{"article":{"id":8420,"heading":"US officials outline Bush's Andean Regional Initiative","author":"RevereRides","created":"2001-07-04 16:05:06","modified":"2005-08-15 00:36:08","last_modified":"Mon, 15 Aug 2005 07:36:08","article":"<p>Check out these excerpt, which one of our public servants is promoting: <br><br>     JAMES MACK <br>  <br>     DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  <br>  <br>     FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS <br>  <br>     U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE <br>  <br> \"Some allege that the glyphosate used in the spray program results in health side-effects to exposed populations. First, let me stress that glyphosate is one of the least harmful herbicides available on the world market.\" <br><br> And this one.... a couple of notes... A.) the gov't may maintain a program, however, they don't institute it <br>  <br>   B.) the reason coca, etc is grown is because the \"neo-liberal\" IMF\/WTO strictures have eliminated tariffs, and subsidized US ( etc. ) produce has decimated the price local growers used to make a living on.... ( sort of like the destruction of the family farm in, where... why, the US!! ) <br><br> Excerpt Two:  ( attributed to same propagandist, note when seeing Sec'y of State, try and think, Sec'y of Real Estate.... and they want more tenants!! ) <br>  <br> \"Furthermore, the government of Colombia maintains a system to compensate farmers for damages caused by the program. Over the past few months, we have encouraged the Colombian government to streamline the process and efforts have begun to better educate the public about that option. <br><br> Recent field visits encountered evidence that coca growers in southern Colombia are using dangerous chemicals, such as paraquat. That is a concern to us as it presents a very real risk to the people of the region. <br><br> The traffickers' utter disregard for human health and environmental security that pervades the illegal drug industry goes beyond the obvious examples of poisoning millions of drug consumers with their illegal products. It includes the clear cutting of rain forest; the contamination of soil and watersheds with acids and chemical salts; and the exposure of their workers and themselves to potentially deadly chemicals all in the name of profit....\" <br><br>  <br>  <br>   ( ed.  sorry, about the length ) <br>  <br> [This message is being sent in 2 parts]  <br><br> Subj:    CLM: US officials outline Bush's Andean Regional Initiative  <br>  <br> Date:   7\/2\/01 6:20:03 AM Mountain Daylight Time <br>  <br> Sender: owner-clm-news@. prairienet.org <br>  <br> To: clm-news@. prairienet.org <br><br> ________________________________________________________________ <br>  <br> COLOMBIAN LABOR MONITOR <br>  <br> www.prairienet.org\/clm <br><br> Monday, 2 July 2001 <br><br>     ***************** <br>  <br>     * U.S. CONGRESS * <br>  <br>     ***************** <br><br> 1. AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE-Thursday, 28 June 2001 <br>  <br>    US State Dept officials outline Bush's Andean Regional Initiative <br><br> 2. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES-Thursday, 28 June 2001 <br>  <br>    Statement of James Mack <br>  <br>    Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics <br>  <br>    and Law Enforcement Affairs <br>  <br>    U.S. Department of State <br><br> 3. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES-Thursday, 28 June 2001 <br>  <br>    Statement of Michael Deal <br>  <br>    Deputy Assistant Administrator <br>  <br>    Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean <br>  <br>    U.S. Agency for International Development <br>  <br> ________________________________________________________________ <br>  <br> **************************************************************** <br><br> * 1 * <br><br> AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE <br><br> Thursday, 28 June 2001 <br><br>          US State Dept officials outline  <br>  <br>         Bush's Andean Regional Initiative  <br>  <br>         --------------------------------- <br><br> WASHINGTON - State Department officials on Thursday outlined President <br>  <br> George W. Bush's Andean Regional Initiative, a group of programs aimed at <br>  <br> addressing the challenges of democracy, drugs and development in the area.  <br><br> The initiative is seen as an extension of Plan Colombia, a Colombian <br>  <br> proposal to address that country's complex war- and narcotics-related <br>  <br> problems, backed by the United States to the tune of one billion dollars.  <br><br> \"ARI balances the need to address the continuing challenges in Colombia <br>  <br> with the competing priority of working with the rest of the region to <br>  <br> prevent a further spreading of Colombia's problems,\" said Deputy Assistant <br>  <br> Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement <br>  <br> Affairs, James Mack.  <br><br> US funding for the plan was controversial as some lawmakers feared it <br>  <br> could drag the United States into Colombia's conflict with the guerrillas <br>  <br> believed by Washington to be profiting from the drug trade.  <br><br> Nations bordering Colombia also said they feared the intensive <br>  <br> anti-narcotics push would result in rebel activity and refugees spilling <br>  <br> over into their nations, and demanded US aid to help them deal with that.  <br><br> \"Our support to Plan Colombia was the first step in responding to the <br>  <br> crisis undersay in Colombia,\" Mack told a House subcommittee hearing on <br>  <br> the ARI.  <br><br> \"The Andean Regional Initiative is the next stage of a long-term effort to <br>  <br> address the threat of narcotics and the underlying causes of the narcotics <br>  <br> industry and violence in Colombia while assisting Colombia's neighbors to <br>  <br> ward off those same dangers.\"  <br><br> Bush has proposed 882 million dollars for ARI, 731 million dollars of <br>  <br> which would be earmarked for the anti-narcotics fight, and also includes <br>  <br> funding for developmental and economic support programs, and \"a small <br>  <br> amount\" of Foreign Military Funding.  <br><br> ARI covers programs in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, Panama <br>  <br> and Brazil.  <br><br> Speaking at the same hearing, Republican congressman Ben Gilman called for <br>  <br> the reinstatement of anti-narcotics shoot-down policy over Peru and <br>  <br> Colombia, suspended after Peru's air force downed a missionary plane, <br>  <br> killing a young mother and her infant child.  <br><br> US surveillance flights had been used to detect and track suspected drug <br>  <br> flights for the Peruvian air force. <br><br>     Copyright 2001 Agence France Presse    <br><br> ________________________________________________________________ <br>  <br> **************************************************************** <br><br> * 2* <br><br> U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES <br><br> Friday, 28 June 2001 <br><br>     *********** <br>  <br>     * HEARING * <br>  <br>     *********** <br><br>     HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE  <br>  <br>     SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE <br><br>     JAMES MACK <br>  <br>     DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  <br>  <br>     FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS <br>  <br>     U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE <br><br> Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I am pleased to be <br>  <br> here today to discuss with you the status of Plan Colombia and to describe <br>  <br> for you the Department of, State's programs envisioned under the <br>  <br> Administration's proposed Andean Regional Initiative, or ARI. <br><br> First, I'd like to provide you background on the origin of the President's <br>  <br> Initiative. In July 2000, Congress approved a $1.3 billion supplemental <br>  <br> appropriation to carry out enhanced counternarcotics activities in the <br>  <br> Andean region. Of that amount, approximately $1 billion in Function 150 <br>  <br> funding through the State Department was the U.S. contribution to what has <br>  <br> become known as Plan Colombia, a comprehensive, integrated, Colombian <br>  <br> action plan to address Colombia's complex and interrelated problems. The <br>  <br> initial two-year phase of Plan Colombia focused on the southern part of <br>  <br> the country. <br><br> It began with an intensive counternarcotics push into southern Colombia, <br>  <br> along with the expansion of programs aimed at social action and <br>  <br> institutional strengthening, and alternative development. Plan Colombia is <br>  <br> now well underway and showing good results. In addition to stemming the <br>  <br> flow of narcotics entering the U.S., our