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Was Huntington Right? Testing Cultural Legacies and the Civilization Border

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Abstract. This article draws upon a survey concluded in three countries – Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia – to test the "civilization border" between Central Europe and the Balkans that Samuel Huntington and others made famous. In 2000, the authors surveyed three second-wave EU applicant countries, two Balkan and one Central European, and concluded that no differences in democratic attitudes or their predictors were to be found. The most important legacy that still shapes today's political culture is the recent communist past. No evidence was discovered to support the effects of more remote cultural legacies. Political attitudes in former Habsburg and Catholic Slovakia are similar to former Ottoman and Orthodox Christian Romania and Bulgaria. Nostalgia for the "golden age" of communism, distrust in political governments and a preference for direct rather than representative democracy creates a populist syndrome present in all three countries. Multiple regression models are used to explain what makes East Europeans endorse democracy, regret communism or turn to populism.

Introduction

Few debates in international relations have been as acrimonious as those generated by Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations*. Since the first essay carrying this title was published, a battle of arguments raged for and against the Huntington paradigm. This debate spread well beyond the English-speaking world into even the most parochial languages in which the essay had been translated.[1] Both the rejection and the acceptance of Huntington's argument have been intense, and such intensity rose further in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the US.[2] The broad character of Huntington's "theory" – he summarizes thousands of years of history and complicated cultural arguments to reach simple conclusions – can explain this great publicity success.[3] Given such a treatment, any argument will be rough hewn, with raw edges; Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" is no exception.

Huntington has defended himself against numerous challenges by invoking Thomas Kuhn's argument that no paradigm can be required to fit all particular facts.[4] By looking at specific cases, however, some general ideas underpinning the

theory can and should be empirically tested, even if we agree with Huntington that there are always exceptions, even to the best of theories. Huntington's theory shocked us by its boldness and directness. These traits concealed, however, that Huntington's views embody preconceptions, some of which are centuries old and had been tested and discarded earlier.[5]

Our research draws upon previous attempts to test cultural determinism and its role in democratization and the emergence of a democratic political culture. Among recent efforts relevant for Eastern Europe are works of Ronald Inglehart,[6] Richard Rose and his collaborators,[7] Heywood, Miller and White.[8] Unlike these works, however, our study makes the test of cultural legacy theories in a post-communist environment its primary concern. If Huntington's argument is too general to be tested, his argument concerning Eastern Europe, with its explicit and implicit assumptions, is worth careful examination and this has yet to be undertaken. We are mainly concerned with the following Huntington paragraph from his original *Foreign Affairs* article, an application for Eastern Europe of his broader argument:

> The fault lines between civilizations are replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed. The Cold War began when the Iron Curtain divided Europe politically and ideologically. The Cold War ended with the end of the Iron Curtain. As the ideological division of Europe has disappeared, the cultural division of Europe between Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on the other, has reemerged. The most significant dividing line in Europe, as William Wallace has suggested, may well be the eastern boundary of Western Christianity in the year 1500. This line runs along what are now the boundaries between Finland and Russia and between the Baltic states and Russia, cuts through Belarus and Ukraine separating the more Catholic western Ukraine from Orthodox eastern Ukraine, swings westward separating Transylvania from the rest of Romania, and then goes through Yugoslavia almost exactly along the line now separating Croatia and Slovenia from the rest of Yugoslavia. In the Balkans this line, of course, coincides with the historic boundary between the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires. The peoples to the north and west of this line are Protestant or Catholic; they shared the common experiences of European history...; they are generally economically better off than the peoples to the east; and they may now look forward to increasing involvement in a common European economy and to the consolidation of democratic political systems. The peoples to the east and south of this line are Orthodox or Muslim; they historically belonged to the Ottoman or Tsarist empires and were only lightly touched by the shaping events in the rest of Europe; they are generally less advanced economically;

> they seem much less likely to develop stable democratic political systems. *The Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe.*[9]

This argument draws upon irrefutable history such as the division of Eastern Europe among foreign empires (notably Habsburg, Ottoman, and Russian) while Western Europe experienced centuries of normal and independent evolution. Yet the Huntingtonian view is also based on the omition of other "facts" – Orthodox Europe fought more with Islam than did Western Europe, and that wars between the two parts of Christianity were quite insignificant when compared to wars between Protestant and Catholic Western Europe.

Implications of Huntington's argument, however, go beyond history. The border Huntington sets for Europe excludes – on *cultural, not developmental* grounds – the Orthodox countries from European civilization. Such a division is not the border the European Union agreed upon when inviting new members at the 1999 Helsinki summit. To summarize Huntington's argument in a few testable propositions one can say that:

- *Culture gauged by religious identity is a stronger predicator of democratic development than ideology*. By culture, Huntington understands religion. His sense of culture cannot be equated with ethnicity since his East European border cuts through Slavic peoples. Neither can Huntington mean a common historical background, since the border he sets arbitrarily is one present at a single historical moment; *i.e*. the year 1500, and even then is made to fit the border of religions – ignoring many shared experiences across regions before or after this moment. By "ideology" he means the modern ideologies of the two Cold War camps, communism and liberalism.
- *Present political cultures of Eastern Europe vary consistently across the cultural border.* According to Huntington's logic, different evolutions in terms of democratic stability within Eastern Europe are therefore not due to objective historical problems such as poorly drawn borders in 1918, uneven development, communist legacy, or lengthy rule by communist elites in search of legitimacy. Rather, different political histories are *due to differences in democratic political cultures.* The cultural border means far more for political life than shared socioeconomic, geopolitical, or ideological factors.

Research Design and Hypotheses

We believe both these assertions can be tested. Empirical evidence, sometimes gathered for different purposes, already exists to contradict both of these Huntingtonian-derived hypotheses. To test Huntington's political culture argument, we compare political cultures of two Orthodox Balkans countries versus a Catholic Central European country at the national level – specifically, the role of cultural and ideological factors in determining individuals' democratic attitudes.

