excellent collection of raw material on Colombia. Note: modification of program "Plan Colombia" to now, "Andean Regional Initiative" (ARI)... apparently the corporations see the ability to franchise farther afield!
Check out these excerpt, which one of our public servants is promoting:
JAMES MACK
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
"Some allege that the glyphosate used in the spray program results in health side-effects to exposed populations. First, let me stress that glyphosate is one of the least harmful herbicides available on the world market."
And this one.... a couple of notes... A.) the gov't may maintain a program, however, they don't institute it
B.) the reason coca, etc is grown is because the "neo-liberal" IMF/WTO strictures have eliminated tariffs, and subsidized US ( etc. ) produce has decimated the price local growers used to make a living on.... ( sort of like the destruction of the family farm in, where... why, the US!! )
Excerpt Two: ( attributed to same propagandist, note when seeing Sec'y of State, try and think, Sec'y of Real Estate.... and they want more tenants!! )
"Furthermore, the government of Colombia maintains a system to compensate farmers for damages caused by the program. Over the past few months, we have encouraged the Colombian government to streamline the process and efforts have begun to better educate the public about that option.
Recent field visits encountered evidence that coca growers in southern Colombia are using dangerous chemicals, such as paraquat. That is a concern to us as it presents a very real risk to the people of the region.
The traffickers' utter disregard for human health and environmental security that pervades the illegal drug industry goes beyond the obvious examples of poisoning millions of drug consumers with their illegal products. It includes the clear cutting of rain forest; the contamination of soil and watersheds with acids and chemical salts; and the exposure of their workers and themselves to potentially deadly chemicals all in the name of profit...."
( ed. sorry, about the length )
[This message is being sent in 2 parts]
Subj: CLM: US officials outline Bush's Andean Regional Initiative
Date: 7/2/01 6:20:03 AM Mountain Daylight Time
Sender: owner-clm-news@. prairienet.org
To: clm-news@. prairienet.org
________________________________________________________________
COLOMBIAN LABOR MONITOR
www.prairienet.org/clm
Monday, 2 July 2001
*****************
* U.S. CONGRESS *
*****************
1. AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE-Thursday, 28 June 2001
US State Dept officials outline Bush's Andean Regional Initiative
2. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES-Thursday, 28 June 2001
Statement of James Mack
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs
U.S. Department of State
3. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES-Thursday, 28 June 2001
Statement of Michael Deal
Deputy Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean
U.S. Agency for International Development
________________________________________________________________
****************************************************************
* 1 *
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE
Thursday, 28 June 2001
US State Dept officials outline
Bush's Andean Regional Initiative
---------------------------------
WASHINGTON - State Department officials on Thursday outlined President
George W. Bush's Andean Regional Initiative, a group of programs aimed at
addressing the challenges of democracy, drugs and development in the area.
The initiative is seen as an extension of Plan Colombia, a Colombian
proposal to address that country's complex war- and narcotics-related
problems, backed by the United States to the tune of one billion dollars.
"ARI balances the need to address the continuing challenges in Colombia
with the competing priority of working with the rest of the region to
prevent a further spreading of Colombia's problems," said Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, James Mack.
US funding for the plan was controversial as some lawmakers feared it
could drag the United States into Colombia's conflict with the guerrillas
believed by Washington to be profiting from the drug trade.
Nations bordering Colombia also said they feared the intensive
anti-narcotics push would result in rebel activity and refugees spilling
over into their nations, and demanded US aid to help them deal with that.
"Our support to Plan Colombia was the first step in responding to the
crisis undersay in Colombia," Mack told a House subcommittee hearing on
the ARI.
"The Andean Regional Initiative is the next stage of a long-term effort to
address the threat of narcotics and the underlying causes of the narcotics
industry and violence in Colombia while assisting Colombia's neighbors to
ward off those same dangers."
Bush has proposed 882 million dollars for ARI, 731 million dollars of
which would be earmarked for the anti-narcotics fight, and also includes
funding for developmental and economic support programs, and "a small
amount" of Foreign Military Funding.
ARI covers programs in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, Panama
and Brazil.
Speaking at the same hearing, Republican congressman Ben Gilman called for
the reinstatement of anti-narcotics shoot-down policy over Peru and
Colombia, suspended after Peru's air force downed a missionary plane,
killing a young mother and her infant child.
US surveillance flights had been used to detect and track suspected drug
flights for the Peruvian air force.
Copyright 2001 Agence France Presse
________________________________________________________________
****************************************************************
* 2*
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Friday, 28 June 2001
***********
* HEARING *
***********
HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
JAMES MACK
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I am pleased to be
here today to discuss with you the status of Plan Colombia and to describe
for you the Department of, State's programs envisioned under the
Administration's proposed Andean Regional Initiative, or ARI.
First, I'd like to provide you background on the origin of the President's
Initiative. In July 2000, Congress approved a .3 billion supplemental
appropriation to carry out enhanced counternarcotics activities in the
Andean region. Of that amount, approximately billion in Function 150
funding through the State Department was the U.S. contribution to what has
become known as Plan Colombia, a comprehensive, integrated, Colombian
action plan to address Colombia's complex and interrelated problems. The
initial two-year phase of Plan Colombia focused on the southern part of
the country.
It began with an intensive counternarcotics push into southern Colombia,
along with the expansion of programs aimed at social action and
institutional strengthening, and alternative development. Plan Colombia is
now well underway and showing good results. In addition to stemming the
flow of narcotics entering the U.S., our assistance is intended to support
institutional and judicial reform, as well as economic advancement, in one
of this hemisphere's oldest democracies.