assistance is intended to support <br>  <br> institutional and judicial reform, as well as economic advancement, in one <br>  <br> of this hemisphere's oldest democracies. <br><br> Members of Congress, the NGO community, and other interested observers had <br>  <br> previously expressed concerns regarding aspects of U.S. government support <br>  <br> to Plan Colombia. Those concerns focused particularly on three areas: that <br>  <br> we did not consult widely enough in putting together our support package; <br>  <br> that we focused too much on security and law enforcement, and not enough <br>  <br> on development and institutional reform; and that our assistance was too <br>  <br> heavily oriented toward Colombia as compared to the rest of the region. <br><br> The Bush Administration has taken to heart those concerns in formulating <br>  <br> the President's proposed Andean Regional Initiative (ARI). ARI is the <br>  <br> product of extensive consultations with the staffs of committees and <br>  <br> Members of Congress, with the governments of the region, and with other <br>  <br> potential donor countries and international financial institutions. ARI <br>  <br> addresses the three issues that lie at the heart of the challenges facing <br>  <br> the region: democracy, development, and drugs. ARI balances the need to <br>  <br> address the continuing challenges in Colombia with the competing priority <br>  <br> of working with the rest of the region to prevent a further spreading of <br>  <br> Colombia's problems or backsliding in areas where progress already has <br>  <br> been made. <br><br> The President has proposed $882 million in Function 150 programs for the <br>  <br> ARI. $731 million of the $882 million in ARI is for the Department's <br>  <br> Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) <br>  <br> funding of the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI). The ARI also includes <br>  <br> funding for relevant Economic Support Funds (ESF), Developmental <br>  <br> Assistance (DA), and Child Survival and Disease (CSD) programs, plus a <br>  <br> small amount of Foreign Military Financing (FMF). The ARI covers programs <br>  <br> in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, and those areas and <br>  <br> programs in Panama and Brazil most affected by the region's problems and <br>  <br> those where our assistance can best make a difference. In addition to <br>  <br> being balanced geographically, our budget will likewise be balanced <br>  <br> programmatically. About 50 percent of the ARI budget will be devoted to <br>  <br> programs focused on development and support for democratic institutions. <br>  <br> Integral to ARI as well are the economic development and job creation <br>  <br> afforded by expanded trade opportunities. The Free Trade Area of the <br>  <br> Americas (FTAA) can help the entire region through increased investment <br>  <br> and job creation. More immediately, renewal and enhancement of the Andean <br>  <br> Trade Preferences Act (ATPA) can provide real alternatives to drug <br>  <br> production and trafficking for farmers and workers desperate for the means <br>  <br> to support their families. <br><br> Our support to Plan Colombia was the first step in responding to the <br>  <br> crisis underway in Colombia. The Andean Regional Initiative is the next <br>  <br> stage of along-tern effort to address the threat of narcotics and the <br>  <br> underlying causes of the narcotics industry and violence in Colombia, <br>  <br> while assisting Colombia's neighbors to ward off those same dangers in <br>  <br> their own countries. <br><br> Their success is vital to our own national interests in promoting the <br>  <br> spread of strong democratic institutions, the enhancement of trade and <br>  <br> investment opportunities for U.S. businesses and workers, and the <br>  <br> reduction of narcotics production and trafficking that threaten our <br>  <br> society. <br><br> My USAID colleague will describe in detail the status of our alternative <br>  <br> development projects. However, I want to point out that alternative <br>  <br> development is an integral part of our plan for weeding out illicit coca <br>  <br> and poppy cultivation in the Andes. We have had large alternative <br>  <br> development programs in Bolivia and Peru for many years, and they have <br>  <br> been quite successful, combining with aggressive eradication and <br>  <br> interdiction programs to produce significant declines in the coca crops of <br>  <br> those countries. <br><br> Colombia is trying to replicate that success in Plan Colombia, combining a <br>  <br> substantially expanded alternative development program with aerial <br>  <br> eradication and interdiction activities in southern Colombia, currently <br>  <br> the largest concentration of coca cultivation in the world. <br><br> I am pleased to report that the Department is moving quickly to implement <br>  <br> our support to Plan Colombia. Below, I will discuss delivery of <br>  <br> helicopters, aerial spray aircraft, and other equipment, which is <br>  <br> proceeding smoothly. <br><br> I will also describe our support for the Colombian government's aerial <br>  <br> spraying program. <br><br> I'd then like to discuss the proposal we have submitted in our FY 2002 <br>  <br> budget request for INL's $731 million Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), <br>  <br> as part of the larger $882 million ARI. This initiative addresses <br>  <br> holistically-providing assistance for social and economic development as <br>  <br> well as for counternarcotics and security efforts-the narcotics scourge <br>  <br> throughout the Andean region. We are hopeful that this macro-approach will <br>  <br> eliminate the \"balloon effect\" which we observe when programs are <br>  <br> developed country by country. <br><br> Finally, I will note our support for the ATPA. <br><br>  <br>  <br> STATUS OF SPENDING ON PLAN COLOMBIA <br><br> In less than one year, the Department has \"committed\" approximately 75 <br>  <br> percent of the $1.018 billion two-year Plan Colombia Supplemental. By <br>  <br> \"committed,\" we mean that we have contracted for equipment or services, <br>  <br> signed reimbursable agreements with other agencies or bureaus within the <br>  <br> Department, and contributed to the U.N. Taken together, these <br>  <br> \"commitments\" total more than $760 million of the Supplemental. <br><br> The Administration is finalizing the Congressionally-mandated bi-annual <br>  <br> report on the Supplemental. <br><br>  <br>  <br> STATUS OF EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES <br><br> Turning now to our equipment deliveries, I can say that they have <br>  <br> proceeded smoothly, generally adhering to the anticipated schedules. Some <br>  <br> have even been accelerated from their original estimates. As of June 22, <br>  <br> 2001, the status of UH-60, UH-1N, Huey-II and spray planes is as follows: <br><br> COLAR and CNP Black Hawks: A contract was signed with Sikorsky on December <br>  <br> 15th for fourteen Black Hawks for the Colombian Army (COLAR) and two <br>  <br> helicopters for the Colombian National Police (CNP). Specifications for <br>  <br> the aircraft configuration were based on SOUTHCOM recommendations with <br>  <br> input from respective Colombian organizations. Arrangements are being made <br>  <br> for next month's delivery of the two CNP aircraft and the first COLAR <br>  <br> aircraft. <br><br> Remaining deliveries will be made in increments through December of this <br>  <br> year. The contract includes one year of contractor logistics support <br>  <br> (CLS). We expect to extend this contract pending availability of FY 2002 <br>  <br> funding. <br><br> COLAR UH-1Ns: The UH-1Ns supplied to Colombia earlier continue to provide <br>  <br> air mobility support to the troops of the Counterdrug Brigade. <br><br> CNP Huey-IIs: INL and the CNP agreed to use the $20.6 million CNP Huey-II <br>  <br> and $5 million CNP aircraft upgrade budget lines from the Supplemental to <br>  <br> modify nine additional aircraft to desired specifications and retrofit <br>  <br> twenty-two of the earlier produced Huey-IIs to include additional options, <br>  <br> such as floor armor and passive infrared (IR) countermeasures. A delivery <br>  <br> order has been issued for four modifications to be accomplished by U.S. <br>  <br> Helicopter (completion expected approximately August\/September), and the <br>  <br> other five modifications will be done by CNP in-country with kits <br>  <br> furnished by INL. (Note: Twenty-Five Huey-II helicopters have been <br>  <br> delivered to the CNP from previous FY 1998 and FY 1999 funding). <br><br> COLAR Huey-IIs: SOUTHCOM presented their recommendations on the <br>  <br> configuration of the COLAR Huey-IIs on February 