The Orthodox "Eastern civilization" is here represented by two cases, Romania and Bulgaria, while the "Western" culture (in Huntington's terms) is assessed

through the Slovak case. These countries were selected because of their relatively similar levels of development. The European Union invited them to join only in the second wave of enlargement, having all been judged as politically and economically unfit for the first wave. Further, they share a similar development pattern. For Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia, breaking the bonds of communist systems was more difficult than elsewhere in the region. They also share the distinction of having larger ethnic minorities than today's Hungary or Poland, and have similar patterns of late urban development and recent communist heavy industrialization.

In short, they combine an old tradition of rural underdeveloped societies with a recent tradition of high communist socioeconomic interventionism (the former causing the latter to a large extent). Their traditional political cultures can be qualified as "peasant" of the dependent or parochial type, and by no means autonomous and "urban" – a feature they share with the rest of Eastern Europe.[10] Nevertheless, they were considered more "rural" and "backward" even before the advent of communism. These broadly similar traits among cases are those that are needed for an effort to test the alleged cultural border that divides post-communist Europe and its effect on democratic culture. A similar systems design – a panel of countries with congruent historical constraints on development, both politically and economically – "controls" for such variance and enables one to look more directly at cultural effects on democratic norms and behaviors. Slovakia is, unlike the other two Orthodox countries, mostly Catholic and its pre-1914 past belongs with the Habsburg, not the Ottoman Empire.

In 2000, the year of our survey, the three countries' governments were quite similar in terms of ideology and background. They can be described as anti-communist center-right governments, leaning more towards Christian Democracy in Slovakia and Romania, and towards liberalism in Bulgaria. Since then, these governments lost office in Romania and Bulgaria, being defeated by former communists and populists. In Slovakia, the center-right gradually has lost popularity to the extremist former leader Vladimir Merciar. Such center-right governments, however, produced different results. The Slovak government has been spectacularly successful in catching up with the first wave of EU applicants, by closing most of the negotiation chapters with the EU in record time. This leaves only Romania and Bulgaria trailing among serious East European EU applicants. The last Regular Reports of the European Commission, however, show one essential difference among the three, qualifying Slovakia as a "functional market economy," and the other two as only "close" to becoming functional markets. All three remain, however, strikingly similar on a variety of other issues, most notably on administrative corruption and performance of the judiciary, seen as serious obstacles hindering accession in all three countries.

A quick glance at all of what was labeled as "Eastern Europe" during the Cold War, tends to support those who doubt the presence of a separate Central European identity.[11] Differences in economic performance are striking and obviously rooted in a legacy of development. Slovakia's GDP is higher than both Romania's and Bulgaria's, but the foreign direct investment per capita after a decade of transition places it at the bottom with the other two. Subjective indicators from the

Table 1. Selected Subjective and Objective Statistics from East and Central European Countries

Variable	CZ	HU	PL	SL	BU	RO	SK
GDP/capita adjusted by purchase power parity (PPP 1999)[a]	62	53	42	73	24	28	49
Foreign direct investment (FDI)/capita (thousands US$)[a]	1.68	2.05	1.04	1.35	0.464	0.268	0.389
Corruption perceived as increased when compared to communism	44	58	28	35	49	66	55
Trust in parties (%)	15	11	9	11	13	19	15
Trust in civil servants (%)	27	32	28	34	18	50	28
Trust in parliament (%)[b]	15	25	25	20	21	31	25

CZ = Czech Republic, HU = Hungary, PL = Poland, SL = Slovenia, BU = Bulgaria, RO = Romania, SK = Slovak Republic.
[a] *Business Central Europe 2001*, 8:83:57.
[b] Richard Rose and C. Haerpfer, *New Democracy Barometer VB. A 12-Nation Survey* (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 1998).

New Democracy Barometer (NDB hereafter) show high similar approval rates in all Eastern European countries (Table 1) of the current regime and democratic institutions.[12]

National public polls were conducted in Spring 2000 in each of the three countries. The questionnaire was unique, but carefully adjusted to each national language; the sampling techniques were identical. The sampling model was a two-stage random cluster sample. The sampling universe was the population of Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia aged 18 and over, and final samples included 1237 respondents for Romania, 1161 for Bulgaria and 1000 for Slovakia. Initially, three national samples were examined separately, after which a single, pooled sample was created using self-ascribed ethnicity as a dummy variable. The questionnaire measured core political values (freedom versus equality), two pairs of materialist-post-materialist values as in the World Values Survey (fight rising prices, maintain order, more say to people in politics, freedom of the press impersonal), religious and nationalist attitudes, trust (interpersonal, in public sector and international institutions) and evaluations of various government institutions' performance, ideology and party preference. We included a strong module of comparison between transition and communist times, ranging from memory ("best time this century for the country") to evaluation of leaders, and the economic and political situation. People chose from several undemocratic alternatives, from military rule to strong leadership by the President alone, also measuring their interest in politics, opinions regarding politicians, electoral system and the quality of governance. Selected results are in Table 2, juxtaposed with two common ratings of democracy.

Looking at the three case studies, we find both many similarities and quite a few inconsistencies. At first glance, Romania has the largest number of democrats, despite expectations derived from Huntington's paradigm, and the most people who endorse a military regime. The percent of the total population declaring that they are worse off now than during communist times, the percent who thinks that communist times were better economically, or that under communism were the best times of their country this century or that communism was a good idea incorrectly put into practice, are strikingly similar across the three countries and constitute impressive majorities. Even those who endorse political communism – that is, one party rule and repression of the opposition – are quite numerous, but inconsistent

Table 2. Basic Indicators of Democracy and Democratic Culture of Countries Surveyed

Indicator	Romania	Slovakia	Bulgaria
Freedom index[a]	3-Free	3-Free	5-Free
TI corruption index 1999[b]	3.3	3.7	3.3
Communism good idea badly put into practice[c]	64.3	56.8	71.1
Country better off if run by the military	13.3	8.7	3.4
Democracy best despite shortcomings	71.1	48.3	65.1
Democracy best, communism not good idea ("True Democrats")	24.8	21.3	21.5
Politics and human rights better before 1989	24.4	38.1	32.7
Economic life better before 1989	65.5	68.0	72.3
Freedom versus equality[d]	53.6/40.6	39.3/54.8	52.7/41.7
Worse off now than when compared to communist times[e]	60.6	73.0	70.5
Communism best time this century for the country	59	47	59

[a]Total Freedom House scores for civil liberties and civil rights. The lower the score, the greater the freedom. See: http://www.freedomhouse.org/216.119.117.183/research/survey2002.html.
[b]Transparency international index, scores ascend as corruption increases with 1 = least corrupt. See: http://www.transparency.org/anti-corruption/index.html.
[c]All figures for the nine rows below are percentages. See http://wvs.isr.umich.edu/wvs-ques3.html.
[d]Adjusted from the World Values Survey and phrased as "free to develop without hindrance" and "some people should not be much better off than others." See: http://wvs.isr.umich.edu/wvs-ques3.html.
[e]Public opinion data from our survey; throughout the table, figures show cumulative percentage of respondents who fully or to a large extent agreed with the statements.

with Huntington's theory, as the Slovaks (38 percent) seem more pro-communist than Romanians (24 percent) and Bulgarians (32 percent).

