{"article":{"id":5660,"heading":"CA's Energy Crisis:UK reporting!!","author":"RevereRides","created":"2001-03-13 08:11:39","modified":"2005-08-15 00:31:41","last_modified":"Mon, 15 Aug 2005 07:31:41","article":"<br>  <br> Sunday, February 4, 2001 <br><br> A HIGH PRICE TO PAY FOR THE POWER AND THE GLORY The Firms that are <br>  <br> pulling the plug on California learnt their trade from Maragaret <br>  <br> Thatcher <br><br> Inside Corporate America by Gregory Palast The Observer, London, Sunday <br>  <br> 4 February 2001 <br><br>  <br>  <br> President George W. Bush has announced that on 7 February, come hell or <br>  <br> high water, he will end Bill Clinton's order directing emergency <br>  <br> electricity supplies to California. As the lights on the Golden Gate <br>  <br> bridge blink off, the state's politicians are in full panic that this <br>  <br> spells bankruptcy for two giant regional electricity companies, Southern <br>  <br> California Edison and Pacific Gas &amp; Electric. Not me. I can't think of <br>  <br> anything which would more joyously combine historic justice and good <br>  <br> public policy than their corporate death. <br><br> To understand why, we need to identify the true villains of the <br>  <br> California electricity disaster: the British. <br><br> The story begins in August 1989 in Atlanta, Georgia, with poor Jake <br>  <br> Horton, senior vice-president for Gulf Power, a subsidiary of Southern <br>  <br> Company, an unremarkable regional electricity firm dying of a thousand <br>  <br> financial wounds. Since the turn of the century, American states have <br>  <br> kept tight lids on utility monopolies' profits. In the Eighties, <br>  <br> consumer groups demanded, rightly, that power companies, including <br>  <br> Southern, eat their losses on foolish nuclear investments. The <br>  <br> cash-short company had resorted to such unfortunate tactics as keeping <br>  <br> hidden sets of account books tracking non-existent light poles. <br><br> Horton, told he would be fired, was on the point of testifying to a <br>  <br> grand jury about improper payments he made to politicians on the com <br>  <br> pany's behalf. (The company later pleaded guilty to this felony.) He <br>  <br> demanded and received use of the corporate jet to confront Southern's <br>  <br> directors. Ten minutes after take-off, the jet blew up. Poor Jake. 'He <br>  <br> saw no other way out,' laments former Southern chairman A.W. 'Bill' <br>  <br> Dahlberg. But for Southern itself, Dahlberg, who took over at Southern <br>  <br> after Horton's death, conceived of an unorthodox way out of its <br>  <br> troubles. <br><br> The plan: the troubled local company would take over the entire planet's <br>  <br> electricity system and, at the same time, completely eliminate from the <br>  <br> face of the earth those utility regulations which had crushed his <br>  <br> company's fortunes. <br><br> California blackouts are just a hiccup on the road to the astonishing <br>  <br> success of this extraordinary programme. While America's papers are <br>  <br> filled with tales of the woes of the two California companies bleeding <br>  <br> from $12 billion in payments for electricity supplies, virtually nothing <br>  <br> is said of the companies receiving their blood. <br><br> The biggest sellers and traders in the new California and Western market <br>  <br> are Enron of Houston, Reliant of Houston and Southern. The success of <br>  <br> Southern's plan for world power conquest (or, if you prefer, 'vision for <br>  <br> globalisation of energy supplies') hinged on Britain. As Keynes noted, <br>  <br> the mad rants of men in authority have their origins in the jottings of <br>  <br> some forgotten professor of economics. <br><br> So in case you've forgotten, the professor in question here is Dr <br>  <br> Stephen Littlechild. In the Seventies, Littlechild cooked up a scheme to <br>  <br> replace British government ownership of utilities with something almost <br>  <br> every economist before him said simply violated all accepted theorems: a <br>  <br> free market in electricity. <br><br> The fact that a truly free market didn't exist and can't possibly work <br>  <br> did not stop Margaret Thatcher from adopting it. In 1990, Littlechild's <br>  <br> market, the England-Wales Power Pool, went into business. On paper, it <br>  <br> was an academic beauty to behold. In this auction house for <br>  <br> kilowatt-hours, private power-plant owners would ruthlessly bid against <br>  <br> each other to cut electricity prices for British consumers. <br><br> I can't say for certain whether the market scheme failed in minutes or <br>  <br> days, but the pool quickly became a playground for what the industry <br>  <br> calls 