22nd. An interagency team <br>  <br> then selected a configuration that includes a passive IR engine exhaust <br>  <br> system, floor armor, M60D door guns, secure radios, and a radar altimeter, <br>  <br> along with other standard equipment. We estimate that twenty-five Huey-IIs <br>  <br> modified to this standard, along with individual crew equipment (NV Gs, <br>  <br> survival vests, helmets, etc.) and some spares will be possible within the <br>  <br> $60 million line item of the Supplemental Appropriation. We have <br>  <br> established a contract delivery order for the accomplishment of the <br>  <br> initial 20 modifications, with options for additional aircraft. Work is in <br>  <br> progress on these aircraft and we believe that aircraft deliveries to <br>  <br> Colombia can begin by approximately January 2002. <br><br> Additional OV-10D Spray Planes: Three aircraft are currently undergoing <br>  <br> refurbishment\/modification at Patrick Air Force Base and are expected to <br>  <br> be completed in August of this year. <br><br> Additional Ayres Turbo-Thrush Spray Planes: A contract is in place for <br>  <br> nine additional agricultural spray planes. The first aircraft should be <br>  <br> delivered in August, with the balance phased in through February 2002. <br><br>  <br>  <br> AERIAL SPRAYING <br>  <br> Plan Colombia-related aerial spray operations began on December 19, 2000 <br>  <br> in the southern department of Caqueta and moved into neighboring Putumayo <br>  <br> on December 22. Operations later shifted to the northern and eastern parts <br>  <br> of the country. <br><br> Some allege that the glyphosate used in the spray program results in <br>  <br> health side-effects to exposed populations. First, let me stress that <br>  <br> glyphosate is one of the least harmful herbicides available on the world <br>  <br> market. <br><br> Glyphosate has been the subject of an exhaustive body of scientific <br>  <br> literature which has shown that it is not a health risk to humans, and is <br>  <br> extremely environment-friendly. It is used throughout the United States <br>  <br> and over 100 other countries and has been rigorously tested for safety for <br>  <br> animals and humans. Nonetheless, we feel compelled to probe assertions <br>  <br> that it is making people sick. At the request of Congress, the U.S. <br>  <br> Embassy in Bogota, with assistance from our regional EPA representative in <br>  <br> Embassy Lima, is sponsoring two studies on the issue. The first dealt with <br>  <br> the individuals who reported reactions to the spraying. The final report <br>  <br> is not yet complete but the physicians who reviewed those cases found them <br>  <br> to be inconsistent with glyphosate exposure. In fact, many of the cases <br>  <br> were reported prior to any exposure from the spray program. The second <br>  <br> study is getting underway and will compare populations before and after <br>  <br> their areas are sprayed to see if any differences could be attributable to <br>  <br> spraying. <br><br> The Center for Disease Control is assisting in designing an appropriate <br>  <br> sampling methodology for this study <br><br> The timing of spray operations in Putumayo was based on a number of <br>  <br> factors. <br><br> Some were operational concerns, such as seasonal weather conditions. The <br>  <br> timing of operations was also meant to discourage the return of an <br>  <br> itinerant labor pool (coca leaf pickers or \"raspachines\") who generally <br>  <br> spend the December holidays at their homes in other parts of the country. <br>  <br> Importantly, the timing also corresponded with efforts to recruit <br>  <br> communities to enroll in development programs. While the intent of the <br>  <br> Colombian government to conduct eradication in southern Colombia was well <br>  <br> publicized, coca growing communities in the region initially showed little <br>  <br> interest in participating in development programs, preferring instead to <br>  <br> continue their illicit activity. Only after those initial spray efforts in <br>  <br> Putumayo, which demonstrated the government of Colombia's resolve to <br>  <br> address the growing problem of coca cultivation in the region, did these <br>  <br> communities express real interest in abandoning their illegal activities <br>  <br> in exchange for assistance. Funding was already in place for these <br>  <br> programs at the time spray operations began and, as each community signed <br>  <br> up for the program, the process began to tailor community-specific <br>  <br> assistance packages. <br><br> Many safeguards are built into the selection of spray targets and further <br>  <br> improvements are constantly being made to the system. And while the <br>  <br> Department of State does not select the spray locations, (those decisions <br>  <br> are made by the government of Colombia), the Department, through the <br>  <br> Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) of U.S. Embassy Bogota, does consult on <br>  <br> the selection and supports the Colombian National Police (CNP) efforts. <br><br> According to Colombian law, an Inter-Institutional Technical Committee <br>  <br> (ITC) of Colombian government officials determines what areas of the <br>  <br> country may or may not be sprayed. The CNP generates quarterly estimates <br>  <br> of the illicit coca crop by flying over coca growing regions on at least a <br>  <br> quarterly basis to search for new growth and to generate an estimate of <br>  <br> the illicit coca crop. This information is reviewed for accuracy by <br>  <br> technical\/environmental auditors and is passed on to the ITC. The <br>  <br> Directorate of Dangerous Drugs (DNE) chairs the ITC, which includes <br>  <br> representatives from the Anti-Narcotics Police, Ministry of the <br>  <br> Environment, the National Institute of Health, the National Institute of <br>  <br> Agriculture, the National Plan for Alternative Development (PLANTE), <br>  <br> regional environmental agencies, and technical\/environmental auditors. The <br>  <br> CNP notifies the NAS Aviation Office of all decisions as to which areas <br>  <br> may not be sprayed. Spray operations are then coordinated and conducted in <br>  <br> approved areas only. <br><br> Generally, reconnaissance flights are conducted over areas identified by <br>  <br> the CNP in their quarterly coca crop estimates. With the use of SATLOC, an <br>  <br> aircraft-mounted global positioning system, these flights identify the <br>  <br> precise geographical coordinates where coca is being grown. Areas with <br>  <br> large concentrations of coca are then plotted, and a computer program sets <br>  <br> up precise flight lines, calibrated for the width of the spray swath of <br>  <br> the spray plane to be used. Once the government of Colombia has approved <br>  <br> spraying in a given area, spray pilots then fly down those prescribed <br>  <br> flight lines and spray the coca located there. <br><br> Also, every effort is made to protect legitimate farming operations from <br>  <br> possible damage from the aerial spray program. The spray aircraft apply <br>  <br> glyphosate at low altitude against predetermined fields, identified by <br>  <br> earlier reconnaissance. The planes carry computerized GPS monitoring <br>  <br> equipment that records their position and the use of the spray equipment. <br>  <br> This system serves to verify that glyphosate is being accurately applied <br>  <br> to intended areas. After spraying, combined U.S.