Even if results seem to point to anything else but Huntington's border, they could have been predicted by similar results from the NDB. For the purpose of a more in-depth analysis we therefore formulated two sets of hypotheses. The first looked at the national level and tested the "cultural legacy" hypothesis, focusing mainly on the role of religion in shaping democratic attitudes. The second looked at the individual level, testing especially the two more popular theories on the formation of support for post-communist democratic regimes: the socialization hypothesis, which assumes that people's attitudes come from their life time learning, not structural predispositions, either cultural or genetic; and the performance hypothesis (Rose et al formulated this as the "Churchill" hypothesis) which assumes that democracy will be judged by its performance in comparison to other regimes and rated accordingly. In more detail, our hypotheses could be outlined as follows:

At the National Level:

- (A.1) In line with the Huntington theory, the former Habsburg province of Slovakia, as a Catholic country, should display a democratic political culture to a larger extent than Orthodox Romania and Bulgaria. Determinants of the democratic political culture should differ from Slovakia to the other two countries, with religion playing an important role.
- (A.2) Alternatively, with similar levels of political and economical development and a common recent experience such as communism, these three countries should exhibit similar levels of democratic support and democratic orientation; different religious backgrounds should not matter.

At the Individual Level:

- (B) If the socialization hypothesis is correct, democratic attitudes should be positively associated with post-communist socialization via higher media consumption when the media is free. Conversely, democratic attitudes should be negatively associated with communist socialization measured by variables expressing endorsement of communist times and ideology as well as age; the older people are, the more years of communist-era socialization they lived through.
- (C) If the performance hypothesis is correct, democrats should be found among people who gained wealth from freedom, i.e. the rich, while anti-democrats should be concentrated among the poor and disadvantaged. Also, we should expect to find a positive correlation between democratic attitudes and the approval of the regime's performance as expressed in positive ratings for various state institutions.

To test these hypotheses we took a number of steps: First, the three samples were aggregated to create a pooled sample in order to have larger numbers of individuals belonging to different denominations. Since Romanians and Bulgarians are mostly Orthodox, and Slovaks are Catholic, the aggregation of three samples created a larger group of Protestants, who are otherwise a minority denomination in these countries. Likewise, Catholics from Romania and Bulgaria were combined with Slovak Catholics. Most of the Muslim group, however, remained based on the Bulgarian Muslim minority (see Table 4).

These denominations, however, sometimes superimpose ethnic cleavage and religious cleavage. Equating ethnicity with religion, as do many authors including Huntington – even concerning Serbs and Croats, who belong to the same ethnic group – can be quite misleading. Belonging to a denomination, in Huntington's terms, is to belong to a "civilization." Belonging to an ethnic group in these multinational countries, despite their large ethnic majorities, is belonging to a cultural context and a shared historical experience, regardless of religious background.

Thus, self-ascribed nationality is used here as a control together with religion. The alternative would have been to conflate religion and ethnicity in one variable, and to have "Catholic Slovaks," "Protestant Hungarians" and so forth. Besides the serious inconvenience of further reducing minority denominations, we did not aggregate religion and ethnicity because we wanted to avoid superimposing religious cleavage on a different variable, the status as minority groups of Hungarians, Muslim Turks and so forth. We doubted, and therefore planned to test, the influence of *religion* on democratic orientation, not the influence of *minority status*. It is very reasonable to assume that there may be a difference in the democratic orientation of majorities and minorities. Minorities suffered a more repressive treatment than the average population during the previous dictatorships, so they are the main beneficiaries of the new democratization processes. By using two controls, religion and nationality we tried to avoid this risk.

Second, we cross-tabulated the democratic orientation ("Democracy best despite shortcomings") with the endorsement of communism ("Communism good idea badly put into practice"), as it was clear that a high number of respondents had

Table 3. Democrats by Support for Communism

	Democracy is best despite shortcomings	
	Fully or strongly agree	**Fully or strongly disagree**
Communism is a good idea put badly into practice		
Fully or strongly agree	38.5 (1308)	19.6 (667)
Fully or strongly disagree	19.5 (664)	4.5 (154)

Note: Figures in parentheses are base *N*s for the adjacent percentage. The difference up to total $N = 3{,}398$ is made by respondents who refused to answer or answered "don't know."

agreed with both (see Table 3). In fact, the largest group "strongly agreed" with both.

The results provided us with three distinct groups: *true democrats*, who endorsed only the first, *ambivalent democrats*, who endorsed both, and *communists*, who endorsed communism, but not democracy. We then compared the *true democrats* in the three countries (see Tables 4 and 5). The figures are almost the same.

Third, to explain the strong sympathy for communism (revealed by the proportion who said "Communism is a good idea badly put into practice"), we regressed socialization, performance and anti-democratic attitudes. Support for communist policies of human rights and one-party system, labeled as "Authoritarianism," turned out to be a significant predictor in each of the three countries. Only real democrats seem to be the "true" ones – that is, respondents who simultaneously rejected "Communism good idea" while saying "Democracy is best." This group therefore became our main dependent variable as a proxy for the democratic orientation.

Fourth, a cross-tabulation of "true democrats" with nationality and religion, at the level of the pooled sample, and a test for association yielded results in Tables 4 and 5.