Members of Congress, the NGO community, and other interested observers had
previously expressed concerns regarding aspects of U.S. government support
to Plan Colombia. Those concerns focused particularly on three areas: that
we did not consult widely enough in putting together our support package;
that we focused too much on security and law enforcement, and not enough
on development and institutional reform; and that our assistance was too
heavily oriented toward Colombia as compared to the rest of the region.
The Bush Administration has taken to heart those concerns in formulating
the President's proposed Andean Regional Initiative (ARI). ARI is the
product of extensive consultations with the staffs of committees and
Members of Congress, with the governments of the region, and with other
potential donor countries and international financial institutions. ARI
addresses the three issues that lie at the heart of the challenges facing
the region: democracy, development, and drugs. ARI balances the need to
address the continuing challenges in Colombia with the competing priority
of working with the rest of the region to prevent a further spreading of
Colombia's problems or backsliding in areas where progress already has
been made.
The President has proposed 2 million in Function 150 programs for the
ARI. 1 million of the 2 million in ARI is for the Department's
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)
funding of the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI). The ARI also includes
funding for relevant Economic Support Funds (ESF), Developmental
Assistance (DA), and Child Survival and Disease (CSD) programs, plus a
small amount of Foreign Military Financing (FMF). The ARI covers programs
in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, and those areas and
programs in Panama and Brazil most affected by the region's problems and
those where our assistance can best make a difference. In addition to
being balanced geographically, our budget will likewise be balanced
programmatically. About 50 percent of the ARI budget will be devoted to
programs focused on development and support for democratic institutions.
Integral to ARI as well are the economic development and job creation
afforded by expanded trade opportunities. The Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA) can help the entire region through increased investment
and job creation. More immediately, renewal and enhancement of the Andean
Trade Preferences Act (ATPA) can provide real alternatives to drug
production and trafficking for farmers and workers desperate for the means
to support their families.
Our support to Plan Colombia was the first step in responding to the
crisis underway in Colombia. The Andean Regional Initiative is the next
stage of along-tern effort to address the threat of narcotics and the
underlying causes of the narcotics industry and violence in Colombia,
while assisting Colombia's neighbors to ward off those same dangers in
their own countries.
Their success is vital to our own national interests in promoting the
spread of strong democratic institutions, the enhancement of trade and
investment opportunities for U.S. businesses and workers, and the
reduction of narcotics production and trafficking that threaten our
society.
My USAID colleague will describe in detail the status of our alternative
development projects. However, I want to point out that alternative
development is an integral part of our plan for weeding out illicit coca
and poppy cultivation in the Andes. We have had large alternative
development programs in Bolivia and Peru for many years, and they have
been quite successful, combining with aggressive eradication and
interdiction programs to produce significant declines in the coca crops of
those countries.
Colombia is trying to replicate that success in Plan Colombia, combining a
substantially expanded alternative development program with aerial
eradication and interdiction activities in southern Colombia, currently
the largest concentration of coca cultivation in the world.
I am pleased to report that the Department is moving quickly to implement
our support to Plan Colombia. Below, I will discuss delivery of
helicopters, aerial spray aircraft, and other equipment, which is
proceeding smoothly.
I will also describe our support for the Colombian government's aerial
spraying program.
I'd then like to discuss the proposal we have submitted in our FY 2002
budget request for INL's 1 million Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI),
as part of the larger 2 million ARI. This initiative addresses
holistically-providing assistance for social and economic development as
well as for counternarcotics and security efforts-the narcotics scourge
throughout the Andean region. We are hopeful that this macro-approach will
eliminate the "balloon effect" which we observe when programs are
developed country by country.
Finally, I will note our support for the ATPA.
STATUS OF SPENDING ON PLAN COLOMBIA
In less than one year, the Department has "committed" approximately 75
percent of the .018 billion two-year Plan Colombia Supplemental. By
"committed," we mean that we have contracted for equipment or services,
signed reimbursable agreements with other agencies or bureaus within the
Department, and contributed to the U.N. Taken together, these
"commitments" total more than 0 million of the Supplemental.
The Administration is finalizing the Congressionally-mandated bi-annual
report on the Supplemental.
STATUS OF EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES
Turning now to our equipment deliveries, I can say that they have
proceeded smoothly, generally adhering to the anticipated schedules. Some
have even been accelerated from their original estimates. As of June 22,
2001, the status of UH-60, UH-1N, Huey-II and spray planes is as follows:
COLAR and CNP Black Hawks: A contract was signed with Sikorsky on December
15th for fourteen Black Hawks for the Colombian Army (COLAR) and two
helicopters for the Colombian National Police (CNP). Specifications for
the aircraft configuration were based on SOUTHCOM recommendations with
input from respective Colombian organizations. Arrangements are being made
for next month's delivery of the two CNP aircraft and the first COLAR
aircraft.
Remaining deliveries will be made in increments through December of this
year. The contract includes one year of contractor logistics support
(CLS). We expect to extend this contract pending availability of FY 2002
funding.
COLAR UH-1Ns: The UH-1Ns supplied to Colombia earlier continue to provide
air mobility support to the troops of the Counterdrug Brigade.
CNP Huey-IIs: INL and the CNP agreed to use the .6 million CNP Huey-II
and million CNP aircraft upgrade budget lines from the Supplemental to
modify nine additional aircraft to desired specifications and retrofit
twenty-two of the earlier produced Huey-IIs to include additional options,
such as floor armor and passive infrared (IR) countermeasures. A delivery
order has been issued for four modifications to be accomplished by U.S.
Helicopter (completion expected approximately August/September), and the
other five modifications will be done by CNP in-country with kits
furnished by INL. (Note: Twenty-Five Huey-II helicopters have been
delivered to the CNP from previous FY 1998 and FY 1999 funding).
