This is a Document from the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, labled "Top Secret" entitled "COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE TONKIN GULF INCIDENT 4-5 AUGUST 1964" dated 26 Feburary 1965
From the Preface:
This paper presents an account of command and control aspects of the Tonkin Gulf incident of 4 and 5 August 1964. The paper is one of a series prepared in response to DJSM 1111-61 of 14 September 1961 and other JCS authorizations, in accordance with which WSEG has been conducting studies of command problems and procedures in a variety of recent critical situations. The overall purpose of these studies is to provide empirical data concerning the operations of the national military command system in actual crisis situations, in order to aid in the development of improved command and control arrangements and procedures.
The basic paper covers command decisions and actions during the incident; NMCC operations in connection with it and the communications support and information flow that were involved in its management. Summary observations on what are believed to be the chief command and control aspects of the incident are presented at the end of the basic paper, on pages 65-71.
The basic paper is followed bya series of supporting appendices which cover some of the material in greater detail, and which provide documentation of the points made in the basic paper. These appendices cover some of the important policy and planning actions which preceded the incident; the 2 and 4 August attacks on the U.S. destroyers, which precipitated it; message and telephone traffice relating to it; and an outline chronology of the main events.
The overall study is based upon an analysis of messages, logs, recoreded telephone traffic, and other documentary materials that were made available in the NMCC and J-3, and also to some extent in J-6, the Services, DIA, and ISA. In addition, about a dozen staff officers associated with the event were interviewed. The information available suffers from certain limitations, in that it does not reveal some of the details of the high echelon activity connected with the incident, and some of the more highly classified aspects of it. However, it is believed that enough information has been gathered to permit a reasonably accurate reconstruction of the crisis from the command and control standpoint.
for more information about the Gulf of Tonkin incident as well as False Flag operations in general please see the film, "Terrorstorm"
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=786048453686176230&q=terrorstorm