Fifth, we regressed religion on "true democrats," controlled for age, education, wealth and sex, and then with all the explanatory variables (socialization and performance variables). In each case, three national models and one common model were constructed on the basis of the aggregated pooled sample.

Table 4. Democratic Orientation by Religion

Religion	**% True democrat**	**% Ambivalent and Communist**
Orthodox	24.4 (318)	75.6 (986)
Catholic	19.8 (149)	80.2 (602)
Protestant	20.4 (30)	79.6 (117)
Muslim	16.5 (15)	83.5 (76)
Other religion	25.0 (21)	75.0 (63)
Non-believers	22.6 (231)	77.4 (790)
Total	22.5 (764)	77.5 (2634)

Note: Figures in parentheses are base *N*s for the adjacent percentage.
Total $N = 3{,}398$.
Pearson Chi-square = 8.280 and Pr = 0.142.

Table 5. Democratic Orientation by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	% True democrat	% Ambivalent and Communist
Romanian	24.9 (282)	75.1 (853)
Bulgarian	22.9 (230)	77.1 (776)
Turk	15.8 (15)	84.2 (80)
Hungarian	22 (36)	78 (128)
Slovak	21.1 (188)	78.9 (702)
Other nationality	12 (13)	88 (95)
Total	22.5 (764)	77.5 (2634)

Note: Figures in parentheses are base *N*s for the adjacent percentage.
Total $N = 3{,}398$.
Chi-square = 14.092 and Pr = 0.015.
When other nationalities are excluded, Chi-square = 7.006 and Pr = 0.136.

Culture Beats Ideology

Religion and ethnicity were not significantly associated with democratic orientation in any of the cross-tabulations. Religion did not predict democratic attitudes in any of the models, not even in the basic social structure models and even less so in models including socialization and performance factors (see Table 6). Neither religion nor ethnicity were predictors of democratic orientations even when tested separately. Some authors make the point that, in a large sample like this one, it is reasonable to keep highly collinear variables. However, since multicollinearity tends to lead to insignificant *t*-ratios and to bias the coefficients towards non-significance, we

Table 6. Determinants of the Democratic Orientation

Independent variable	Pooled sample	Romania	Bulgaria	Slovakia
Socioeconomic				
Income	.082** (.028)	.149** (.045)	.031* (.053)	.053 (.048)
Male	.059 (.056)	.015* (.089)	.107 (.102)	.084 (.101)
Education	.199** (.042)	.271** (.065)	.130 (.085)	.117 (.076)
Employed private sector	.076 (.066)	.184 + (.103)	.004 (.132)	.007 (.117)
Age	−.006** (.001)	−.006* (.002)	−.006* (.003)	−.008** (.003)
Media consumption	.123** (.033)	.037 (.058)	.181** (.057)	.152* (.065)
Political				
Communism best time this century	−.400** (.058)	−.360** (.091)	−.424** (.112)	−.406** (.106)
Left and center-left	−.356** (.088)	−.312* (.140)	−.543** (.173)	−.386* (.160)
Center	−.069 (.076)	.151 (.139)	−.052 (.146)	−.300* (.127)
Right and center-right	.388** (.079)	.418** (.128)	.608** (.141)	.074 (.152)
Economy better now than under communism	.650** (.067)	615** (.107)	.531** (.133)	.774** (.118)
Religion				
Orthodox	.079 (.118)			
Muslim	−.046 (.193)			
Other religion	.127 (.177)			
Ethnicity				
Hungarian	.072 (.136)			
Romanian	.047 (.117)			
Bulgarian	−.070 (.111)			
Other nationality	−.058 (.188)			
Constant	−1.303** (.137)	−1.381** (.215)	−1.153** (.257)	−.935** (.227)
Model chi-squared	543.34**	215.70**	210.16**	144.85**
% Reduction in error	.74	.72	.77	.73
Observations	3159	1158	1005	996

Note: Entries are Probit estimates (standard errors in parentheses).
Excluded categories for Religion are Catholic and Protestant and for Nationality is Slovak.
Significant predictor at $p < .10$,* at $p < .05$,** at $P < .01$.

decided to exclude "Turk" and to keep "Muslim" in the model. We did not think it necessary to exclude any other variable because their inclusion in the model is theoretically motivated and allows us to test hypotheses of interest. It is well known that misspecification and the omission of relevant variables leads to biased estimators. These findings confirm those of Rose et al[13] who also found religion to be an insignificant factor for democratic support in the New Democracy Barometer countries.

Why these results? Does not classical theory predict that religion matters in shaping political cultures? Max Weber discussed the role of religion in fostering individualism and a range of other attitudes closer to economic than political attitudes.[14] Weber made no assumption that some Christians are more democratic or less democratic than others. At the national level, Seymour Martin Lipset[15] counted democracies in the 1950s and found that only Protestant countries were solidly democratic (except for Germany) and Catholic countries were lagging behind. No Orthodox country was, at the time Lipset wrote, a democracy. But, he did not firmly attribute democratic stability to religion since as at least one other major variable, such as geopolitics, was involved as well (Eastern Europe was at the time under Soviet occupation).

More recently, when reviewing evidence on religion's role in shaping political culture, Ronald Inglehart concludes that almost no direct influence of the Church can be found today, and overall, most of Europe, both West and East, has undergone a major secularization process. Today, East European countries cluster in one group, together with China. This group includes Protestants, Catholics, Orthodox Christians as well as Confucians. Within this group, countries behave similarly, being high on survival values and the secular-rational authority axis. This is very much what one would expect in the aftermath of a political regime which promoted atheism as well as fostered poverty. As Inglehart concludes, "In most countries, these cultural differences reflect the entire historical experiences of given societies, and not the influence of respective churches today" as in today's Netherlands. "Moreover, the Catholics and Protestants within these societies do not show markedly different value systems: the Dutch Catholics today are as Calvinist as the members of the Dutch Reformed Church."[16]