-Colombian teams also <br>  <br> visit randomly chosen fields, security permitting, to verify that the <br>  <br> treated plants were indeed coca. To further aid in the identification of <br>  <br> fields not subject to aerial eradication, the government of Colombia is <br>  <br> currently working to produce a comprehensive digitized map indicating <br>  <br> exempted areas. <br><br> Furthermore, the government of Colombia maintains a system to compensate <br>  <br> farmers for damages caused by the program. Over the past few months, we <br>  <br> have encouraged the Colombian government to streamline the process and <br>  <br> efforts have begun to better educate the public about that option. <br><br> Recent field visits encountered evidence that coca growers in southern <br>  <br> Colombia are using dangerous chemicals, such as paraquat. That is a <br>  <br> concern to us as it presents a very real risk to the people of the region. <br><br> The traffickers' utter disregard for human health and environmental <br>  <br> security that pervades the illegal drug industry goes beyond the obvious <br>  <br> examples of poisoning millions of drug consumers with their illegal <br>  <br> products. It includes the clear cutting of rain forest; the contamination <br>  <br> of soil and watersheds with acids and chemical salts; and the exposure of <br>  <br> their workers and themselves to potentially deadly chemicals all in the <br>  <br> name of profit <br><br> For example, the expansion of coca cultivation, production, and <br>  <br> trafficking in Peru, Bolivia and Colombia has resulted in the destruction <br>  <br> of, at an absolute minimum, 2.4 million hectares of the fragile tropical <br>  <br> forest in the Andean region over the last 20 years. In addition, the very <br>  <br> act of refining raw coca leaves into finished cocaine creates significant <br>  <br> environmental damage because of the irresponsible disposal of large <br>  <br> amounts of toxic chemicals used in the process. A study conducted by the <br>  <br> U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 1993 of cocaine production <br>  <br> in the Chapare region of Bolivia showed that production of one kilo of <br>  <br> cocaine base required the use of three liters of concentrated sulfuric <br>  <br> acid, ten kilos of lime, 60 to 80 liters of kerosene, 200 grams of <br>  <br> potassium permanganate, and one liter of concentrated ammonia. Processors <br>  <br> discard these poisonous waste products indiscriminately, often dumping <br>  <br> them into the nearest waterway, where the extent of damage is greatly <br>  <br> increased. They also may dump these chemicals on the ground, where as <br>  <br> point sources, they may infiltrate through the soil to groundwater. A <br>  <br> report from the National Agrarian University in Lima Peru estimated that <br>  <br> as much as 600 million liters of so-called precursor chemicals are used <br>  <br> annually in South America for cocaine production. This translates to more <br>  <br> than two metric tons of chemical waste generated for each hectare of coca <br>  <br> processed to produce cocaine. <br><br> These environmental concerns are another reason why we must continue in <br>  <br> our efforts to help the governments of the Andean region in their ongoing <br>  <br> struggle against the narcotics industry. <br><br>  <br>  <br> INL'S PROPOSED ANDEAN COUNTERDRUG INITIATIVE (ACI) <br><br> The Andean region represents a significant challenge and opportunity for <br>  <br> U.S. foreign policy in the next few years. Important U.S. national <br>  <br> interests are at stake. Democracy is under pressure in all of the <br>  <br> countries of the Andes. Economic development is slow and progress towards <br>  <br> liberalization is inconsistent. The Andes produces virtually all of the <br>  <br> world's cocaine, and an increasing amount of heroin; thus representing a <br>  <br> direct threat to our public health and national security. All of these <br>  <br> problems are inter-related. Sluggish economies produce political unrest <br>  <br> that threatens democracy and provides ready manpower for narcotics <br>  <br> traffickers and illegal armed groups. Weak democratic institutions, <br>  <br> corruption and political instability discourage investment, contribute to <br>  <br> slow economic growth and provide fertile ground for drug traffickers and <br>  <br> other outlaw groups to flourish. The drug trade has a corrupting influence <br>  <br> that undermines democratic institutions, fuels illegal armed groups and <br>  <br> distorts the economy, discouraging legitimate investment. None of the <br>  <br> region's problems can be addressed in isolation. <br><br> Of the $882 million Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) request, $731 million <br>  <br> is for INL's Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI). Our goals in the Andes <br>  <br> are to: <br><br> Promote and support democracy and democratic institutions-Foster <br>  <br> sustainable economic development and trade liberalization-Significantly <br>  <br> reduce the supply of illegal drugs to the U.S. at the source <br><br> Just as Plan Colombia represented an improved approach by considering drug <br>  <br> trafficking as part of Colombia's larger crisis, the Andean Counterdrug <br>  <br> Initiative benefits from its appreciation of the illegal drug industry as <br>  <br> part of something bigger. Drug trafficking is a problem that does not <br>  <br> respect national borders and that both feeds and feeds upon the other <br>  <br> social and economic difficulties with which the Andean region is <br>  <br> struggling. <br><br> No nation in the region is free of trafficking or the attendant ills of <br>  <br> other crime forms and corruption. To combat these ills, we propose a <br>  <br> regional versus Colombia-centric policy and a comprehensive and integrated <br>  <br> package that brings together democracy and development as well as drug <br>  <br> initiatives. <br><br> For this reason, we plan to allocate almost one-half of the requested $731 <br>  <br> million for this initiative to countries other than Colombia. In so doing, <br>  <br> we intend to bolster the successful efforts and tremendous progress we <br>  <br> have made in counternarcotics in countries such as Peru and Bolivia, while <br>  <br> preventing the further expansion of the drug trafficking problem into <br>  <br> other countries of the region., such as Brazil, Panama, Venezuela and <br>  <br> Ecuador. <br><br> In addition to ensuring regional balance, the ACI also spans all three of <br>  <br> our stated goals counternarcotics, economic development, and support for <br>  <br> democratic institutions. The full ARI budget of $882 million breaks into <br>  <br> an approximately 50\/50 split between counternarcotics and alternative <br>  <br> development\/institution-building programs. Its ACI component ($731 <br>  <br> million) breaks into a 60140 (counternarcotics vs. development\/democracy) <br>  <br> split. <br><br> $293 million of the ACI budget will be devoted to programs focused on <br>  <br> alternative development and support for democratic institutions. <br><br> All of Colombia's neighbors are worried about the possibility of <br>  <br> \"spillover,\" specifically that the pressure applied by the government of <br>  <br> Colombia (GOC) in southern Colombia will result in the flight of refugees, <br>  <br> guerrillas, paramilitaries and\/or narcotics traffickers across porous <br>  <br> borders into other countries. We will work with the countries of the <br>  <br> region to strengthen their capacity to cope with potential outflows. In <br>  <br> Peru and Bolivia, we will work with those governments to continue their <br>  <br> reductions in coca through a combination of eradication, interdiction, and <br>  <br> alternative development. In all countries, we will work to strengthen <br>  <br> democracy and local institutions in order to attack trafficking networks <br>  <br> which move precursors, money, fraudulent documents and people. <br><br> Since we believe Plan Colombia will result in major disruption of the <br>  <br> cocaine industry, ACI's regional approach becomes even more of an <br>  <br> imperative. Traffickers will undoubtedly try to relocate as their <br>  <br> operations in southern Colombia are disrupted. We believe they will first <br>  <br> try to migrate to other areas inside Colombia, then try to return to <br>  <br> traditional growing areas in Peru and Bolivia. But if those options are <br>  <br> forestalled, they may well seek to move more cultivation, processing <br>  <br> and\/or trafficking routes into other countries such as Ecuador, Brazil, or <br>  <br> Venezuela. <br><br> The nations of the region arc already heavily committed in all three of <br>  <br> the major areas of concern: democratization, economic development and <br>  <br> counternarcotics. All devote significant percentages of their annual <br>  <br> budgets to these areas, and are willing to work with us in the design and <br>  <br> integration of successful programs. Exact figures are impossible to come <br>  <br> by, but the nations of the region in total are committing billions of <br>  <br> dollars to economic development, democratization and counternarcotics <br>  <br> efforts. For example, Ecuador has established a Northern Border Initiative <br>  <br> to promote better security and development in the region bordering <br>  <br> Colombia. Brazil has launched Operation Cobra, a law enforcement effort <br>  <br> concentrated in the Dog's Head region bordering Colombia. Bolivia has been <br>  <br> attacking drug production through its Dignity Plan and is developing a <br>  <br> comprehensive poverty reduction strategy. Colombia continues to pursue its <br>  <br> commitments under Plan Colombia. <br><br> Panama has taken concrete steps to improve security and development in the <br>  <br> Darien region. The new Peruvian government has made reform of democratic <br>  <br> institutions a national priority, and continues to pursue aggressively the <br>  <br> counternarcotics missions. In Venezuela, local