COLAR Huey-IIs: SOUTHCOM presented their recommendations on the
configuration of the COLAR Huey-IIs on February 22nd. An interagency team
then selected a configuration that includes a passive IR engine exhaust
system, floor armor, M60D door guns, secure radios, and a radar altimeter,
along with other standard equipment. We estimate that twenty-five Huey-IIs
modified to this standard, along with individual crew equipment (NV Gs,
survival vests, helmets, etc.) and some spares will be possible within the
million line item of the Supplemental Appropriation. We have
established a contract delivery order for the accomplishment of the
initial 20 modifications, with options for additional aircraft. Work is in
progress on these aircraft and we believe that aircraft deliveries to
Colombia can begin by approximately January 2002.
Additional OV-10D Spray Planes: Three aircraft are currently undergoing
refurbishment/modification at Patrick Air Force Base and are expected to
be completed in August of this year.
Additional Ayres Turbo-Thrush Spray Planes: A contract is in place for
nine additional agricultural spray planes. The first aircraft should be
delivered in August, with the balance phased in through February 2002.
AERIAL SPRAYING
Plan Colombia-related aerial spray operations began on December 19, 2000
in the southern department of Caqueta and moved into neighboring Putumayo
on December 22. Operations later shifted to the northern and eastern parts
of the country.
Some allege that the glyphosate used in the spray program results in
health side-effects to exposed populations. First, let me stress that
glyphosate is one of the least harmful herbicides available on the world
market.
Glyphosate has been the subject of an exhaustive body of scientific
literature which has shown that it is not a health risk to humans, and is
extremely environment-friendly. It is used throughout the United States
and over 100 other countries and has been rigorously tested for safety for
animals and humans. Nonetheless, we feel compelled to probe assertions
that it is making people sick. At the request of Congress, the U.S.
Embassy in Bogota, with assistance from our regional EPA representative in
Embassy Lima, is sponsoring two studies on the issue. The first dealt with
the individuals who reported reactions to the spraying. The final report
is not yet complete but the physicians who reviewed those cases found them
to be inconsistent with glyphosate exposure. In fact, many of the cases
were reported prior to any exposure from the spray program. The second
study is getting underway and will compare populations before and after
their areas are sprayed to see if any differences could be attributable to
spraying.
The Center for Disease Control is assisting in designing an appropriate
sampling methodology for this study
The timing of spray operations in Putumayo was based on a number of
factors.
Some were operational concerns, such as seasonal weather conditions. The
timing of operations was also meant to discourage the return of an
itinerant labor pool (coca leaf pickers or "raspachines") who generally
spend the December holidays at their homes in other parts of the country.
Importantly, the timing also corresponded with efforts to recruit
communities to enroll in development programs. While the intent of the
Colombian government to conduct eradication in southern Colombia was well
publicized, coca growing communities in the region initially showed little
interest in participating in development programs, preferring instead to
continue their illicit activity. Only after those initial spray efforts in
Putumayo, which demonstrated the government of Colombia's resolve to
address the growing problem of coca cultivation in the region, did these
communities express real interest in abandoning their illegal activities
in exchange for assistance. Funding was already in place for these
programs at the time spray operations began and, as each community signed
up for the program, the process began to tailor community-specific
assistance packages.
Many safeguards are built into the selection of spray targets and further
improvements are constantly being made to the system. And while the
Department of State does not select the spray locations, (those decisions
are made by the government of Colombia), the Department, through the
Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) of U.S. Embassy Bogota, does consult on
the selection and supports the Colombian National Police (CNP) efforts.
According to Colombian law, an Inter-Institutional Technical Committee
(ITC) of Colombian government officials determines what areas of the
country may or may not be sprayed. The CNP generates quarterly estimates
of the illicit coca crop by flying over coca growing regions on at least a
quarterly basis to search for new growth and to generate an estimate of
the illicit coca crop. This information is reviewed for accuracy by
technical/environmental auditors and is passed on to the ITC. The
Directorate of Dangerous Drugs (DNE) chairs the ITC, which includes
representatives from the Anti-Narcotics Police, Ministry of the
Environment, the National Institute of Health, the National Institute of
Agriculture, the National Plan for Alternative Development (PLANTE),
regional environmental agencies, and technical/environmental auditors. The
CNP notifies the NAS Aviation Office of all decisions as to which areas
may not be sprayed. Spray operations are then coordinated and conducted in
approved areas only.
Generally, reconnaissance flights are conducted over areas identified by
the CNP in their quarterly coca crop estimates. With the use of SATLOC, an
aircraft-mounted global positioning system, these flights identify the
precise geographical coordinates where coca is being grown. Areas with
large concentrations of coca are then plotted, and a computer program sets
up precise flight lines, calibrated for the width of the spray swath of
the spray plane to be used. Once the government of Colombia has approved
spraying in a given area, spray pilots then fly down those prescribed
flight lines and spray the coca located there.
Also, every effort is made to protect legitimate farming operations from
possible damage from the aerial spray program. The spray aircraft apply
glyphosate at low altitude against predetermined fields, identified by
earlier reconnaissance. The planes carry computerized GPS monitoring
equipment that records their position and the use of the spray equipment.
This system serves to verify that glyphosate is being accurately applied
to intended areas. After spraying, combined U.S.-Colombian teams also
visit randomly chosen fields, security permitting, to verify that the
treated plants were indeed coca. To further aid in the identification of
fields not subject to aerial eradication, the government of Colombia is
currently working to produce a comprehensive digitized map indicating
exempted areas.
Furthermore, the government of Colombia maintains a system to compensate
farmers for damages caused by the program. Over the past few months, we
have encouraged the Colombian government to streamline the process and
efforts have begun to better educate the public about that option.
Recent field visits encountered evidence that coca growers in southern
Colombia are using dangerous chemicals, such as paraquat. That is a
concern to us as it presents a very real risk to the people of the region.