Multinational studies on the scale of Inglehart's World Values Survey might miss some details. When looking at a smaller scale, however, findings endorse those of Inglehart. Our pooled sample reflects quite well the variety of religions in Eastern Europe, capturing both the dominant Orthodox and Catholic faiths as well as Protestant and Muslim minorities. There is no evidence, however, that an East European is more likely to be a democrat if he or she belongs to any of these religious groups, or to any ethnic group. Some ethnic groups fall on one side of Huntington's civilization border, some on the other, and some are divided by it. The largest ethnic group divided by the border are the Orthodox Romanians, for whom the Huntington paradigm again does not work: those on the "Western" side of the border, in Transylvania, voted significantly more with nationalist Vadim Tudor in the 2000 presidential elections as compared to Orthodox Romanians in the traditional Romanian regions of Wallachia and Moldavia.[17]

Table 7. Determinants of Residual Communism

Independent variables	Romania	Bulgaria	Slovakia
Income	−.086* (.038)	−.063 (.044)	−.052 (.039)
Male	.044 (.075)	−.186* (.085)	−.049 (.081)
Education	−.200** (.055)	.068 (.072)	.037 (.065)
Employed private sector	−.115 (.089)	.150 (.114)	−.080 (.094)
Age	.003 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.000 (.002)
Media consumption	.054 (.050)	−.071 (.046)	−.034 (.050)
Communism best time this century	.353** (.078)	.317** (.094)	.294** (.083)
Equality	.443** (.081)	.402** (.095)	.334** (.088)
Authoritarian	.348** (.090)	.244** (.097)	.420** (.089)
Model chi-squared	178.28**	96.64**	103.23**
Observations	902	713	818

Note: Entries are order Probit estimates (standard errors in parentheses).
*Significant at $p < .05$.
**Significant at $p < .01$.

This is not to say that historically the Church did not play an important role. The traditional argument, as synthesized by Schöpflin, focuses on the tension between secular and religious authorities. In such a view, Western Europe's pluralistic tradition is related to the past competition between the secular and religious authorities, while Eastern Europe's statism is linked to the State takeover of the Church in Byzantium.[18] This developmental argument does not imply, however, as does the "Clash of Civilizations," that belonging to some religion or ethnic group, or falling on one side of the "cultural line" dooms one to democracy or authoritarianism. Neither does a developmental model assume inevitable conflict between religions.

Both ethnicity and religion were included in our definition of "culture" due to their character as "givens." Our other hypotheses address factors that are more or less conjectural, and more or less transitory, encompassing an area that describes the influence of government. Whether a communist government with its strong emphasis on indoctrination, or transitional governments with their inherent clumsiness of newcomers to democracy and administration, we expect the type or form of government to be influential. Both models, of democratic orientation (Table 6) and of residual communism (Table 7), illustrate the dominant role of these conjectural factors over structural ones.

Below, we examine the role of these conjectural determinants of political attitudes beginning with the influence of socialization factors and then performance factors.

The Role of Socialization Factors

Age

As expected, if all other variables including ideological orientation are held constant, the number of years people were socialized matters significantly. Older people, who neither remember pre-communist traditions nor relate to them, are far more likely to be committed communists, collectivists and nostalgic about the golden times of communism. The more such older people identify themselves with the communist era that framed most of their life experience, the more they select some communist period as "best time this century" and disagree that democracy is the best system of government.

Preference for a "Golden Age"

People who declare any communist period as "the best times" are more likely to be communists and anti-democrats. The mechanism underlying such an association clearly ties in one's identification with central lifetime experiences. Someone who was ten in 1945 at the outset of communist regimes in Eastern Europe was 65 at the time of this survey. Most people knew nothing other than communism. When combined with the effects of low education and political repression, opportunities to learn about pre-communist Eastern Europe were severely restricted. Pre-communist years before World War II are popular among only the very educated of the elderly and the very young. For the rest of our respondents, to reject communism as the best time for the country implied departing from their own experience, and denying any meaning to their lives.

This identification mechanism is very strong, and it is a reliable predictor of democratic attitudes. We can predict with high accuracy whether somebody is a democrat or sympathetic to communism simply by asking what period in the twentieth century was best for the country. In that regard, communism is endorsed by majorities in all three countries surveyed. This does not mean that Romanians, Bulgarians and Slovaks want a communist regime to rule again, as Rose correctly observed. Yet, the communist past has not been (and cannot be) fully removed as a positive reference from citizens' subjective memories. Such nostalgia for communism surfaces with more vigor each time present hardship or inconvenience becomes significant.

Media Consumption

People more exposed to post-communist socialization, either due to their higher media consumption or other factors (in the Romanian sample, for instance, higher media consumption was not a predictor of democratic attitudes, but work in the private sector was), are more likely to be democrats and less likely to evince attachment or nostalgia for communism. Youth and media consumption, other things being equal, determine the endorsement of democracy. In the Bulgarian and Slovak samples, as well as in the pooled sample, higher consumption of political news in the media was a significant predictor for democratic orientation. People who are more interested in politics and are better informed about public life are more likely to be democrats, very much as classical political communication theory predicts.

Ideology

Further, only communist socialization can account for the strong relationship between "left" as respondents' self-assessed ideology and rejection of democracy as the best system of government. The most salient feature of all our models is the positive correlation between the rejection of democracy with the self-assessed ideological orientation to the left or center-left. In the models explaining "Communism is a good idea," this relationship is replaced by a positive correlation between endorsement of communism and preference for equality over liberty. People who endorse the "left" in the three countries surveyed have little to do with their counterparts in Western countries. *The post-communist left is strongly associated with a*

propensity for authoritarianism; as a legacy from communist ideology, not European social-democracy, such a left had from the outset no democratic orientation.

Communism still shapes the ideological landscape. Ten or more years after the change of regimes, being a democrat is still being an anti-communist and "democrats" assess themselves as "center-right" to distinguish themselves from non-democrats and communists who assess themselves as "Left." Being on the right or left means, however, only to position oneself towards the communist/anti-communist cleavage, and little else. Being on the center or rejecting the left-right dichotomy altogether, as did the relative majority of our sample, also increases the likelihood that one is not a democrat. In any event, ideology trumps culture.

Performance

Performance also matters. Most of the sample rates the current economic management of their countries as inferior to communist times. This surfaced as a predictor for democratic orientation. People who earn more, are more educated (the two being very correlated among themselves as well, as Eyal et al[19] have demonstrated) and do not believe that the communist economy was preferable are the democrats. Not surprisingly, they are in the minority. In these three hardly constrained societies, where the economical transition has yet to translate into higher living standards (despite experiencing recent economic breakthroughs), most people still think that they are economically worse off compared to the communist era.

