics\nin 1991 because the number of voluntary relocations is never given.\nIn 1993 the Ukrainian Minister of Chernobyl Affairs indicated\n98 000 relocations since 1989 [13]. The Belarussian 1996\nreport of Ministry for Emergencies and Population Protection\nfrom the Chernobyl NPP Catastrophe Consequences<\/i> indicated\nthat the resettlement of the population is basically completed<\/i>.\n131 200 persons have been resettled [it seems that the 24 700\npersons evacuated in 1986 are included]. No indication about the\nnumber of voluntary relocations.<\/p>\n\n
An upper estimate of the number of resettled inhabitants for\nthe three Republics of the ex-USSR might be around 300 000.\nThis is far below the million people who should have been compulsorily<\/b>\nresettled from all radiation-controlled zones and who scared Ilyin\nand his colleagues so much when they referred the matter to President\nGorbachev in September 1989.<\/p>\n\n
In Paris, Belyayev [25] asserted that it had been concluded\nfrom cost-efficiency or cost-benefit analysis in matters of countermeasures\nimplementation, that relocation is uneffective in most cases.\n[But only managers and decision-makers evaluate costs, not the\nsimple citizens. Belyayev did not give any precision about the\nprice of a radiation-induced cancer or of other diseases]. Nevertheless\nhe had admitted previously that \" relocation could practically\navert any further exposure dose \"<\/i> which is quite obvious.<\/p>\n\n
These doses that could have been averted for the million\ninhabitants of areas with radiation control represent diseases,\nsuffering and deaths for them and their progeny. And our experts\nhave helped the central Soviet authorities to reduce the number\nof people to be relocated.<\/b><\/p>\n\n
<\/p>\n\n
New ICRP recommendations in the event of a major nuclear\naccident<\/b><\/p>\n\n
The ICRP made recommendations to protect the public in case\nof a severe nuclear accident in publication 40 (May 1984). In\nthe early phase, the countermeasures are sheltering, stable iodine\ndistribution, evacuation. Two levels of dose, the lower and upper\nlevels, determine the dose range<\/i> in which each countermeasure\nhas to be implemented [28] : below the lower level of dose,\ncountermeasure is not warranted, above the upper level its implementation\nshould almost certainly have been attempted.<\/p>\n\n
- Sheltering : whole body projected dose between 5 mSv\n(0.5 rem) and 50 mSv (5 rem).<\/p>\n\n
- Administration of stable iodine : projected thyroid\ndose between 5 and 50 mSv.<\/p>\n\n
- Evacuation : projected whole body dose between 50 mSv\n(5 rem) and 500 mSv (50 rem) and\/or projected equivalent\norgan dose (thyroid, skin), between 500 and 5000 mSv.<\/p>\n\n
Each step of decision-making requires cost-benefit optimisation.\nA countermeasure should be introduced \" only when its\nsocial cost and risk is less than those resulting from further\nexposure \"<\/i>. Of course ordinary citizens are kept in ignorance\nof the subtle calculations of experts (with cost as a major parameter)\nwho are discussing the price of their life. At that time ICRP\ndid not consider long-lasting situations like Chernobyl's, where\nthree years after the accident, lots of people still had to be\nmoved away from contaminated areas and resettled.<\/p>\n\n
After Chernobyl<\/b> : obviously ICRP has drawn many lessons\nfrom Chernobyl disaster regarding dose limits for introducing\ncountermeasures as shown by the new intervention levels recommended\nin 1992 (publication 63).<\/p>\n\n
In the event of an accident the projected dose is calculated\nfor each exposure pathway but the key concept for an intervention\nis the averted <\/i>dose which is the dose saved by implementing\na protective action. The \" (...) implementation of a given\nprotective action will be justified<\/b> if its benefits, which\ninclude radiation detriment averted, are greater than its associated\ndetriments , in terms of non-radiological risks associated with\nit, its financial cost and other, less quantifiable consequences\nsuch as social disruption \".<\/i><\/p>\n\n