The traffickers' utter disregard for human health and environmental
security that pervades the illegal drug industry goes beyond the obvious
examples of poisoning millions of drug consumers with their illegal
products. It includes the clear cutting of rain forest; the contamination
of soil and watersheds with acids and chemical salts; and the exposure of
their workers and themselves to potentially deadly chemicals all in the
name of profit
For example, the expansion of coca cultivation, production, and
trafficking in Peru, Bolivia and Colombia has resulted in the destruction
of, at an absolute minimum, 2.4 million hectares of the fragile tropical
forest in the Andean region over the last 20 years. In addition, the very
act of refining raw coca leaves into finished cocaine creates significant
environmental damage because of the irresponsible disposal of large
amounts of toxic chemicals used in the process. A study conducted by the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 1993 of cocaine production
in the Chapare region of Bolivia showed that production of one kilo of
cocaine base required the use of three liters of concentrated sulfuric
acid, ten kilos of lime, 60 to 80 liters of kerosene, 200 grams of
potassium permanganate, and one liter of concentrated ammonia. Processors
discard these poisonous waste products indiscriminately, often dumping
them into the nearest waterway, where the extent of damage is greatly
increased. They also may dump these chemicals on the ground, where as
point sources, they may infiltrate through the soil to groundwater. A
report from the National Agrarian University in Lima Peru estimated that
as much as 600 million liters of so-called precursor chemicals are used
annually in South America for cocaine production. This translates to more
than two metric tons of chemical waste generated for each hectare of coca
processed to produce cocaine.
These environmental concerns are another reason why we must continue in
our efforts to help the governments of the Andean region in their ongoing
struggle against the narcotics industry.
INL'S PROPOSED ANDEAN COUNTERDRUG INITIATIVE (ACI)
The Andean region represents a significant challenge and opportunity for
U.S. foreign policy in the next few years. Important U.S. national
interests are at stake. Democracy is under pressure in all of the
countries of the Andes. Economic development is slow and progress towards
liberalization is inconsistent. The Andes produces virtually all of the
world's cocaine, and an increasing amount of heroin; thus representing a
direct threat to our public health and national security. All of these
problems are inter-related. Sluggish economies produce political unrest
that threatens democracy and provides ready manpower for narcotics
traffickers and illegal armed groups. Weak democratic institutions,
corruption and political instability discourage investment, contribute to
slow economic growth and provide fertile ground for drug traffickers and
other outlaw groups to flourish. The drug trade has a corrupting influence
that undermines democratic institutions, fuels illegal armed groups and
distorts the economy, discouraging legitimate investment. None of the
region's problems can be addressed in isolation.
Of the 2 million Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) request, 1 million
is for INL's Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI). Our goals in the Andes
are to:
Promote and support democracy and democratic institutions-Foster
sustainable economic development and trade liberalization-Significantly
reduce the supply of illegal drugs to the U.S. at the source
Just as Plan Colombia represented an improved approach by considering drug
trafficking as part of Colombia's larger crisis, the Andean Counterdrug
Initiative benefits from its appreciation of the illegal drug industry as
part of something bigger. Drug trafficking is a problem that does not
respect national borders and that both feeds and feeds upon the other
social and economic difficulties with which the Andean region is
struggling.
No nation in the region is free of trafficking or the attendant ills of
other crime forms and corruption. To combat these ills, we propose a
regional versus Colombia-centric policy and a comprehensive and integrated
package that brings together democracy and development as well as drug
initiatives.
For this reason, we plan to allocate almost one-half of the requested 1
million for this initiative to countries other than Colombia. In so doing,
we intend to bolster the successful efforts and tremendous progress we
have made in counternarcotics in countries such as Peru and Bolivia, while
preventing the further expansion of the drug trafficking problem into
other countries of the region., such as Brazil, Panama, Venezuela and
Ecuador.
In addition to ensuring regional balance, the ACI also spans all three of
our stated goals counternarcotics, economic development, and support for
democratic institutions. The full ARI budget of 2 million breaks into
an approximately 50/50 split between counternarcotics and alternative
development/institution-building programs. Its ACI component (1
million) breaks into a 60140 (counternarcotics vs. development/democracy)
split.
3 million of the ACI budget will be devoted to programs focused on
alternative development and support for democratic institutions.
All of Colombia's neighbors are worried about the possibility of
"spillover," specifically that the pressure applied by the government of
Colombia (GOC) in southern Colombia will result in the flight of refugees,
guerrillas, paramilitaries and/or narcotics traffickers across porous
borders into other countries. We will work with the countries of the
region to strengthen their capacity to cope with potential outflows. In
Peru and Bolivia, we will work with those governments to continue their
reductions in coca through a combination of eradication, interdiction, and
alternative development. In all countries, we will work to strengthen
democracy and local institutions in order to attack trafficking networks
which move precursors, money, fraudulent documents and people.
Since we believe Plan Colombia will result in major disruption of the
cocaine industry, ACI's regional approach becomes even more of an
imperative. Traffickers will undoubtedly try to relocate as their
operations in southern Colombia are disrupted. We believe they will first
try to migrate to other areas inside Colombia, then try to return to
traditional growing areas in Peru and Bolivia. But if those options are
forestalled, they may well seek to move more cultivation, processing
and/or trafficking routes into other countries such as Ecuador, Brazil, or
Venezuela.
The nations of the region arc already heavily committed in all three of
the major areas of concern: democratization, economic development and
counternarcotics. All devote significant percentages of their annual
budgets to these areas, and are willing to work with us in the design and
integration of successful programs. Exact figures are impossible to come
by, but the nations of the region in total are committing billions of
dollars to economic development, democratization and counternarcotics
efforts. For example, Ecuador has established a Northern Border Initiative
to promote better security and development in the region bordering
Colombia. Brazil has launched Operation Cobra, a law enforcement effort
concentrated in the Dog's Head region bordering Colombia. Bolivia has been
attacking drug production through its Dignity Plan and is developing a
comprehensive poverty reduction strategy. Colombia continues to pursue its
commitments under Plan Colombia.