authorities have cooperated <br>  <br> admirably on drug interdiction, exemplified by last year's record <br>  <br> multi-ton seizure during Operation Orinoco. <br><br> Programs to provide humanitarian relief for displaced persons, to help <br>  <br> small farmers and low-level coca workers find legitimate alternatives to <br>  <br> the drug trade, and to strengthen governance, the rule of law, and human <br>  <br> rights will also be incorporated into the ACI. <br><br> [Part 2 of 2] Holistic?????? <br><br>  <br>  <br> [RERUN] STATUS OF EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES <br><br> \"Turning now to our equipment deliveries, I can say that they have <br>  <br> proceeded smoothly, generally adhering to the anticipated schedules. Some <br>  <br> have even been accelerated from their original estimates. As of June 22, <br>  <br> 2001, the status of UH-60, UH-1N, Huey-II and spray planes is as follows: <br><br> COLAR and CNP Black Hawks: A contract was signed with Sikorsky on December <br>  <br> 15th for fourteen Black Hawks for the Colombian Army (COLAR) and two <br>  <br> helicopters for the Colombian National Police (CNP). Specifications for <br>  <br> the aircraft configuration were based on SOUTHCOM recommendations with <br>  <br> input from respective Colombian organizations. Arrangements are being made <br>  <br> for next month's delivery of the two CNP aircraft and the first COLAR <br>  <br> aircraft. <br><br> Remaining deliveries will be made in increments through December of this <br>  <br> year. The contract includes one year of contractor logistics support <br>  <br> (CLS). We expect to extend this contract pending availability of FY 2002 <br>  <br> funding. <br><br> COLAR UH-1Ns: The UH-1Ns supplied to Colombia earlier continue to provide <br>  <br> air mobility support to the troops of the Counterdrug Brigade. <br><br> CNP Huey-IIs: INL and the CNP agreed to use the $20.6 million CNP Huey-II <br>  <br> and $5 million CNP aircraft upgrade budget lines from the Supplemental to <br>  <br> modify nine additional aircraft to desired specifications and retrofit <br>  <br> twenty-two of the earlier produced Huey-IIs to include additional options, <br>  <br> such as floor armor and passive infrared (IR) countermeasures. A delivery <br>  <br> order has been issued for four modifications to be accomplished by U.S. <br>  <br> Helicopter (completion expected approximately August\/September), and the <br>  <br> other five modifications will be done by CNP in-country with kits <br>  <br> furnished by INL. (Note: Twenty-Five Huey-II helicopters have been <br>  <br> delivered to the CNP from previous FY 1998 and FY 1999 funding). <br><br> COLAR Huey-IIs: SOUTHCOM presented their recommendations on the <br>  <br> configuration of the COLAR Huey-IIs on February 22nd. An interagency team <br>  <br> then selected a configuration that includes a passive IR engine exhaust <br>  <br> system, floor armor, M60D door guns, secure radios, and a radar altimeter, <br>  <br> along with other standard equipment. We estimate that twenty-five Huey-IIs <br>  <br> modified to this standard, along with individual crew equipment (NV Gs, <br>  <br> survival vests, helmets, etc.) and some spares will be possible within the <br>  <br> $60 million line item of the Supplemental Appropriation. We have <br>  <br> established a contract delivery order for the accomplishment of the <br>  <br> initial 20 modifications, with options for additional aircraft. Work is in <br>  <br> progress on these aircraft and we believe that aircraft deliveries to <br>  <br> Colombia can begin by approximately January 2002. <br><br> Additional OV-10D Spray Planes: Three aircraft are currently undergoing <br>  <br> refurbishment\/modification at Patrick Air Force Base and are expected to <br>  <br> be completed in August of this year. <br><br> Additional Ayres Turbo-Thrush Spray Planes: A contract is in place for <br>  <br> nine additional agricultural spray planes. The first aircraft should be <br>  <br> delivered in August, with the balance phased in through February 2002. <br><br>  <br>  <br> AERIAL SPRAYING <br>  <br> Plan Colombia-related aerial spray operations began on December 19, 2000 <br>  <br> in the southern department of Caqueta and moved into neighboring Putumayo <br>  <br> on December 22. Operations later shifted to the northern and eastern parts <br>  <br> of the country. <br><br> Some allege that the glyphosate used in the spray program results in <br>  <br> health side-effects to exposed populations. First, let me stress that <br>  <br> glyphosate is one of the least harmful herbicides available on the world <br>  <br> market.\" <br><br>  <br><br> Subj:    CLM: US officials outline Bush's Andean Regional Initiative  <br>  <br> Date:   7\/2\/01 6:20:03 AM Mountain Daylight Time <br>  <br> From:   xx738@p... (Colombian Labor Monitor) <br>  <br> Sender: owner-clm-news@p... <br>  <br> To: clm-news@p... <br><br> ________________________________________________________________ <br>  <br> COLOMBIAN LABOR MONITOR <br>  <br> www.prairienet.org\/clm <br><br> Monday, 2 July 2001 <br><br>     ***************** <br>  <br>     * U.S. CONGRESS * <br>  <br>     ***************** <br><br> PART II: <br><br> ATPA RENEWAL <br><br> Renewal of the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA) is perhaps the single <br>  <br> largest short-term contribution to economic growth and prosperity in the <br>  <br> Andes. By renewing the Act and expanding its benefits, we can continue to <br>  <br> provide economic alternatives to narcotics trafficking in Bolivia, Peru, <br>  <br> Ecuador and Colombia. The Act has already succeeded in doing so without <br>  <br> adverse economic impact for the U.S. The original justification for the <br>  <br> legislation still stands, but it expires at the end of the year, and <br>  <br> should clearly be renewed at the earliest possible date. ATPA renewal <br>  <br> would serve to strengthen the credibility of democratically-elected <br>  <br> governments in the region and provide them with a clear demonstration of <br>  <br> the benefits of continuing to cooperate on counternarcotics. It would also <br>  <br> halt a potentially crippling exodus of U.S. industries that relocated to <br>  <br> the region when ATPA was established. <br><br> I appreciate the opportunity you have given fine to speak to you today, <br>  <br> and I look forward to responding to questions which members of the <br>  <br> committee may have. <br><br> ________________________________________________________________ <br>  <br> **************************************************************** <br><br> * 3* <br><br> U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES <br><br> Thursday, 28 June 2001 <br><br>     *********** <br>  <br>     * HEARING * <br>  <br>     *********** <br><br>     Statement of Michael Deal <br>  <br>     Deputy Assistant Administrator <br>  <br>     Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean <br>  <br>     U.S. Agency for International Development <br><br>     Before the House International Relations Committee <br>  <br>     Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere <br><br> Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to be here to <br>  <br> speak about the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) role <br>  <br> in the Administration's proposed Andean Regional Initiative and progress <br>  <br> to date in implementing Plan Colombia. <br><br> USAID's program directly supports a comprehensive, integrated approach to <br>  <br> our Andean counter drug strategy by balancing the interdiction and <br>  <br> eradication efforts of other agencies with social and economic development <br>  <br> assistance. Our experience demonstrates that no single facet of our <br>  <br> counter-drug program can be successful without the other two also being <br>  <br> effectively applied. <br><br> The Andean Region faces a wide range of challenges. There are growing <br>  <br> doubts among significant numbers of the region's populations whether <br>  <br> democratic government can deliver essential services and a better life. <br>  <br> Sluggish economies produce political unrest that threatens democracy and, <br>  <br> in turn, weak democratic institutions; corruption and political <br>  <br> instability discourages investment, and contributes to slow economic <br>  <br> growth. This vicious cycle provides fertile ground for drug traffickers <br>  <br> and other illegal groups to flourish, and forces large segments of the <br>  <br> population to rely on crime, insurgency and the drug economy to survive. <br><br> The Andean Regional Initiative, like our support for Plan Colombia, <br>  <br> maintains a belief that the problems of drugs and violence in the Andean <br>  <br> region will not be solved in any sustained way unless the