Transitional Democrats and the Roots of Populism

Whatever makes someone a democrat – most likely a combination of socialization, performance and individual factors – models that might best explain democratic orientation will be similar in Romania, Bularia, and the Slovak Republic. The thesis that they may somehow belong to two different civilizations is belied by these survey data. The same can be said about the models explaining sympathy for communism. Cultural factors such as religion are insignificant explanatory tools. Citizens of the three countries similarly endorse communism as an ideal period for their country. The comparison between communism and the present works similarly across state boundaries to provide communism with retrospective legitimacy. Preference for a single party system surfaces as a predictor for endorsement of an ideal communism.

You could easily say that we are dealing with *one* country, or *one* culture – one that is stronger than the national cultures, or alleged civilizations. This one culture trumps all cultural legacies; it is the culture of post-communism, a specific combination of residual communism with the anomy and deep frustration caused by economic transition. Social structure variables behave similarly in the three countries' models, as do subjective factors.

Since, however, the true democrats do not make the majority yet, while formally these countries are democracies and would-be members of the European Union, what kind of political cultures are we dealing with? In other words, beyond this

quantitative paradox – a majority of formal democrats, a minority of true ones – in more qualitative terms, what kind of regime do these people want? And is this ideal different from Slovakia to the Eastern Balkan countries?

The resilience of communist attitudes and the large number of ambivalent democrats is not surprising. West Germany needed a few decades to reach a majority that supported democratic values,[20] and the communist regimes lasted considerably longer than Hitlerism. More than the global orientation of East Europeans – democratic or authoritarian – their endorsement of institutions of democracy is essential. Democracy is chiefly the institutions it comes with: if those lose popular support, the system itself may become endangered.

Our respondents showed substantial dissatisfaction with new democratic institutions, especially with the parliaments. Eastern Europeans strongly dislike political parties and parliaments (see Table 1). The NDB shows this as a common feature in all of Eastern Europe, explained in part by the controversial behavior of the new "political class." There is a whole syndrome, however, that we find as a common feature for our three new democracies after ten years of post-communism. People loathe proportional systems and party-lists voting, and long for majority ones and want the government to submit every important decision to a referendum. Further, they distrust political parties and would prefer to have technocratic, apolitical governments (see Table 8). Those who want to be consulted more, however, are often among those with low interest in politics and who seldom follow political news.

Looking for a term to explain this syndrome, the closest one is "populism." Although populism is used by different authors to explain different phenomena, there is some agreement on the basics of a "populist syndrome." First, there is a context of populism – a specific environment associated with the syndrome called the "development crisis" that consists of social and psychological disruption caused by aggressive modernization leading to an idealization of the pre-change period.[21] The association between the modernization crises of Eastern Europe in the early twentieth century and the major overhaul caused by the transition from command to market economy, with its rising unemployment, degradation of health systems and overnight social disparity, is not far-fetched. In both instances traditional ways had to be abandoned swiftly under a threat to survival, social norms changed radically overnight, and individual self-esteem received a major blow.

After the initial euphoria, citizens of transitional East European countries have experienced disillusion and frustration, which surfaced even in the most assisted transformations such as East Germany. Second, besides the context there are always

Table 8. Attitudes on Government and Governance

% Agree fully or to a large extent	Romania	Bulgaria	Slovakia
The most important government decisions should also seek popular approval via a referendum.	68.3	69.5	83.7
We should have a better electoral system in order to vote representatives directly and not party lists.	92.8	75.3	89.0
We should have experts running the country, instead of political governments.	81.2	56.8	88.8
Even between elections the government should read polls and only take measures that are popular with the majority of the people.	86.1	80.4	92.2

two essential features which surface in *any* populist movement. Shils defined these when discussing American populism as (1) identifying the will of the "people" with justice and morality, (2) the desirability of a "direct" relationship between people and leadership, unmediated by institutions.[22]

What feeds this drive for direct democracy and majority systems? It may be a reaction to misgovernment. Poor governance and low government accountability are indeed common in Eastern Europe.[23] One can argue that little political sophistication is needed for a citizen to perceive that he or she is the object of poor governance. Corruption ratings by *Transparency International* in the three countries surveyed (see Table 2) are among the highest in post-communist Europe. One need not be able to spell "government accountability" to feel its absence. One root of the syndrome we discuss, therefore, originates in the poor performance of governments, and this can be tested as a performance hypothesis.

But *why* is it that political parties and parliaments carry the blame, while governments and presidents fare comparatively better? Many people agree both that a government should not bother with parliament's approval if they have popular support, and that a directly elected president should have more power. Even citizens' strong preference for a government of experts may reflect their dislike of politicians more than an endorsement of competence. When constituencies in these three countries had an electoral choice, they more often than not chose populists. In Romania's 2000 presidential election, radical populist Corneliu Vadim Tudor and moderate populist Ion Iliescu were the candidates who advanced to a runoff (won by Iliescu), while technocratic candidates Mugur Isarescu and Theodor Stolojan were endorsed by less than 20 percent of the voters. In Bulgaria, the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) government and President Petr Stoyanov lost in 2001 to ex-King Simeon in legislative elections and to former communists in the presidential ballot. Despite its impressive performance in the contest to enter the EU, the Slovak Christian Democrat government has witnessed a constant rise in the popularity of their populist challenger, Vladimir Meciar.

The second powerful explanation for the anti-political syndrome captured in Table 8 is authoritarianism. People hate politics because they were brought up to do precisely that; they dislike politicians because an essential part of their socialization focused on persuading them that there is no process of politics, and that government is merely "scientific administration." Given the strong residual communism we found, we expect it to account, in part, for this discontent towards democratic institutions.