For the early phase, the worrying aspect of these recommendations\nis that precise values are given only for the almost always\njustified <\/i>intervention levels.These justified upper limits\ncorrespond to the previous 1984 upper limits. They are in contrast\nto vague lower values of the range of optimised intervention levels,\nin which the optimised value has to be \" not more\nthan a factor of 10 lower than the justified value \"<\/i>.\nAverted dose estimates will depend on the moment at which a given\ncountermeasure is introduced. Experts will \"optimise\"\nthe costs to decide if this measure is worth implementing at that\ntime. In case of a severe nuclear accident, authorities might\nbe tempted to use the simple upper justified<\/i> values as\nintervention levels. In fact, for ICRP, the only imperative requirement\nis to avoid serious deterministic effects.<\/p>\n\n
As regards relocation which refers to the long-term removal\nof people from an affected area (like post-Chernobyl relocations\nafter 1989) the justified level is 1 sievert (100 rem). But ICRP\npublication adds that \" the justified level of averted\ndose for relocation might even be higher<\/b> than this reference\nlevel \"<\/i>.<\/p>\n\n
In line with its previous 1984 report which advocated optimised\ncost-benefit analysis, the new report specifies some monetary\ncosts of implementation of a countermeasure strategy. For example\nrelocation analysis requires to know the cost of one man-sievert<\/i>,\nthe collective dose unit related to the price of one person's\nlife in case of a fatal radiation-induced cancer. In the table\nbelow are given the values for 3 parameters, for three types of\ncountries : c<\/b> is the cost of relocation per unit time (one\nmonth), alpha is the cost of unit collective dose (man-sievert),\nc\/<\/b>alpha is the derived value for the dose-rate (per month)\nat which relocation is optimised.<\/p>\n\n
<\/p>
| \n <\/p>\n\n Type of country\n <\/p><\/td>\n | \n
(US$ per man-month)\n <\/p><\/td>\n | \n
(US$ per man-sievert)\n <\/p><\/td>\n | \n c\/alpha<\/p>\n\n (mSv per month)\n <\/p><\/td>\n <\/tr>\n | ||||||||||||
| \n Rich developed<\/p>\n\n Developed<\/p>\n\n Developing\n <\/p><\/td>\n | \n 500<\/p>\n\n 200<\/p>\n\n 40\n <\/p><\/td>\n | \n 100 000<\/p>\n\n 20 000<\/p>\n\n 3 000\n <\/p><\/td>\n | \n 5<\/p>\n\n 10<\/p>\n\n 15\n <\/p><\/td>\n <\/tr>\n<\/table>\n\n From the table it is possible to derive the price of life.The\nlife of a developing country's inhabitant is worth 33 times less\nthan of a rich developed country.The estimated price of a rich\nAmerican's life is 2 million US$, the life of a poor Chinese only\n60 000 US$ ! [4].<\/p>\n\n The dose-rate c\/a value at which relocation is optimised is\n15 mSv\/month (1,5 rem\/month) in a developing country, 3 times\nmore than in a rich developed country. It is concluded that\n\" the derived value for the dose rate at which relocation\nis optimised is about 10 mSv per month and is fairly robust around\nthis figure \".<\/i> The duration of such a relocation is not\nindicated. With 10 mSv\/month, that is 1 rem\/month, the Soviet\n35 rem criterion would be attained in 3 years... Over 10 years,\na cumulative dose of 120 rem would be of the same order of magnitude\nthan the highest value recommended by Pellerin and Beninson \"\n3 times 35 rem\". There's nothing surprising about that. Pellerin\nwas a member of ICRP's Committee 4 which prepared the new recommendations\nwhile Beninson was the chairman of ICRP.<\/p>\n\n Finally, in the management of the Chernobyl nuclear crisis\nby the authoritarian Soviet power, 135 000 people were evacuated\nin 1986 and some 300 000 people were relocated after 1989.\n(Not enough, unfortunately, as shown previously). But who knows,\na Western democratic government (like ours) might have imposed\nquite higher dose limits to avoid relocation of people and therefore\nleft them to live in heavily contaminated areas...