fundamental <br>  <br> causes of these problems are also addressed. Democratic institutions in <br>  <br> the region must become stronger, more responsive, more inclusive and more <br>  <br> transparent. <br><br> The presence of governments (both national and local) in rural areas must <br>  <br> increase and provide better services to the rural poor, and give them a <br>  <br> stake in the future, and improve the quality of life. The justice system <br>  <br> must be more accessible and efficient, must reduce impunity, and the human <br>  <br> rights environment must improve. Unless the problem of widespread <br>  <br> corruption is solved, and legal employment opportunities are created to <br>  <br> absorb the high number of unemployed, these fundamental causes and their <br>  <br> effects on the region and on America's national interests will be with us <br>  <br> for a long time to come. <br><br> Helping address these tough social and economic issues is going to take <br>  <br> time. They will require a sustained commitment and interest on the part of <br>  <br> the U.S. Government. The Andean Regional Initiative, which builds upon the <br>  <br> FY 2000 supplemental funding for Plan Colombia, proposes that USAID manage <br>  <br> $390 million in FY 2002 funds. This initiative expands many of our <br>  <br> existing programs in response to the changing circumstances in the region. <br>  <br> USAID assistance will be directed in three main areas: first, <br>  <br> strengthening democracy; second, economic growth through trade enhancement <br>  <br> and poverty reduction; and third, alternative development. <br><br>  <br>  <br> Strengthening Democracy <br><br> In order to strengthen democracy in the region, we propose to commit $59.3 <br>  <br> million in FY 2002. This assistance will help address the problems of <br>  <br> fledgling institutions, political instability and corruption which lessen <br>  <br> popular support for democracy at a time when most economies are <br>  <br> under-performing. <br><br> USAID will assist in improving the administration of justice by helping to <br>  <br> make justice systems work, make them more modern and efficient, more <br>  <br> transparent, and more accessible. An independent and vigorous judicial <br>  <br> system is vital to the observance of human rights, the defeat of narcotics <br>  <br> trafficking, and the decrease of white collar and street crime. Working <br>  <br> with the U.S. Department of Justice in Colombia, for example, we are <br>  <br> helping move from an inquisitorial to a more open, accusatorial judicial <br>  <br> process. We are strengthening court administration and training of judges, <br>  <br> institutionalizing the public defender system, and working with NGOs and <br>  <br> other interested groups to provide greater oversight and participation in <br>  <br> judicial reform. Part of that program provides access to justice for the <br>  <br> poor through one stop legal offices called \"Casas de Justicia\" (Houses of <br>  <br> Justice), in the poorer neighborhoods of major cities. We are doing this <br>  <br> now in Colombia and Peru with very good results. In Colombia, 18 \"Casas de <br>  <br> Justicia\" have been established thus far, each hearing 150 cases per day <br>  <br> and using alternative dispute resolution techniques to resolve problems. <br><br> We also have a program that is designed to help improve the observance of <br>  <br> human rights which will continue. We are strengthening human rights <br>  <br> institutions and groups, increasing their capacity to document human <br>  <br> rights abuses and monitor individual cases. In Colombia, our activities <br>  <br> are designed to help prevent killings with the development of an early <br>  <br> warning system that works with the human rights ombudsman and channels <br>  <br> information up the line to law enforcement and the military. We also have <br>  <br> programs directly aimed at the protection of human rights workers and <br>  <br> union leaders. <br><br> In Peru, we will continue to promote increased observance of human rights <br>  <br> through informal mechanisms for the resolution of disputes, with support <br>  <br> to legal clinics and conciliation centers, which provided assistance for <br>  <br> 145,000 cases in 2000. <br><br> We are and will continue to strengthen local governments in rural areas of <br>  <br> Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, and Panama where the lack of basic <br>  <br> institutional and social services has marginalized rural populations. <br><br> Where the state is present, it is in the form of an overly centralized, <br>  <br> unresponsive bureaucracy that does not necessarily work or understand the <br>  <br> local interests of a community. Thus, we are training mayors and council <br>  <br> members in identifying and monitoring projects, setting priorities, and <br>  <br> handling financial resources in a more accountable, transparent way. It is <br>  <br> a very important part of bringing democracy to rural areas. And it is an <br>  <br> indispensable part of any program where local empowerment and ownership of <br>  <br> national goals-such as the war against drug cultivation - will be <br>  <br> required to assure the continued enforcement of agreed upon eradication <br>  <br> agreements. <br><br> With USAID assistance and through policy dialogue, the decentralization <br>  <br> process in Bolivia helps targeted municipal governments to develop and <br>  <br> carry out action plans in a participatory fashion, engaging civil society <br>  <br> at the local and regional level in the process. As a result, citizen <br>  <br> participation in government has increased, and municipalities have <br>  <br> organized themselves into a nationwide Federation, with departmental <br>  <br> associations and an association of women council members. <br><br> Corruption is another very serious problem. The ongoing corruption scandal <br>  <br> from the Fujimori era in Peru has shaken public confidence in the <br>  <br> government institutions of the country. We will work closely with the <br>  <br> incoming administration to strengthen democratic institutions and promote <br>  <br> good government. Similar problems are being encountered throughout the <br>  <br> region, where we are working to strengthen the ability to expose corrupt <br>  <br> practices and investigate and prosecute corrupt officials and very <br>  <br> importantly, make citizens realize they have the right to demand <br>  <br> accountability from their governments. <br><br>  <br>  <br> Social and Economic Development <br><br> The second major area of emphasis for USAID assistance will be economic <br>  <br> growth, trade enhancement and poverty reduction, for which we propose $123 <br>  <br> million in FY 2002 funding. All of the economies in the region have <br>  <br> struggled over the last few years, and continue to be vulnerable to <br>  <br> setbacks. Each of the Andean countries has a large divide between a small <br>  <br> wealthy elite and a large impoverished class, frequently indigenous in <br>  <br> origin. Some lack the mix of policies necessary to promote growth. Others <br>  <br> have constructive policies, but lack the popular support necessary to <br>  <br> sustain them over the long run. <br><br> USAID assistance will directly support the poverty reduction strategies of <br>  <br> Ecuador and Bolivia, and will also address macroeconomic policy and <br>  <br> banking reform in Ecuador. After an intense economic crisis in 1999, <br>  <br> recent increases in oil prices have helped Ecuador's economy and <br>  <br> contributed to a successful dollarization that has restored confidence in <br>  <br> the economy. <br><br> However, important and necessary structural reforms are still pending, <br>  <br> particularly in the banking sector, for a sustainable recovery. In both <br>  <br> countries, our assistance will promote employment generation and access to <br>  <br> private lending capital through support to microenterprise. <br><br> Support for trade capacity development will be strengthened to help these <br>  <br> countries develop WTO consistent trade regimes. The Administration has <br>  <br> endorsed an extension of the Andean Trade Preference Act and a desire to <br>  <br> move aggressively toward creation of a Free Trade Area for the Americas by <br>  <br> January 2005. USAID Administrator Natsios has consulted with Trade <br>  <br> Representative Zoellick as to how we can advance these trade <br>  <br> liberalization measures. Early in June, my staff presented a range of <br>  <br> options for promoting free trade to our Andean country Mission Directors. <br>  <br> We look forward to helping our cooperating governments analyze their <br>  <br> existing trade regimes and prepare themselves for