'gaming' - collusion, price gouging and all means of fleecing <br>  <br> captive electricity consumers. Ten years of hapless fixes by Littlechild <br>  <br> and his successor have failed to stem the tide of rip-offs at the heart <br>  <br> of this unfixable system. <br><br> At the same time, 'deregulated' regional electric companies expertly <br>  <br> vacuumed the pockets of captive customers. From their besieged Atlanta <br>  <br> headquarters, Southern's executives learned they could charge in England <br>  <br> double the price permitted in Georgia. The moment the Government <br>  <br> permitted it, Southern bought SWEB, the old South Western Electricity <br>  <br> Board. This was the first purchase ever by a US power company outside <br>  <br> the States. The cash rolled in and American operators soon grabbed the <br>  <br> majority of the British electricity sector. <br><br> Although Thatcher's private power market scheme was a poor idea that <br>  <br> proved worse in practice, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank <br>  <br> adopted it as a requirement of every single structural assistance <br>  <br> programme worldwide. The World Bank's former chief economist, Joe <br>  <br> Stiglitz, told me how IMF and Bank teams would fly into Russia and Asia, <br>  <br> preach the wonders of privatising electricity markets, 'and you could <br>  <br> see the wheels turning in the local officials' minds'. Here was a means <br>  <br> for their corruption 'rents' to multiply a thousand-fold. <br><br> Power systems were privatised from Brazil to Pakistan and the baksheesh <br>  <br> flowed. Or so say Pakistan's anti-corruption prosecutors although the <br>  <br> World Bank dismissed the allegations. US power buccaneers, led by <br>  <br> Southern and Texas companies Enron, Reliant and TXU, grabbed plants and <br>  <br> wires on every continent save Antarctica. But not in the US, not at <br>  <br> first. It stubbornly exempted itself from neoliberal 'reform', and this <br>  <br> rankled the new international players. So the industry's lobbyists <br>  <br> brought Thatcher's professors and their wheezing power market <br>  <br> contraptions to California. <br><br> In 1996, the state's legislature, inebriated by long draughts of utility <br>  <br> political donations (entirely legal), tossed out a regulatory system <br>  <br> which had provided reasonably cheap, clean, reliable energy to the <br>  <br> state. Despite the British disaster, the sun-addled legislators wrote <br>  <br> into the law itself the lobbyists' slick line that a 'deregulated' <br>  <br> market would cut consumer prices by 20 per cent. <br><br> My parents sent me their light bill from San Diego. Instead of 20 per <br>  <br> cent savings, last year their energy charges rose 379 per cent. But <br>  <br> before the bills hit, the new planetary power merchants, using a <br>  <br> combination of money muscle and America's penchant to follow California, <br>  <br> suckered 23 other states into adopting deregulation plans. SCE and PG&amp;E, <br>  <br> California's two big regional distributors, wrote a UK-style 'price <br>  <br> freeze' into the law which permitted them to stuff their accounts with <br>  <br> $20bn in extra revenues as oil prices fell. Now that the oil market has <br>  <br> reversed, the stacking, cramming and scheduling games the traders <br>  <br> learned in the UK have literally come home to roost. These two companies <br>  <br> are sinking under the $12bn in debt for the power from Southern and the <br>  <br> other deregulated sellers. <br><br> So I dressed for their bankruptcy burial in a dark suit and a big grin. <br>  <br> (Fifteen years ago, working with government, I had enormous fun pushing <br>  <br> a multi-billion dollar New Hampshire utility into bankruptcy. There, by <br>  <br> the way, the lights are still shining bright). Unfortunately, <br>  <br> California's governor, Gray Davis, pounded by the utilities' lobby <br>  <br> machine and bogus power outage scares, appears to be losing his courage. <br>  <br> He's now considering how the state can borrow money to bail out the <br>  <br> companies and bill it to consumers. And that reveals the real wisdom of <br>  <br> the deregulated marketplace: the brilliant method by which profits are <br>  <br> privatised and losses socialised. <br><br> gregory.palast@o... <br><br>   <br>  <br>  \n","contact":"","link":"","address":"","phone":"","parent_id":0,"mime_type":"text\/plain","summary":"Interesting look into the energy \"crisis\" from over the pond... may wash upon these shores any decade now...","numcomment":0,"fileurl":"\/uploads\/2001\/03\/ca\\_s_ener.txt","filesize":"7.7 kibibytes","article_url":"\/news\/2001\/03\/5660.php"},"attachments":[],"comments":[]}