But, then, one should not overlook just how difficult the transitions of these countries have been. People experienced economic hardship and witnessed social disparities increase after being used to a relative social uniformity. Politicians may pay the bill for the frustration caused by the social costs of the transition.[24]

To discriminate among these possible causes we constructed a multivariate linear regression model to explain an index built as factor score from the strongly correlated variables "The most important government decisions should also seek popular approval via a referendum," "We should have a better electoral system in order to elect representatives directly, not on party lists," and "Government should

take only popular measures." We labeled this factor as "Populism" and we grouped independent variables under the following explanatory categories:

1. Affirmative answer to the question "Have you been mistreated by a civil servant after 1989?" and comparison of current leaders with communist leaders under "Government performance." In another variant we also used the preference for a technocratic government, "Country better off if run by experts."
2. The "paranoia" variable, consisting in the assessment "Minorities within this country are a threat to our national sovereignty and our borders"; the "Dependency" variable ("People like me can do little or nothing to influence political events"); agreement with the statement "Government should not waste time with Parliament approval but decide by itself when need presses"; and residual communism ("Communism good idea badly put into practice") under "Residual authoritarianism."
3. The variable "Frustration" ("Same people enjoy privileges now as under the communist regime") and "Subjective well-being" ("How do you fare now compared to communist times?") under "Frustration with transition." The former question was answered affirmatively by majorities in all three countries, despite their being run by center-right, avowedly *anti-communist governments* at the times of our survey.

As controls we used personal income, residence in the urban area, age, education, media consumption, and work in the private sector.

Models in Table 9 differ by only one powerful predictor, "Country better off run by experts." One can argue that this is a part of the syndrome rather than

Table 9. Determinants of Populism

Independent variables	Model 1	Model 2
Status		
Male	−.010 (.031)	−.007(.031)
Income	.007(.016)	.008 (.016)
Education	−.029 (.022)	−.024 .023
Age	−.001 (.001)	−.000 (.001)
Employed in private sector	−.091** (.037)	−.048 (.037)
Media consumption	.012 (.020)	.008 (.020)
Authoritarianism		
Golden age communism	–	−.014 (.034)
Minorities a threat	.117*** (.016)	.139*** (.167)
Dependency	−.013 (.017)	.005 (.017)
Bypass of parliament fine	.072*** (.022)	.105*** (.022)
Communism a good idea	.040** (.017)	.057*** (.017)
Government performance		
Country better off run by experts	.213*** (.020)	–
Bad experience with a civil servant	−.047 (.031)	−.022 (.032)
Leaders	−.163*** (.038)	−.178*** (.039)
Frustration with transition		
Same people enjoy privileges	.027 (.017)	.029* (.017)
Life now compared to communism	−.204*** (.062)	−.249*** (.063)
Intercept	−1.130*** (.132)	.657*** (.125)
Adjusted R square	0.17	0.11
Observations	3.398	3.398

Notes: Table entries are Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression estimates (standard errors in parentheses).
Level of significance: $^{***}p = .001$; $^{**}p = .01$, $^{*}p = .05$.

a cause of it, and that people state their preference for experts to then endorse populist leaders. Thus, we created two variants of the model. Model two (without experts) is the one we discuss in the following paragraphs as our final model of populism.

Conclusion

The final model shows that our hypotheses work as complementary rather than exclusive explanations. The "populist" syndrome is, indeed, caused by residual authoritarianism, which plays an important role. Considering minorities a threat, agreeing with the government bypassing parliament and approving communism retrospectively turn out to be predictors. Performance indicators are weaker, with the essential variable, negative experience with the administration, not a predictor. Negative assessment of current leaders *vis-à-vis* communist ones is correlated with populism. Since a majority believes that communist *nomenklatura* governed better than the transitional political class, such views seem inconsistent with the government's *objective* performance. Rather such opinion belongs with the other "nostalgia" variable, "Communism good idea." Frustration factors matter considerably. Discontent with one's life compared to communist times, and the perception that the "same people" have been successful before and after 1989, both feed populism. This retrospective envy for those faring better in communist times shows that communism was not so ideal after all, and the endorsement of communist leaders is only a symptom of frustration and authoritarian sentiments.

The mix of resulting predictors approximates the classical definition of populism as a frame of mind that follows abrupt societal transformation, defined by fear of and resistance to change, nostalgia for a golden period, and a sort of persecution syndrome. Minorities, people perceived as faring comparatively better, and politicians are blamed quite indiscriminately. Politicians are perceived as the new privileged, a super-status group associated with those who profited from the transition. The political oligarchy was always the mortal enemy of the populist minded.

Are "populists" anti-democrats? Again, data support classical theory in picturing them as a "third" variant. Populism is related to authoritarianism, but has justified claims against transition democracy. As its proponents endorse neither military governments nor any other "hard" anti-democratic government, populists cannot be considered anti-democrats altogether. Focus groups with these transitional democrats revealed their ideal of government to be one in which a president is directly elected and not a member of any political party, who would appoint "competent" and "honest" apolitical ministers, and who would then manage an economic system closer to a command economy than a market one. This shared ideal polity is hardly a liberal democratic one, but neither is it fully authoritarian: this is populism. Here lies the explanation of the long time success of populist leader Vladimir Meciar in Slovakia, of Ion Iliescu in Romania, of the newly created party of King Simeon in Bulgaria.

Regardless of cultural borders, difficult transitions in Eastern Europe work similarly in turning what are otherwise common political attitudes into a populist syndrome. The golden age is no longer, however, a traditional world of the early twentieth century. Rather, the golden age is the communist era – another "neo-traditionalist" breed of society, as Jowitt described it.[25] It is a sad irony that ideology is so much stronger than culture. But it is not an unexpected irony. After all, no other regime in world history went so far with social engineering and remaking history as did communism.

Huntington's fault line does not, however, lose any of its importance even if it cannot be traced at the level of political culture. Even imagined borders can, if we are dealing with widespread perceptions, turn into real borders;[26] Vaclav Havel's "wall in our heads" is of our own doing. The fault line between democrats and anti-democrats, between those who play by the rules of civilization and those who do not, cuts across cultures, and not between them, and it is considerably more complex than "civilizations clash" theory predicts.

Appendix – Description of Variables by Wording and Scale Used

Age – Respondent's age in years.

Authoritarian – Dummy variable indicating that respondent reported that politics and human rights were better before 1989 (coded 1).

Bad experience with a civil servant – Dichotomous variable (1 = had encountered, 2 = other).