Panama has taken concrete steps to improve security and development in the
Darien region. The new Peruvian government has made reform of democratic
institutions a national priority, and continues to pursue aggressively the
counternarcotics missions. In Venezuela, local authorities have cooperated
admirably on drug interdiction, exemplified by last year's record
multi-ton seizure during Operation Orinoco.
Programs to provide humanitarian relief for displaced persons, to help
small farmers and low-level coca workers find legitimate alternatives to
the drug trade, and to strengthen governance, the rule of law, and human
rights will also be incorporated into the ACI.
[Part 2 of 2] Holistic??????
[RERUN] STATUS OF EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES
"Turning now to our equipment deliveries, I can say that they have
proceeded smoothly, generally adhering to the anticipated schedules. Some
have even been accelerated from their original estimates. As of June 22,
2001, the status of UH-60, UH-1N, Huey-II and spray planes is as follows:
COLAR and CNP Black Hawks: A contract was signed with Sikorsky on December
15th for fourteen Black Hawks for the Colombian Army (COLAR) and two
helicopters for the Colombian National Police (CNP). Specifications for
the aircraft configuration were based on SOUTHCOM recommendations with
input from respective Colombian organizations. Arrangements are being made
for next month's delivery of the two CNP aircraft and the first COLAR
aircraft.
Remaining deliveries will be made in increments through December of this
year. The contract includes one year of contractor logistics support
(CLS). We expect to extend this contract pending availability of FY 2002
funding.
COLAR UH-1Ns: The UH-1Ns supplied to Colombia earlier continue to provide
air mobility support to the troops of the Counterdrug Brigade.
CNP Huey-IIs: INL and the CNP agreed to use the .6 million CNP Huey-II
and million CNP aircraft upgrade budget lines from the Supplemental to
modify nine additional aircraft to desired specifications and retrofit
twenty-two of the earlier produced Huey-IIs to include additional options,
such as floor armor and passive infrared (IR) countermeasures. A delivery
order has been issued for four modifications to be accomplished by U.S.
Helicopter (completion expected approximately August/September), and the
other five modifications will be done by CNP in-country with kits
furnished by INL. (Note: Twenty-Five Huey-II helicopters have been
delivered to the CNP from previous FY 1998 and FY 1999 funding).
COLAR Huey-IIs: SOUTHCOM presented their recommendations on the
configuration of the COLAR Huey-IIs on February 22nd. An interagency team
then selected a configuration that includes a passive IR engine exhaust
system, floor armor, M60D door guns, secure radios, and a radar altimeter,
along with other standard equipment. We estimate that twenty-five Huey-IIs
modified to this standard, along with individual crew equipment (NV Gs,
survival vests, helmets, etc.) and some spares will be possible within the
million line item of the Supplemental Appropriation. We have
established a contract delivery order for the accomplishment of the
initial 20 modifications, with options for additional aircraft. Work is in
progress on these aircraft and we believe that aircraft deliveries to
Colombia can begin by approximately January 2002.
Additional OV-10D Spray Planes: Three aircraft are currently undergoing
refurbishment/modification at Patrick Air Force Base and are expected to
be completed in August of this year.
Additional Ayres Turbo-Thrush Spray Planes: A contract is in place for
nine additional agricultural spray planes. The first aircraft should be
delivered in August, with the balance phased in through February 2002.
AERIAL SPRAYING
Plan Colombia-related aerial spray operations began on December 19, 2000
in the southern department of Caqueta and moved into neighboring Putumayo
on December 22. Operations later shifted to the northern and eastern parts
of the country.
Some allege that the glyphosate used in the spray program results in
health side-effects to exposed populations. First, let me stress that
glyphosate is one of the least harmful herbicides available on the world
market."
Subj: CLM: US officials outline Bush's Andean Regional Initiative
Date: 7/2/01 6:20:03 AM Mountain Daylight Time
From: xx738@p... (Colombian Labor Monitor)
Sender: owner-clm-news@p...
To: clm-news@p...
________________________________________________________________
COLOMBIAN LABOR MONITOR
www.prairienet.org/clm
Monday, 2 July 2001
*****************
* U.S. CONGRESS *
*****************
PART II:
ATPA RENEWAL
Renewal of the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA) is perhaps the single
largest short-term contribution to economic growth and prosperity in the
Andes. By renewing the Act and expanding its benefits, we can continue to
provide economic alternatives to narcotics trafficking in Bolivia, Peru,
Ecuador and Colombia. The Act has already succeeded in doing so without
adverse economic impact for the U.S. The original justification for the
legislation still stands, but it expires at the end of the year, and
should clearly be renewed at the earliest possible date. ATPA renewal
would serve to strengthen the credibility of democratically-elected
governments in the region and provide them with a clear demonstration of
the benefits of continuing to cooperate on counternarcotics. It would also
halt a potentially crippling exodus of U.S. industries that relocated to
the region when ATPA was established.
I appreciate the opportunity you have given fine to speak to you today,
and I look forward to responding to questions which members of the
committee may have.
________________________________________________________________
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* 3*
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, 28 June 2001
***********
* HEARING *
***********
Statement of Michael Deal
Deputy Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean
U.S. Agency for International Development
Before the House International Relations Committee
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to be here to
speak about the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) role
in the Administration's proposed Andean Regional Initiative and progress
to date in implementing Plan Colombia.
USAID's program directly supports a comprehensive, integrated approach to
our Andean counter drug strategy by balancing the interdiction and
eradication efforts of other agencies with social and economic development
assistance. Our experience demonstrates that no single facet of our
counter-drug program can be successful without the other two also being
effectively applied.