<\/p>\n\n <\/p>\n\n The analysis of the intervention of Western experts in post-Chernobyl\nmanagement demonstrates clearly that they gave unreserved support\nto the Central Soviet authorities and their relevant experts to\nthe detriment of the population's health. The activity of Western\nexperts has almost never been criticized either by the scientific\ncommunity or by the intermediary bodies (medical profession, trade-unions,\nassociations etc.) and medias.<\/b><\/p>\n\n Therefore we have to assume full and entire responsibility\nfor the health consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe. Furthermore,\nour experts have gained experience through Chernobyl. Since then,\nthey have brought in strictly economic criteria for the management\nof future nuclear crisis. One has to remember that the possibility\nof a severe nuclear accident with its trail of dramatic consequences\ncannot be ruled out on our own nuclear reactors.<\/b><\/p>\n\n November 1997<\/p>\n\n Bella Belbéoch<\/i> is Secretary of the Groupement\nde Scientifiques pour l'Information sur l'Energie Nucléaire<\/i>\n(group of scientists for information on nuclear energy) which\nedits a quarterly review La Gazette Nucléaire<\/i>, 2\nrue François Villon, 91400, France. Fax : 33160143496<\/p>\n\n (To be published in the Acts of the 2nd International Scientific\nConference on Consequences of Chernobyl Catastrophe Health\nand Information : From Uncertainties to Interventions in the Chernobyl\nContaminated Regions<\/i>, Geneva, 13th and 14th November 1997,\nCentre Universitaire d'Écologie Humaine et des Sciences\nde l'Environnement, Geneva, Switzerland).<\/p>\n\n <\/p>\n\n References<\/b><\/p>\n\n [1] Gazette Nucléaire<\/i> n96\/97, Juillet 1989.\n Dossier Tchernobyl trois ans après<\/i>.\n <\/p> [2] AIEA. INFCIRC\/380 Vienne, 25 Juillet 1990.\n <\/p> [3] USSR State Committee on the utilization of nuclear Energy\n : The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant and its consequences.\n Information compiled for the IAEA Expertí Meeting<\/i>,\n 25-29 August 1986, Vienna.\n <\/p> [4] The collective dose, in man-sievert units, is the product\n of the total number of persons by one person's average dose in\n Sv. The number of the fatal radiation-induced cancers is derived\n from the product of the collective dose by the risk factor. In\n 1977 (ICRP 26) the fatal cancer risk factor was 1.25% per sievert.\n (125 fatal cancers will result from a dose of 10 000man-Sv.\n In 1990 (ICRP 60) it increased to 5%\/Sv (500 fatal cancer will\n result from 10 000 man-Sv). If a collective dose of 1 man-Sv\n costs 100 000 US$, the price of 1 life is 2 million US$\n (100 000 US$ : 0.05) but it seems that this price\n represents the social cost of one death and not the price of\n one's life which, evidently, has no price.\n <\/p> [5] Science<\/i>, Sept. 12, 1986, vol. 233.\n <\/p> [6] Commission des Communautés Européennes.\n Líaccident nucléaire de Tchernobyl et ses conséquences\n dans le cadre de la communauté européenne<\/i>,\n COM (86) 607, Oct. 1986.\n <\/p> [7] Nucleonics Week<\/i>, May 10, 1990, p. 3.\n <\/p> [8] A. Moiseev, Analysis of the radiological consequences\n of the Chernobyl accident for the population in the European\n part of the USSR. <\/i>WHO Consultation on Epidemiology related\n to the Chernobyl Accident, 13-14 May 1987, Copenhagen.\n <\/p> [9] Libération<\/i> 4 nov. 1987.\n <\/p> [10] L. A. Ilyin, O. A. Pavlovskij Radiological consequences\n of the Chernobyl accident in the Soviet Union and mesures taken\n to mitigate their impact,<\/i> IAEA Bulletin 4\/1987.\n <\/p> [11] L. A. ILíIN The Chernobyl experience in the\n context of current radiation protection problems<\/i> Proceedings\n of an international conference, Sydney 18-22 April 1988, Radiation\n Protection in nuclear energy<\/i>, vol. 2 p. 363.\n <\/p> [12] UNSCEAR Report to the general Assembly 1988 Sources,\n effects and risks of ionizing radiation<\/i>. The USSR collective\n committed effective dose equivalent is 226 000 man-Sv.