Catholic, protestant, muslim, other religion, non-believer – Dummy variables indicating the respondent's religion or non-attendance of any religious service.

Center – Dummy variable indicating respondent's ideological self-assessment as "center".

Communism good idea – Agreement with the statement "Communism was a good idea which was badly put into practice" (1 = fully disagree, to 4 = fully agree).

Communism best time of this century – Dummy variable indicating that respondent reported that the country was better off in the (twentieth) century during the communist regime.

Country better off run by experts – Measured by agreement with the statement, "We should have experts running the country, instead of political governments" (1 = fully disagree, to 4 = fully agree).

Dependency – Measured by agreement with the statement, "People like me can do little to nothing to influence political events" (1 = fully disagree, to 4 = fully agree).

Economy better governed before 1989 – Respondents who agreed fully or to a large extent.

Education – 1 = primary, 2 = elementary and vocational, 3 = high-school, 4 = college and higher.

Employed in private sector – Dummy variable indicating that respondent is employed in the private sector.

Equality – Dummy variable indicating that respondent's choice was "equality" at the World Values survey question asking for a choice between freedom and equality.

Income – In which quartile of the income distribution the respondent falls.
Leaders – Comparison of patriotism, honesty, industriousness, competence and care for people of current leaders compared to communist leaders (from –1 = communist leaders better, to +1 = current leaders better, non-answers coded 0).
Left – Dummy variable indicating respondent's ideological self-assessment as "left" or "center left".
Life now compared to Communism – Response to question, "How do you fare now compared to communist times?" (from 1 = much worse now, to 5 = much better).
Male – Respondent's sex (1 = male).
Media consumption – A composite of two items: (1) "How often do you read political news in the newspapers?" and (2) "How often do you watch politics on TV?" (0 = not at all, 1 = monthly or more often, 2 = at least weekly, 3 = daily).
Minorities a threat – Agreement (from 1 = does not agree at all, to 4 = total agreement).
Orthodox – Dummy variable indicating that respondent's religion is Orthodox.
Paranoiac – Measured by agreement with the statement: "Some ethnic groups within the country are a threat to our national security and borders" (from 1 = fully disagree, to 5 = fully agree).
Populism – Index built as factor score from the statements: (1) "The most important government decisions should also seek popular approval via a referendum"; (2) "We should have a better electoral system in order to vote for representatives directly, and not party lists"; and (3) "Even between elections the government should read polls and only take measures that are popular with the majority of the people" (from 1 = does not agree at all, to 4 = total agreement).
Right – Dummy variable indicating respondent's ideological self-assessment as "right" or "center right".
Same people enjoy privileges – Agreement with the statement: "Same people as during communism enjoy privileges" (1 = does not agree at all, to 4 = total agreement).
Bypass of Parliament fine – Agreement with the statement: "Government should not waste time with Parliament approval but decide by itself when need presses" (1 = does not agree at all, to 4 = total agreement).
Subjective Corruption – Measured by the following item: "In your opinion, how wide-spread is corruption in the public sector" (1 = scarcely anyone of the officials is involved, 2 = few officials are involved, 3 = most officials are involved, 4 = almost all officials are involved).
True democrats – Agreement with the statement: "Despite some shortcomings, democracy is the best possible system of government"; and disagreement with the statement: "Communism was a good idea which was badly put into practice".

NOTES

1. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations? Asian Responses* (Karachi, New York:

Oxford University Press, 1997). Selected other replies to Huntington are Barry Buzan, "Civilisational *Realpolitik* as the New World Order?" *Survival*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (1997), pp. 180-183; Pierre Hassner, "Morally Objectionable, Politically Dangerous," *The National Interest*, No. 46 (Winter 1996-1997), pp. 63-69; and G. John Ikenberry et al, "The West: Precious, Not Unique," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 2 (1997), pp. 162-163.

2. Huntington himself was featured on CNN in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks denying that the events can be seen as a "proof" in favor of the "clash of civilizations."
3. Daniel Goldsworthy, "Huntington's 'The Clash of Civilizations': An Overview," *Asian Studies Review*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1994), pp. 3-9.
4. Samuel P. Huntington, "If Not Civilizations, What?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 5 (1993), pp. 186-197.
5. Maria Todorova dealt with preconceptions regarding the Balkans and Orthodoxy in general in *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). As to the general argument, its most famous origin is to be found in Oswald Spengler, *Des Untergang der Abendlandes* (Munchen: C.H.Beck'sche Verlagbuchhandlung, 1923).
6. Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Post-Modernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).
7. Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer, *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
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9. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3 (1993), pp. 30-31.
10. George Schopflin, "The Political Tradition of Eastern Europe," pp. 59-93 in Steven R. Graubard, ed., *Eastern Europe ... Central Europe ... Europe* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1978).
11. This argument was reviewed at length in Timothy Garton Ash, *The Uses of Adversity* (London: Vintage, 1990).
12. Richard Rose and C. Haerpfer, *New Democracy Barometer VB. A 12-Nation Survey* (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 1998).
13. *Ibid.*
14. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishers, 1998).
15. Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man, The Social Bases of Politics* (New York: Garden City, 1960).
16. Inglehart, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-102.
17. *Early Warning Report* 1/2000 (Bucharest, Romania: UNDP Office, 2000).
18. Schopflin, *op. cit.*
19. Gill Eyal, Ivan Szleényi, and Eleonor Townsley, *Making Capitalism without Capitalists: Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe* (London: Verso, 1998).
20. See David P. Conradt, "Changing German Political Culture," pp. 56-73 in Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1963).
21. See Ghiţă Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, eds., *Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics* (London: Weidenfied and Nicholson, 1969), pp. 166-186.
22. See Edward Shils, *The Torment of Secrecy: The Background and Consequences of American Security Policies* (London: Heinemann, 1956).
23. See "The Need for Strong Institutions and Good Governance," in *The Road to Stability and Prosperity in South Eastern Europe: A Regional Strategy Paper* (World Bank Europe and Central Asia, March 2000).
24. The social costs of transition and political repercussions were discussed in Daniel N. Nelson, "Civil Society Endangered," *Social Forces*, Vol. 63, No. 2 (1996), pp. 345-368.
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26. See, for example, Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1983).

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