The Andean Region faces a wide range of challenges. There are growing
doubts among significant numbers of the region's populations whether
democratic government can deliver essential services and a better life.
Sluggish economies produce political unrest that threatens democracy and,
in turn, weak democratic institutions; corruption and political
instability discourages investment, and contributes to slow economic
growth. This vicious cycle provides fertile ground for drug traffickers
and other illegal groups to flourish, and forces large segments of the
population to rely on crime, insurgency and the drug economy to survive.
The Andean Regional Initiative, like our support for Plan Colombia,
maintains a belief that the problems of drugs and violence in the Andean
region will not be solved in any sustained way unless the fundamental
causes of these problems are also addressed. Democratic institutions in
the region must become stronger, more responsive, more inclusive and more
transparent.
The presence of governments (both national and local) in rural areas must
increase and provide better services to the rural poor, and give them a
stake in the future, and improve the quality of life. The justice system
must be more accessible and efficient, must reduce impunity, and the human
rights environment must improve. Unless the problem of widespread
corruption is solved, and legal employment opportunities are created to
absorb the high number of unemployed, these fundamental causes and their
effects on the region and on America's national interests will be with us
for a long time to come.
Helping address these tough social and economic issues is going to take
time. They will require a sustained commitment and interest on the part of
the U.S. Government. The Andean Regional Initiative, which builds upon the
FY 2000 supplemental funding for Plan Colombia, proposes that USAID manage
0 million in FY 2002 funds. This initiative expands many of our
existing programs in response to the changing circumstances in the region.
USAID assistance will be directed in three main areas: first,
strengthening democracy; second, economic growth through trade enhancement
and poverty reduction; and third, alternative development.
Strengthening Democracy
In order to strengthen democracy in the region, we propose to commit .3
million in FY 2002. This assistance will help address the problems of
fledgling institutions, political instability and corruption which lessen
popular support for democracy at a time when most economies are
under-performing.
USAID will assist in improving the administration of justice by helping to
make justice systems work, make them more modern and efficient, more
transparent, and more accessible. An independent and vigorous judicial
system is vital to the observance of human rights, the defeat of narcotics
trafficking, and the decrease of white collar and street crime. Working
with the U.S. Department of Justice in Colombia, for example, we are
helping move from an inquisitorial to a more open, accusatorial judicial
process. We are strengthening court administration and training of judges,
institutionalizing the public defender system, and working with NGOs and
other interested groups to provide greater oversight and participation in
judicial reform. Part of that program provides access to justice for the
poor through one stop legal offices called "Casas de Justicia" (Houses of
Justice), in the poorer neighborhoods of major cities. We are doing this
now in Colombia and Peru with very good results. In Colombia, 18 "Casas de
Justicia" have been established thus far, each hearing 150 cases per day
and using alternative dispute resolution techniques to resolve problems.
We also have a program that is designed to help improve the observance of
human rights which will continue. We are strengthening human rights
institutions and groups, increasing their capacity to document human
rights abuses and monitor individual cases. In Colombia, our activities
are designed to help prevent killings with the development of an early
warning system that works with the human rights ombudsman and channels
information up the line to law enforcement and the military. We also have
programs directly aimed at the protection of human rights workers and
union leaders.
In Peru, we will continue to promote increased observance of human rights
through informal mechanisms for the resolution of disputes, with support
to legal clinics and conciliation centers, which provided assistance for
145,000 cases in 2000.
We are and will continue to strengthen local governments in rural areas of
Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, and Panama where the lack of basic
institutional and social services has marginalized rural populations.
Where the state is present, it is in the form of an overly centralized,
unresponsive bureaucracy that does not necessarily work or understand the
local interests of a community. Thus, we are training mayors and council
members in identifying and monitoring projects, setting priorities, and
handling financial resources in a more accountable, transparent way. It is
a very important part of bringing democracy to rural areas. And it is an
indispensable part of any program where local empowerment and ownership of
national goals-such as the war against drug cultivation - will be
required to assure the continued enforcement of agreed upon eradication
agreements.
With USAID assistance and through policy dialogue, the decentralization
process in Bolivia helps targeted municipal governments to develop and
carry out action plans in a participatory fashion, engaging civil society
at the local and regional level in the process. As a result, citizen
participation in government has increased, and municipalities have
organized themselves into a nationwide Federation, with departmental
associations and an association of women council members.
Corruption is another very serious problem. The ongoing corruption scandal
from the Fujimori era in Peru has shaken public confidence in the
government institutions of the country. We will work closely with the
incoming administration to strengthen democratic institutions and promote
good government. Similar problems are being encountered throughout the
region, where we are working to strengthen the ability to expose corrupt
practices and investigate and prosecute corrupt officials and very
importantly, make citizens realize they have the right to demand
accountability from their governments.
Social and Economic Development
The second major area of emphasis for USAID assistance will be economic
growth, trade enhancement and poverty reduction, for which we propose 3
million in FY 2002 funding. All of the economies in the region have
struggled over the last few years, and continue to be vulnerable to
setbacks. Each of the Andean countries has a large divide between a small
wealthy elite and a large impoverished class, frequently indigenous in
origin. Some lack the mix of policies necessary to promote growth. Others
have constructive policies, but lack the popular support necessary to
sustain them over the long run.
USAID assistance will directly support the poverty reduction strategies of
Ecuador and Bolivia, and will also address macroeconomic policy and
banking reform in Ecuador. After an intense economic crisis in 1999,
recent increases in oil prices have helped Ecuador's economy and
contributed to a successful dollarization that has restored confidence in
the economy.