discussion of <br>  <br> competition policy and other issues. <br><br> We will also assist cooperating governments in bringing civil society into <br>  <br> the process to ensure, not only that there are economic and social <br>  <br> development benefits from globalization, but that there is also a broader <br>  <br> understanding of those benefits. <br><br> We will also continue health programs in Peru and Bolivia, and we will pay <br>  <br> specific attention to education, including an Andean regional Center for <br>  <br> Excellence for teacher training as announced by the President in Quebec at <br>  <br> the Summit of the Americas. <br><br> Protection of their natural resources, preserving their unique ecological <br>  <br> diversity, and helping rehabilitate environmental damage from the use of <br>  <br> harsh and persistent chemicals for producing illicit drugs will also <br>  <br> receive attention. Cultivation of illicit crops has a devastating effect <br>  <br> on the environment, both in the high mountains where poppy is grown and in <br>  <br> the lower altitudes where coca is produced. In both cases, delicate <br>  <br> forests are cleared and their fragile soils degraded by the illegal crop. <br>  <br> Even after the coca or poppy is eliminated, the land remains exposed and <br>  <br> environmentally sound production systems must be adopted for sustainable <br>  <br> conversion to pasture or agriculture. As part of our commitment to the <br>  <br> Amazon, we have encouraged the Government of Colombia's decision to <br>  <br> support sound livestock production systems within alternative development <br>  <br> areas. Our Parks in Peril program extends from Mexico through Colombia, <br>  <br> Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia providing practical assistance in protected <br>  <br> area management. Also, we continue to manage local funds created under the <br>  <br> America's Fund and the Tropical Forestry Conservation Act that underwrite <br>  <br> the programs of local environmental NGOs. <br><br>  <br>  <br> Alternative Development <br><br> Our third and largest area of attention is expanding our work in <br>  <br> alternative development for which we are proposing $207.5 million for FY <br>  <br> 2002. We know that alternative development works. After a decade of work <br>  <br> in Bolivia and in Peru, we have seen conclusively that a three-pronged <br>  <br> strategy of eradication, interdiction, and alternative development has <br>  <br> dramatically reduced coca cultivation in both of those countries. There is <br>  <br> nothing as economically profitable as coca. The incentive to get out of <br>  <br> coca on a voluntary basis is not economic. Rather, it is the threat of <br>  <br> involuntary eradication or interdiction because drug production is <br>  <br> illegal. There has to be a credible threat and a risk of continuing to <br>  <br> stay in coca in order for our alternative development approach to work. <br><br> In Colombia, we are seeing that the risk of illegal coca production is <br>  <br> credible, as evidenced by the fact that over 24,000 farmers have lined up <br>  <br> to sign coca crop eradication agreements in just the last two months. But <br>  <br> this is not the only ingredient. Once eradicated, production has to cease. <br><br> It cannot be allowed to grow back and farmers cannot move down the road to <br>  <br> replant the same crop. To make elimination sustainable, farmers have to <br>  <br> have credible alternatives and local governments and organizations have to <br>  <br> apply pressure and provide incentives for the entire community to stay out <br>  <br> of illicit production. <br><br> Our alternative development approach is basically the same in all of the <br>  <br> Andean countries. Groups of small farmers, communities, or farmer <br>  <br> associations sign agreements with the government, agreeing to voluntarily <br>  <br> reduce their coca crop in exchange for a package of benefits both at the <br>  <br> farmer level and at the community level. At the farmer level, the benefits <br>  <br> help get them involved in legal income-producing alternatives, and at the <br>  <br> community level, the Government agrees to provide basic infrastructure <br>  <br> such as schools, health clinics, public water systems, and rural roads. <br><br> Last year USAID set a target in Colombia for voluntary eradication of <br>  <br> 30,000 hectares of coca and 3,000 hectares of opium poppy within five <br>  <br> years. We have started in the Department of Putumayo, which presents a <br>  <br> particularly challenging situation. Compared to the coca areas in Peru and <br>  <br> Bolivia, the climate is harsher, the soils are poorer, the access to <br>  <br> markets is more difficult, the infrastructure is not as good, and of <br>  <br> course the security situation presents an additional complication for <br>  <br> legitimate agricultural activity. Despite these challenges, the turnout of <br>  <br> farmers who are voluntarily agreeing to sign these pacts and eradicate <br>  <br> coca has been quite promising. Our pre-Plan Colombia heroin poppy <br>  <br> eradication program has already eliminated 675 hectares of poppy and <br>  <br> produced 600 hectares of productive, licit crops benefiting 770 families <br>  <br> in the highlands of Tolima, Huila and Cauca. <br><br> In Peru, where coca production has dropped from a high of 129,000 hectares <br>  <br> to just over 38,000, we will concentrate our efforts in the Huallaga <br>  <br> valley. <br><br> Here we intend to put into practice our beliefs that local ownership of <br>  <br> the coca eradication goals and local empowerment to make decisions <br>  <br> regarding the economic and social life of the region will create the <br>  <br> environment to deter a minority from going into, or back into, coca <br>  <br> production. In coca producing valleys, more than 27,000 hectares of crops <br>  <br> such as coffee, cacao, palm heart and pineapple have generated around <br>  <br> 10,000 full time jobs. Niche industries and global link-ups with <br>  <br> international groups have been promoted in the chocolate and specialty <br>  <br> coffee areas. <br><br> In Bolivia, coca cultivation in the once notorious region of the Chapare <br>  <br> has all but been eliminated. Where once over 44,000 hectares of coca grew, <br>  <br> there are now over 114,000 hectares of licit crops and pastureland. Last <br>  <br> year alone the value of licit crops in this region exceeded $49 million. <br>  <br> Our agricultural programs have enabled Bolivian products such as bananas, <br>  <br> canned palm hearts and dried fruit to enter the highest quality markets, <br>  <br> such as Germany, Switzerland and Chile. Last year, Chapare exports <br>  <br> represented $5.7 million, an increase of 68 percent over the previous <br>  <br> year. We intend to consolidate these successes by providing agricultural <br>  <br> services used for coca growers to other farmers who have not yet benefited <br>  <br> from the program but who are susceptible to offers from drug networks. <br><br> In Ecuador, USAID will continue two key border initiatives begun with Plan <br>  <br> Colombia supplemental funding and expand the northern initiative along the <br>  <br> Colombian border. Support will be provided to community organizations <br>  <br> working on land-titling, social and infrastructure services, income <br>  <br> earning activities, integrated farming activities for indigenous <br>  <br> populations, irrigation, potable water and sanitation projects. <br>  <br> Recognizing that support for local initiatives and institutions can help <br>  <br> extend the presence of the state and its accountability to citizens, we <br>  <br> will introduce activities to strengthen the capacity of local governments <br>  <br> both on the southern border, as well as throughout the country. <br><br> Since beginning work in January, Plan Colombia has already begun <br>  <br> implementation of 23 projects valued at $5.0 million and benefiting <br>  <br> 117,000 people. They include potable water systems, sewers, bridges, <br>  <br> roads, land titling, income generation, and human rights. We have special <br>  <br> programs with indigenous communities in Carchi province and an innovative <br>  <br> approach to assisting the 24,000 Afro-Ecuadorans who live in northwestern <br>  <br> Esmereldas province. <br><br>  <br>  <br> Status of Plan Colombia Implementation <br><br> Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I would also like to take a <br>  <br> moment to review, specifically, some of our progress in Colombia. While <br>  <br> the task is complex, and even dangerous, and requires extraordinary <br>  <br> coordination among many actors, we are pleased with our start-up <br>  <br> activities and the progress we have