\n <\/p> [13] Bella et Roger Belbéoch Tchernobyl une catastrophe<\/i>\n Editions ALLIA, Paris 1993.\n <\/p> [14] Sobecednik<\/i>, n17, Avril 1989, in Gazette Nucléaire\n n96\/97<\/i> (1989)\n <\/p> [15] Gazette Nucléaire <\/i>n84\/85, Janvier 1988,\n p. 26\n <\/p> [16] Pravda Ukrayini,<\/i> 5 and 15 July 1989. Maps in\n <\/i>[17] and [13].\n <\/p> [17] Gazette Nucléaire<\/i> n100, Mars 1990. Dossier\n Gestion post-Tchernobyl<\/i> p. 16.\n <\/p> [18] Chernobyl reactor accident.<\/i> Report of a consultation,\n 6 May 1986, WHO, Copenhagen.\n <\/p> [19] Gazette Nucléaire<\/i> n101\/102 Mai 1990 p.\n 32\n <\/p> [20] Gazette Nucléaire <\/i>n109\/110 Juin 1991. Dossier\n Tchernobyl 5 ans après <\/i>(22 pages).\n <\/p> [21]The International Chernobyl Project<\/i>. An Overview.\n Assessment of radiological consequences and evaluation of protective\n peasures<\/i>. Report by an international Advisory Commitee, May\n 1991.\n <\/p> [22] Dr. Marie-Hélène Montaigne, Association\n Avicenne, Ronchain, France.\n <\/p> [23] G.I. Lazjuk et al.<\/i> Radiation Protection Dosimetry\n vol. 62, n1\/2 (1995) p. 71-74 Frequency of changes of inherited\n anomalies in the Republic of Belarus after the Chernobyl accident<\/i>\n <\/p> [24] Gazette Nucléaire<\/i> n157\/158, Mai 1997. Dossier\n Tchernobyl 11 ans après<\/i> (12 pages).\n <\/p> [25] S. T. Belyayev, V. F. Demin Les conséquences\n à long terme de Tchernobyl, les contre-mesures et leur\n efficacité. <\/i>Actes de la conférence internationale\n les accidents nucléaires et le futur de líénergie.\n Leçons tirées de Tchernobyl. <\/i>15-16-17 Avril\n 1991, Paris.\n <\/p> [26] Scientific Correspondence Thyroid cancer after Chernobyl,\n Nature<\/i>, 3 Sept. 1992, vol. 359 V. S. Kazakov, E. P. Demidchik,\n L. N. Astakhova, p. 21\n <\/p> K. Baverstock, B. Egloff, C. Ruchti, D. Williams, A. Pinchera,\n p. 21-22\n <\/p> [27] B. Belbéoch, En Biélorussie : cancers\n de la thyroïde chez les enfants<\/i>\n <\/p> Gazette Nucléaire <\/i>n 119\/120, Août 1992.\n <\/p> [28] M. Genesco, private communication, 28\/2\/1989. At that\n time this authorized officer from the state-financed civilians\n rescue organization said that, in the emergency phase, if the\n projected dose could exceed the lower level of a countermeasure,\n this countermeasure should be implemented.\n \n<\/p><\/ul>\n\n Books recommended :<\/p>\n\n Zhores Medvedev, The legacy of Chernobyl<\/i>, Basil Blackwell,\nOxford, 1990.<\/p>\n\n Permanent People's Tribunal, IMCC, Chernobyl<\/i>, Vienna,\n 12-15 April 1996. (International Peace Bureau 41 rue de Zurich,\n 1201, Geneva, Switzerland).\n \n<\/p><\/ul>\n\n <\/p>\n\n Annex<\/b>\n <\/p> \n <\/p> Population living in legally <\/i>contaminated\n areas in the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Russia (Cs137 > 1Ci\/km2)<\/b>\n \n<\/p><\/ul>\n\n <\/p> Cs137 Population Byelorussia<\/p><\/td>\n The Ukraine<\/p><\/td>\n Russia<\/p><\/td>\n Total<\/p><\/td>\n <\/tr>\n <\/p>\n\n 1-5<\/p>\n\n 5-15 15-40 >40 <\/p>\n\n 1 840<\/p>\n\n 267.2<\/p>\n\n <\/p>\n\n 95.7<\/p>\n\n <\/p>\n\n 11.6\n <\/p><\/td>\n <\/p>\n\n ~ 2 250<\/p>\n\n 204.2<\/p>\n\n <\/p>\n\n 29.7<\/p>\n\n <\/p>\n\n 19.2\n <\/p><\/td>\n <\/p>\n\n ~ 2 300<\/p>\n\n 113<\/p>\n\n <\/p>\n\n 80.9<\/p>\n\n <\/p>\n\n 4.6\n <\/p><\/td>\n <\/p>\n\n ~ 6 400<\/p>\n\n 584.4<\/p>\n\n <\/p>\n\n 206.3<\/p>\n\n <\/p>\n\n 35.4\n <\/p><\/td>\n <\/tr>\n<\/table>\n\n From references <\/i>[2] [13] [20].<\/p>\n\n \n\n\n\n<\/p>\n","contact":"infonucleaire@altern.org","link":"http:\/\/membres.lycos.fr\/mat66\/index_tchernobyl.html","address":"","phone":"","parent_id":0,"mime_type":"text\/html","summary":"The accident at Chernobyl nuclear plant has to be considered as an unprecedented catastrophe in the industrial world given the scale of radioactive polluted land, the levels of contamination and the huge number of people affected.","numcomment":0,"fileurl":"\/uploads\/2002\/04\/westeseei0q.html","filesize":"56.3 kibibytes","article_url":"\/news\/2002\/04\/16183.php"},"attachments":[],"comments":[]} |