However, important and necessary structural reforms are still pending,
particularly in the banking sector, for a sustainable recovery. In both
countries, our assistance will promote employment generation and access to
private lending capital through support to microenterprise.
Support for trade capacity development will be strengthened to help these
countries develop WTO consistent trade regimes. The Administration has
endorsed an extension of the Andean Trade Preference Act and a desire to
move aggressively toward creation of a Free Trade Area for the Americas by
January 2005. USAID Administrator Natsios has consulted with Trade
Representative Zoellick as to how we can advance these trade
liberalization measures. Early in June, my staff presented a range of
options for promoting free trade to our Andean country Mission Directors.
We look forward to helping our cooperating governments analyze their
existing trade regimes and prepare themselves for discussion of
competition policy and other issues.
We will also assist cooperating governments in bringing civil society into
the process to ensure, not only that there are economic and social
development benefits from globalization, but that there is also a broader
understanding of those benefits.
We will also continue health programs in Peru and Bolivia, and we will pay
specific attention to education, including an Andean regional Center for
Excellence for teacher training as announced by the President in Quebec at
the Summit of the Americas.
Protection of their natural resources, preserving their unique ecological
diversity, and helping rehabilitate environmental damage from the use of
harsh and persistent chemicals for producing illicit drugs will also
receive attention. Cultivation of illicit crops has a devastating effect
on the environment, both in the high mountains where poppy is grown and in
the lower altitudes where coca is produced. In both cases, delicate
forests are cleared and their fragile soils degraded by the illegal crop.
Even after the coca or poppy is eliminated, the land remains exposed and
environmentally sound production systems must be adopted for sustainable
conversion to pasture or agriculture. As part of our commitment to the
Amazon, we have encouraged the Government of Colombia's decision to
support sound livestock production systems within alternative development
areas. Our Parks in Peril program extends from Mexico through Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia providing practical assistance in protected
area management. Also, we continue to manage local funds created under the
America's Fund and the Tropical Forestry Conservation Act that underwrite
the programs of local environmental NGOs.
Alternative Development
Our third and largest area of attention is expanding our work in
alternative development for which we are proposing 7.5 million for FY
2002. We know that alternative development works. After a decade of work
in Bolivia and in Peru, we have seen conclusively that a three-pronged
strategy of eradication, interdiction, and alternative development has
dramatically reduced coca cultivation in both of those countries. There is
nothing as economically profitable as coca. The incentive to get out of
coca on a voluntary basis is not economic. Rather, it is the threat of
involuntary eradication or interdiction because drug production is
illegal. There has to be a credible threat and a risk of continuing to
stay in coca in order for our alternative development approach to work.
In Colombia, we are seeing that the risk of illegal coca production is
credible, as evidenced by the fact that over 24,000 farmers have lined up
to sign coca crop eradication agreements in just the last two months. But
this is not the only ingredient. Once eradicated, production has to cease.
It cannot be allowed to grow back and farmers cannot move down the road to
replant the same crop. To make elimination sustainable, farmers have to
have credible alternatives and local governments and organizations have to
apply pressure and provide incentives for the entire community to stay out
of illicit production.
Our alternative development approach is basically the same in all of the
Andean countries. Groups of small farmers, communities, or farmer
associations sign agreements with the government, agreeing to voluntarily
reduce their coca crop in exchange for a package of benefits both at the
farmer level and at the community level. At the farmer level, the benefits
help get them involved in legal income-producing alternatives, and at the
community level, the Government agrees to provide basic infrastructure
such as schools, health clinics, public water systems, and rural roads.
Last year USAID set a target in Colombia for voluntary eradication of
30,000 hectares of coca and 3,000 hectares of opium poppy within five
years. We have started in the Department of Putumayo, which presents a
particularly challenging situation. Compared to the coca areas in Peru and
Bolivia, the climate is harsher, the soils are poorer, the access to
markets is more difficult, the infrastructure is not as good, and of
course the security situation presents an additional complication for
legitimate agricultural activity. Despite these challenges, the turnout of
farmers who are voluntarily agreeing to sign these pacts and eradicate
coca has been quite promising. Our pre-Plan Colombia heroin poppy
eradication program has already eliminated 675 hectares of poppy and
produced 600 hectares of productive, licit crops benefiting 770 families
in the highlands of Tolima, Huila and Cauca.
In Peru, where coca production has dropped from a high of 129,000 hectares
to just over 38,000, we will concentrate our efforts in the Huallaga
valley.
Here we intend to put into practice our beliefs that local ownership of
the coca eradication goals and local empowerment to make decisions
regarding the economic and social life of the region will create the
environment to deter a minority from going into, or back into, coca
production. In coca producing valleys, more than 27,000 hectares of crops
such as coffee, cacao, palm heart and pineapple have generated around
10,000 full time jobs. Niche industries and global link-ups with
international groups have been promoted in the chocolate and specialty
coffee areas.
In Bolivia, coca cultivation in the once notorious region of the Chapare
has all but been eliminated. Where once over 44,000 hectares of coca grew,
there are now over 114,000 hectares of licit crops and pastureland. Last
year alone the value of licit crops in this region exceeded million.
Our agricultural programs have enabled Bolivian products such as bananas,
canned palm hearts and dried fruit to enter the highest quality markets,
such as Germany, Switzerland and Chile. Last year, Chapare exports
represented .7 million, an increase of 68 percent over the previous
year. We intend to consolidate these successes by providing agricultural
services used for coca growers to other farmers who have not yet benefited
from the program but who are susceptible to offers from drug networks.
In Ecuador, USAID will continue two key border initiatives begun with Plan
Colombia supplemental funding and expand the northern initiative along the
Colombian border. Support will be provided to community organizations
working on land-titling, social and infrastructure services, income
earning activities, integrated farming activities for indigenous
populations, irrigation, potable water and sanitation projects.