made to date. <br><br> Because of our close collaboration with international organizations and <br>  <br> NGOs prior to receiving Plan Colombia funds, we were able to sign over $22 <br>  <br> million of our displaced person monies almost immediately upon receiving <br>  <br> the funds. By renegotiating certain contracts funded prior to Plan <br>  <br> Colombia, we were able to \"jump start\" the important southern Colombia <br>  <br> elements of the program. Because of the size of other aspects of the <br>  <br> program and the interest of the U.S. private sector, it took several <br>  <br> months to compete and sign our initial contracts. However, all of our <br>  <br> funds were obligated with the government by September of 2000, all <br>  <br> commitments to contractors and subcontractors for reintegrating and <br>  <br> resettling internally displaced persons have been made, and to date, all <br>  <br> contractors have mobilized in the field. These efforts have resulted in <br>  <br> tangible successes on the ground. <br><br> I have already mentioned our successes in heroin poppy eradication. In the <br>  <br> Plan Colombia phase of our program, I can report that, as of June 11th of <br>  <br> this year, 26 of the 31 coca elimination pacts have been signed. Those <br>  <br> pacts are pledges to the Colombian Government by small farm families to <br>  <br> eradicate coca in exchange for short and long-term assistance in <br>  <br> substitute production, and these 26 pacts represent promises to eradicate <br>  <br> over 29,000 hectares of illicit coca crops by the end of next year. <br><br> Supporting the program has been our local governance strengthening effort <br>  <br> in southern Colombia. Memos of Understanding have been signed between <br>  <br> USAID and the 13 municipal mayors of Putamayo. These memoranda outline the <br>  <br> specific activities that USAID will undertake in each municipality over <br>  <br> the next year. To date, social infrastructure fund activities have engaged <br>  <br> scores of small farmers in their villages in Southern Colombia, providing <br>  <br> many of them with the first tangible evidence of government concern <br>  <br> regarding their economic and social development. <br><br> In democracy strengthening, 6 of 12 planned pilot courtrooms have been <br>  <br> established to demonstrate the efficiency and fairness of oral trials in <br>  <br> helping to move Colombia from an inquisitorial to an accusatorial judicial <br>  <br> system. USAID has supported institutional development of the national <br>  <br> Judicial School, which has trained 3,400 judges in oral advocacy, legal <br>  <br> evidence gathering, and courtroom management procedures. USAID has also <br>  <br> worked with NGOs and other civil society actors to analyze remaining <br>  <br> needed reforms, increase coalition building and support full  <br>  <br> implementation of the modernization process in the justice sector. <br><br> In our highly successful effort to promote justice through alternative <br>  <br> dispute resolution, 18 of a targeted 40 casas de justicia or houses of <br>  <br> justice have been established. These \"casas\" are neighborhood judicial <br>  <br> centers in underserved communities which bring together a variety of <br>  <br> services in one location, giving residents \"one stop\" access to legal <br>  <br> services. <br><br> Protection of human rights workers remains a major concern. In addition to <br>  <br> having selected a long-term local contractor to help design and implement <br>  <br> a management information system for the Ministry of the Interior to <br>  <br> monitor abuses and progress, to date 197 individuals have received some <br>  <br> sort of protection from the program. We are pleased to say that 38 <br>  <br> individuals received needed relocation assistance within Colombia and two <br>  <br> were relocated internationally under the program. <br><br> We have also made grants to seven human rights NGOs in Colombia totaling <br>  <br> over $575,000 to help improve delivery of human rights services. <br><br> Concerning our efforts to respond to the needs of displaced persons, we <br>  <br> can report that over 176,000 individuals have received or are receiving <br>  <br> direct USAID assistance in the areas of housing, employment generation, <br>  <br> health-care or education. This figure exceeds by about 70 percent our <br>  <br> target of 100,000 individual recipients by this time-which was considered <br>  <br> to be very optimistic during our planning of this vitally important <br>  <br> activity. <br><br> USAID also supports a $2.5 million program for Ex-Combatant Children which <br>  <br> strengthens Colombian initiatives in clarifying the legal status of these <br>  <br> children, extend them appropriate treatment and provides concrete and <br>  <br> durable reintegration solutions. In preparation for a large-scale release <br>  <br> of child soldiers by an illegal armed group, USAID is preparing a network <br>  <br> of decentralized organizations to respond to such a release, as well as to <br>  <br> assist individual cases where children must be rehabilitated after <br>  <br> exposure to combat conditions. The Program aims to benefit directly 800 <br>  <br> ex-combatant children through January 2003. <br><br> It is important to underscore the enormous commitment that the Colombians <br>  <br> have shown in the various efforts we are supporting. Our efforts are <br>  <br> complemented by $62 million that the Colombian Government has contributed <br>  <br> this year through the sale of government \"peace bonds\" and an additional <br>  <br> \"peace tax\". Major roads within Putamayo and connecting southern Colombia <br>  <br> to national and international markets are already underway, as are smaller <br>  <br> social and infrastructure projects, such as the Casas de Justicia, health <br>  <br> clinics and schools. There have been problems at times given the need for <br>  <br> coordination with the large number of agencies involved, and the <br>  <br> Government of Colombia's complex procurement procedures, but these were <br>  <br> not unexpected and have not been serious obstacles. When issues have <br>  <br> surfaced, we have worked with the Colombians to improve the process. <br><br> I should note the special dedication of the people such as the Ombudsman's <br>  <br> office representatives in the field, who face serious risks to their own <br>  <br> personal safety as well. Their efforts are also supported by other members <br>  <br> of the international community. International donors other than the United <br>  <br> States have already pledged over $300 million to assist Colombia's effort, <br>  <br> and the Colombians with our support have been working hard to press other <br>  <br> donors to turn these pledges into real commitments and projects in the <br>  <br> field. <br><br> Let me conclude by saying that just as in Colombia, the Andean Regional <br>  <br> Initiative should be viewed as the national program in each of the <br>  <br> affected countries, responding to their priorities and problems. They are <br>  <br> the ones that are going to have to make this work. Our role is one of <br>  <br> facilitating the process, and we will be working along with them over the <br>  <br> next several years in this effort. <br><br> Thank you for giving me this opportunity to outline our programs, and I <br>  <br> would be pleased to respond to any of your questions. <br><br> ________________________________________________________________ <br>  <br> **************************************************************** <br>  <br> * CLM-NEWS is brought to you by the COLOMBIAN LABOR MONITOR at * <br>  <br> *                http:\/\/www.prairienet.org\/clm                 * <br>  <br> *              and the CHICAGO COLOMBIA COMMITTEE              * <br>  <br> *              Email us at clm@. prairienet.org or               * <br>  <br> *          Dennis Grammenos at dgrammen@. prairienet.org         * <br>  <br> **************************************************************** <br>  <br> *     To unsubscribe send request to listproc@. prairienet.org   * <br>  <br> *                     unsubscribe clm-news                     * <br>  <br> **************************************************************** <br><br>  <br>  <br> <\/p>\n","contact":"","link":"","address":"","phone":"","parent_id":0,"mime_type":"text\/plain","summary":"  excellent collection of raw material on Colombia.\r\nNote: modification of program \"Plan Colombia\" to now, \"Andean Regional Initiative\" (ARI)... apparently the corporations see the ability to franchise farther afield!","numcomment":0,"fileurl":"\/uploads\/2001\/07\/us_officia.txt","filesize":"60.0 kibibytes","article_url":"\/news\/2001\/07\/8420.php"},"attachments":[],"comments":[]}