Recognizing that support for local initiatives and institutions can help
extend the presence of the state and its accountability to citizens, we
will introduce activities to strengthen the capacity of local governments
both on the southern border, as well as throughout the country.
Since beginning work in January, Plan Colombia has already begun
implementation of 23 projects valued at .0 million and benefiting
117,000 people. They include potable water systems, sewers, bridges,
roads, land titling, income generation, and human rights. We have special
programs with indigenous communities in Carchi province and an innovative
approach to assisting the 24,000 Afro-Ecuadorans who live in northwestern
Esmereldas province.
Status of Plan Colombia Implementation
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I would also like to take a
moment to review, specifically, some of our progress in Colombia. While
the task is complex, and even dangerous, and requires extraordinary
coordination among many actors, we are pleased with our start-up
activities and the progress we have made to date.
Because of our close collaboration with international organizations and
NGOs prior to receiving Plan Colombia funds, we were able to sign over
million of our displaced person monies almost immediately upon receiving
the funds. By renegotiating certain contracts funded prior to Plan
Colombia, we were able to "jump start" the important southern Colombia
elements of the program. Because of the size of other aspects of the
program and the interest of the U.S. private sector, it took several
months to compete and sign our initial contracts. However, all of our
funds were obligated with the government by September of 2000, all
commitments to contractors and subcontractors for reintegrating and
resettling internally displaced persons have been made, and to date, all
contractors have mobilized in the field. These efforts have resulted in
tangible successes on the ground.
I have already mentioned our successes in heroin poppy eradication. In the
Plan Colombia phase of our program, I can report that, as of June 11th of
this year, 26 of the 31 coca elimination pacts have been signed. Those
pacts are pledges to the Colombian Government by small farm families to
eradicate coca in exchange for short and long-term assistance in
substitute production, and these 26 pacts represent promises to eradicate
over 29,000 hectares of illicit coca crops by the end of next year.
Supporting the program has been our local governance strengthening effort
in southern Colombia. Memos of Understanding have been signed between
USAID and the 13 municipal mayors of Putamayo. These memoranda outline the
specific activities that USAID will undertake in each municipality over
the next year. To date, social infrastructure fund activities have engaged
scores of small farmers in their villages in Southern Colombia, providing
many of them with the first tangible evidence of government concern
regarding their economic and social development.
In democracy strengthening, 6 of 12 planned pilot courtrooms have been
established to demonstrate the efficiency and fairness of oral trials in
helping to move Colombia from an inquisitorial to an accusatorial judicial
system. USAID has supported institutional development of the national
Judicial School, which has trained 3,400 judges in oral advocacy, legal
evidence gathering, and courtroom management procedures. USAID has also
worked with NGOs and other civil society actors to analyze remaining
needed reforms, increase coalition building and support full
implementation of the modernization process in the justice sector.
In our highly successful effort to promote justice through alternative
dispute resolution, 18 of a targeted 40 casas de justicia or houses of
justice have been established. These "casas" are neighborhood judicial
centers in underserved communities which bring together a variety of
services in one location, giving residents "one stop" access to legal
services.
Protection of human rights workers remains a major concern. In addition to
having selected a long-term local contractor to help design and implement
a management information system for the Ministry of the Interior to
monitor abuses and progress, to date 197 individuals have received some
sort of protection from the program. We are pleased to say that 38
individuals received needed relocation assistance within Colombia and two
were relocated internationally under the program.
We have also made grants to seven human rights NGOs in Colombia totaling
over 5,000 to help improve delivery of human rights services.
Concerning our efforts to respond to the needs of displaced persons, we
can report that over 176,000 individuals have received or are receiving
direct USAID assistance in the areas of housing, employment generation,
health-care or education. This figure exceeds by about 70 percent our
target of 100,000 individual recipients by this time-which was considered
to be very optimistic during our planning of this vitally important
activity.
USAID also supports a .5 million program for Ex-Combatant Children which
strengthens Colombian initiatives in clarifying the legal status of these
children, extend them appropriate treatment and provides concrete and
durable reintegration solutions. In preparation for a large-scale release
of child soldiers by an illegal armed group, USAID is preparing a network
of decentralized organizations to respond to such a release, as well as to
assist individual cases where children must be rehabilitated after
exposure to combat conditions. The Program aims to benefit directly 800
ex-combatant children through January 2003.
It is important to underscore the enormous commitment that the Colombians
have shown in the various efforts we are supporting. Our efforts are
complemented by million that the Colombian Government has contributed
this year through the sale of government "peace bonds" and an additional
"peace tax". Major roads within Putamayo and connecting southern Colombia
to national and international markets are already underway, as are smaller
social and infrastructure projects, such as the Casas de Justicia, health
clinics and schools. There have been problems at times given the need for
coordination with the large number of agencies involved, and the
Government of Colombia's complex procurement procedures, but these were
not unexpected and have not been serious obstacles. When issues have
surfaced, we have worked with the Colombians to improve the process.
I should note the special dedication of the people such as the Ombudsman's
office representatives in the field, who face serious risks to their own
personal safety as well. Their efforts are also supported by other members
of the international community. International donors other than the United
States have already pledged over 0 million to assist Colombia's effort,
and the Colombians with our support have been working hard to press other
donors to turn these pledges into real commitments and projects in the
field.
Let me conclude by saying that just as in Colombia, the Andean Regional
Initiative should be viewed as the national program in each of the
affected countries, responding to their priorities and problems. They are
the ones that are going to have to make this work. Our role is one of
facilitating the process, and we will be working along with them over the
next several years in this effort.
Thank you for giving me this opportunity to outline our programs, and I
would be pleased to respond to any of your questions.
________________________________________________________________
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Original: US officials outline Bush's Andean Regional Initiative